USCA11 Case: 22-10606 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2023 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10606
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
PATRICIA VALENCIA-TORRES,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A088-690-762
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10606 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2023 Page: 2 of 3
2 Opinion of the Court 22-10606
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Patricia Valencia-Torres petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ denial of her motion to reopen and
terminate her removal proceedings. Her motion is time barred
because it was filed more than ninety days after the final
administrative removal order. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i);
8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(2). Her motion is also number barred because it is her
second motion to reopen her removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(A);
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).
Nonetheless, Valencia-Torres argues that her motion should
be granted because the notice to appear she received was defective.
After she entered the United States in 1994, the government served
her with a notice to appear on September 29, 2007. That notice did
not specify the date and time for her initial removal hearing.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of the
stop-time rule, a notice to appear must include all statutorily
required information, including the time and place of the initial
hearing, in a single document. Pereira v. Sessions,
138 S. Ct. 2105,
2110 (2018); Niz-Chavez v. Garland,
141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480, 1486
(2021). We note, however, that the stop-time rule had no bearing
on the denial of her motion for cancellation of removal because the
immigration judge found that she had satisfied the physical-
presence requirement.
USCA11 Case: 22-10606 Document: 16-1 Date Filed: 02/08/2023 Page: 3 of 3
22-10606 Opinion of the Court 3
Valencia-Torres’s argument in this Court is not entirely
clear. To the extent that this is a jurisdictional argument, it is
foreclosed by our precedent. We’ve explained that a defect in a
notice to appear does not deprive the immigration judge of
jurisdiction over a removal proceeding. Perez-Sanchez v. U.S.
Att’y Gen.,
935 F.3d 1148, 1150 (11th Cir. 2019). Instead, the
statutory and regulatory requirements for the filing of a notice to
appear set forth claim processing rules.
Id. The Supreme Court’s
later decision in Niz-Chavez, relied upon by Valencia-Torres, does
not undermine this holding. There, the Supreme Court decided
only that the notice to appear needed to come in one document,
not two. Niz-Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 1480, 1486. Nothing in the
decision purported to create a jurisdictional requirement.
Accordingly, the defective notice to appear Valencia-Torres
received does not deprive the immigration judge of jurisdiction.
Valencia-Torres instead may be contending that reopening
is warranted because her notice to appear violated mandatory
(though non-jurisdictional) claim processing rules. If so, this claim
is subject to the time and number limitations on her motion to
reopen. Valencia-Torres does not argue that these limitations
should be equitably tolled or that a statutory exception applies. See
Ruiz-Turcios v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
717 F.3d 847, 849–50 (11th Cir.
2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). Accordingly, the Board of
Immigration Appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying her
motion to reopen.
PETITION DENIED.
