USCA11 Case: 22-11521 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 02/15/2023 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11521
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
KAREN C. YEH HO,
Individual, Vested Beneficiary,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MERRILL LYNCH PIERCE FENNER & SMITH
INCORPORATED,
A Delaware corporation, Doing business in New York
corporation,
A foreign for profit corporation Sunbiz.org
(Document #813294),
USCA11 Case: 22-11521 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 02/15/2023 Page: 2 of 4
2 Opinion of the Court 22-11521
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-81852-AMC
____________________
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and BRANCH and ANDERSON,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Karen Yeh Ho appeals pro se the dismissal with prejudice of
her second amended complaint against Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1). We affirm.
Yeh Ho’s initial complaint alleged that Merrill Lynch owed
her inheritance money as a beneficiary of her late parents’ Merrill
Lynch accounts. It alleged that diversity jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, existed because the amount in controversy was more than
$640,000, she was a “citizen of the State of Florida,” and Merrill
Lynch was “incorporated under the laws of the State of ?????, and
has its principal place of business in the State of New York.” Merrill
Lynch moved to dismiss the complaint because it failed to allege
Merrill Lynch’s state of incorporation. The district court dismissed
the complaint without prejudice and granted leave to amend.
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22-11521 Opinion of the Court 3
Yeh Ho’s amended complaint alleged that diversity jurisdic-
tion existed because she had been “a full-time resident of Florida
since 1987” and Merrill Lynch was “established in Delaware since
11/10/1958” and was “[d]oing business in New York.” Merrill
Lynch again moved to dismiss the amended complaint, which al-
leged Yeh Ho’s residence, instead of her citizenship, and failed to
allege Merrill Lynch’s principal place of business and state of incor-
poration. The district court again dismissed without prejudice and
granted Yeh Ho a final opportunity to allege jurisdiction by includ-
ing “Yeh Ho’s citizenship” and “Merrill Lynch’s principal place of
business.” It warned Yeh Ho that a failure to cure the pleading de-
fects would result in a dismissal with prejudice.
Yeh Ho’s second amended complaint alleged that diversity
jurisdiction existed because she was a “citizen of Florida since 1987”
and Merrill Lynch was a “citizen of Delaware.” Merrill Lynch filed
a third motion to dismiss based on Yeh Ho’s failure to allege diver-
sity of citizenship. The district court granted the motion to dismiss
with prejudice because Yeh Ho failed to allege facts necessary to
establish subject matter jurisdiction. The district court ruled that
“without any allegations regarding Merrill Lynch’s principal place
of business, the [second amended complaint] fails to adequately es-
tablish subject matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1332” and
must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
We review a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
de novo. Travaglio v. American Exp. Co.,
735 F.3d 1266, 1268 (11th
Cir. 2013). “When a plaintiff files suit in federal court, she must
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11521
allege facts that, if true, show federal subject matter jurisdiction
over her case exists.”
Id. If the factual allegations of a complaint “do
not assure the court it has subject matter jurisdiction, then the
court is without power to do anything in the case.”
Id. at 1269. Fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction requires that all parties be completely di-
verse. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc.,
141 F.3d 1464, 1465 (11th
Cir. 1998). Natural persons are citizens of the state where they are
domiciled. McCormick v. Aderholt,
293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir.
2002). A corporation is a citizen of both its state of incorporation
and the state where it has its principal place of business.
28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c)(1); Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
559 U.S. 77, 88 (2010).
The district court did not err in dismissing Yeh Ho’s second
amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The sec-
ond amended complaint failed to establish diversity of citizenship
because it failed to allege Merrill Lynch’s principal place of busi-
ness. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Although Yeh Ho’s initial com-
plaint alleged that Merrill Lynch had “its principal place of business
in the State of New York,” Yeh Ho failed to include this allegation
in her second amended complaint even after the district court in-
structed her to do so. See Reynolds v. Behrman Cap. IV L.P.,
988
F.3d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 2021) (“An amended complaint super-
sedes and replaces the original complaint.”). The factual allegations
in Yeh Ho’s second amended complaint did “not assure the court
it ha[d] subject matter jurisdiction.” Travaglio,
735 F.3d at 1269.
We AFFIRM the dismissal of Yeh Ho’s second amended
complaint.
