USCA11 Case: 22-11197 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 02/07/2023 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11197
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ERIC GRIFFIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ANTHONY VENTRIERE,
ROBERT BELL,
Detectives,
SHERIFF ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11197
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-00737-WWB-LHP
____________________
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
We vacate and withdraw our previous opinion dated De-
cember 28, 2022,
2022 WL 1797224, (11th Cir. Dec. 28, 2022), and
substitute the following opinion.
Eric Griffin appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to Detectives Anthony Ventriere and Robert Bell (Detec-
tives), and Sheriff John Mina based on qualified immunity, in Grif-
fin’s 10-count malicious prosecution and false arrest suit. After
careful review of the record, we affirm.
I. Factual Background
Trevor Glover reported to the Orange County Sheriff’s Of-
fice that two men fired handguns at him as he walked towards his
apartment building on April 27, 2016. Ventriere responded to the
scene and corroborated Glover’s story. At the scene, Glover ad-
vised Officer Robert Fischer that “he has never met or saw either
of the men who attacked him, and they did not say anything or
attempt to take any of his possessions.” Glover expressed his belief
that the two men were friends of Gino Nicholas, his girlfriend’s
brother, who had been shot and killed, and that Nicholas’s friends
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22-11197 Opinion of the Court 3
thought Glover was friendly with Nicholas’s shooter. Glover de-
scribed the perpetrators as two black men, one under six feet tall
and the other six feet and two inches tall.
Several hours after the initial interviews, Glover notified
Ventriere that he remembered more information and could iden-
tify the two suspects. Glover then identified Appellant Griffin as
the suspect who shot at him at close range. It is undisputed that
Griffin is six feet and nine inches tall. Thereafter, Glover identified
Griffin in a photograph lineup, stating he was “absolutely sure”
Griffin was the individual who shot at him. Glover also informed
Ventriere of a text message Griffin sent to Glover’s girlfriend on
April 25, 2016, in which Griffin indicated that Glover refused to
look him in the eye at the night club the previous day.
The arrest affidavit that led to Griffin’s arrest warrant did not
include Glover’s initial statement verbatim, nor the height discrep-
ancy, but did state, at first “Mr. Glover was unable to provide any
further information at that time.” The affidavit stated that Glover
was able to remember the shooters after the adrenaline and pain
wore off. It also included that Glover had selected Griffin from a
photograph lineup, the text messages Griffin sent to Glover’s girl-
friend, and an eyewitness account that the shooters fled in a Dodge
Charger. A Florida judge signed an arrest warrant and Griffin was
subsequently arrested by a warrant unit.
During his post arrest interview, Griffin admitted that he
had rented a Dodge Charger and did not know if he returned it
before or after the shooting occurred. Ventriere confirmed the
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11197
following week, based on information he was unable to obtain the
night he interviewed Griffin, that the car was returned before the
shooting. After FLDE testing of the weapon Griffin had on his per-
son at the time of arrest, it was confirmed it was not the same gun
used in the shooting. Griffin gave an alibi that surveillance video
would show he was at his parents’ house at the time the shooting
occurred, but Ventriere could not remember what he did with the
information Griffin gave him about his parents’ surveillance cam-
era. Ventriere completed the investigation after he received search
warrants for Griffin’s phone days later. Griffin was later released.
Griffin filed a ten-count complaint against Ventriere, Bell,
and Sheriff Mina. 1 Counts I and II are claims against Ventriere and
Bell for false arrest under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts III and IV are
claims against Ventriere and Bell for malicious prosecution under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts V, through VIII are Florida law claims
against Ventriere, Bell, and Mina for false arrest. Counts IX and X
are Florida law claims against Ventriere and Bell for malicious pros-
ecution.
The district court granted summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds, concluding that Griffin was arrested pursuant
to a valid arrest warrant and therefore cannot assert false arrest,
finding that probable cause or arguable probable cause would have
1 Sheriff Mina was sued in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Orange County
for the actions for Ventriere and Bell.
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22-11197 Opinion of the Court 5
existed even if the omissions were included in the affidavit. Griffin
timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
We “review[] de novo a district court’s disposition of a sum-
mary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, applying the
same legal standards as the district court.” Durruthy v. Pastor,
351
F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir. 2003). All issues of material fact are re-
solved in favor of the plaintiff, and then, under that version of the
facts, the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled to
qualified immunity is determined.
Id.
To receive qualified immunity, a public official must prove
that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority
when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Lee v. Ferraro,
284
F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). We must determine “whether the
act complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within,
or reasonably related to, the outer perimeter of an official’s discre-
tionary duties.” Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic,
458 F.3d 1295,
1303 (11th Cir. 2006). If the official was acting within his discre-
tionary duties with respect to the claims raised in the complaint,
the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to prove “(1) the defendant[s] vio-
lated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established
at the time of the alleged violation.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman
v. Harland,
370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004).
III. Discussion
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Griffin argues on appeal that summary judgment was im-
proper here for two overarching reasons. First, he argues genuine
issues of material fact exist in two instances: (1) as to whether a
judge would have signed a warrant if the omitted information was
included, and (2) as to the timing of Griffin’s arrest. Second, he
argues that qualified immunity cannot attach because the defend-
ants withheld exonerating evidence from the arrest warrant and
failed to investigate such evidence. We consider each issue in turn.
Griffin first contends that a jury should decide whether the
omissions from the arrest affidavit would cause a judge not to sign
the warrant. He is mistaken. The standard for determining the
existence of probable cause is the same under both Florida and fed-
eral law. Rankin v. Evans,
133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998).
The Florida Supreme Court has held that when analyzing alleged
omissions from probable cause affidavits, “(1) the reviewing court
must determine whether the omitted material, if added to the affi-
davit, would have defeated probable cause, and (2) the reviewing
court must find that the omission resulted from intentional or reck-
less police conduct that amounts to deception.” Johnson v. State,
660 So.2d 648, 656 (Fla. 1995) (emphasis added). Further, the pro-
hibition of police officers knowingly making false statements in an
arrest affidavit applies when the resulting affidavit is “insufficient
to establish probable cause” without an officer’s false statements.
United States v. Kirk,
781 F.2d 1498, 1502 (11th Cir. 1986).
Here, even if the affidavit included Glover’s statement at the
scene, it nevertheless would not defeat the probable cause already
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22-11197 Opinion of the Court 7
established in the affidavit. The affidavit states that Glover remem-
bered who the perpetrators were hours after leaving the scene, and
that the detectives questioned him on how he was able to remem-
ber additional information and includes Glover’s response that af-
ter the pain and shock wore off, he was able to remember. It also
includes multiple text messages from Griffin that suggest motive,
information about the Glover picking Griffin out of a photo lineup,
and an independent eyewitness statement that the perpetrators fled
in a Dodge Charger, which bolsters Glover’s later statement that
Griffin was driving a Dodge Charger around the time of the inci-
dent to support a finding of probable cause. This information so
strongly supports a finding a probable cause and explains the dis-
crepancy between the statement at the scene and the statement
hours afterwards, that the inclusion of Glover’s statements at the
scene would not defeat it.
Griffin also argues that his false arrest claim was wrongly
dismissed because there are genuine issues of material fact as to the
timing of the arrest. However, because Griffin was arrested pursu-
ant to a valid arrest warrant, and all questioning by the detectives
occurred subsequent to the lawful arrest, there are no material is-
sues of fact and his false arrest claim was properly dismissed.
Second, Griffin maintains that arguable probable cause does
not exist because reasonable officers in the same circumstances
could not have believed that probable cause existed as to Griffin.
To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983,
Griffin must prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11197
be free from unreasonable seizures in addition to the elements of
the common law tort of malicious prosecution. Wood v. Kessler,
323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). The elements of malicious pros-
ecution are: “(1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by
the present defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause;
(3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4) caused
damage to the plaintiff accused.”
Id. at 882.
Here, Griffin alleges that the detectives’ disregard of
Glover’s initial statement that he had never met the shooters and
reliance on the subsequent statement where Glover identifies Grif-
fin as the shooter are enough to defeat probable cause. To deter-
mine if probable cause, or arguable probable cause, exists with re-
spect to a malicious prosecution claim, the court looks to the
crimes charged in the arrest warrant. Williams v. Aguirre,
965 F.3d
1147, 1163–64 (11th Cir. 2020). To succeed, Griffin must also es-
tablish “(1) that the legal process justifying his seizure was consti-
tutionally infirm and (2) that his seizure would not otherwise be
justified without legal process.” Id. at 1165. Griffin cannot meet
this burden, however, because the legal process justifying his sei-
zure was proper. Based on the experience and explanations of the
detectives, sufficient probable cause existed. 2
2 Griffin also argues that qualified immunity is improper because the detec-
tives failed to investigate readily available exonerating evidence. This argu-
ment fails because the evidence Griffin relies on was obtained after his lawful
arrest and was investigated in a timely manner.
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22-11197 Opinion of the Court 9
Because the false arrest claims were properly dismissed and
the detectives demonstrated probable cause for the remaining ma-
licious prosecution claims, we AFFIRM.
AFFIRMED.
