Mariamar Masso v. Miami-Dade County ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 6, 2007
No. 06-16611 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-20904-CV-FAM
MARIAMAR MASSO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 6, 2007)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Mariamar Masso appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Miami-Dade County Police Department (MDPD) on her claim for retaliatory
failure to hire pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a).
In 2004, Masso applied for two positions with MDPD. In the application’s
Personal History Questionnaire (PHQ), Masso responded to the question whether
employers always treated her fairly by indicating she had filed discrimination
charges against her employer because the management pressured her to sign a
memo acknowledging they could not guarantee her job security. Citing a
confidentiality agreement, Masso refused to provide any documentation of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charge despite repeated
requests from MDPD. MDPD eventually obtained a copy of the charge, in which
Masso stated she believed her employer discriminated against her because of her
sex and pregnancy. She also stated that she was harassed, excluded from meetings,
and no longer allowed to work from home or to “make up time.” MDPD did not
hire her, citing her failure to follow departmental procedures and her falsification
of the application.
Masso contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether
MDPD’s proffered reason for not hiring her was a pretext for retaliatory
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discrimination because: (1) it was not clear that she falsified her application or that
there was a discrepancy between the PHQ and the EEOC charge; (2) MDPD
insisted on having proof of the EEOC charge and focused on the details of her
charge to the point of raising suspicion as to the truth of its articulated reason; and
(3) there was no rational business justification for MDPD’s investigation of her
discrimination charge in the manner that it did.
The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56 (c); see also Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo). If the
non-moving party bears the ultimate burden of proof regarding the claim at issue in
the motion, that party, in response to the motion, must go beyond the pleadings and
establish, through competent evidence, that there truly is a genuine, material issue
to be tried. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553
(1986).
Title VII prohibits retaliation by an employer against an applicant because
the applicant has opposed an unlawful employment practice “or because he has
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made a charge . . . under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A plaintiff
may establish his case through circumstantial evidence, using the burden-shifting
framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). See EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc.,
296 F.3d 1265, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2002). Under this framework, the plaintiff must
first establish a prima facie case of discrimination to create a rebuttable
presumption of discrimination. Id. at 1272. To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected
expression, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was some
causal relation between the two events. Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d
1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001).
Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of discrimination, the
burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the employment action. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-
55, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094-95 (1981). If the defendant articulates a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason, the plaintiff must come forward with evidence
sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by
the employer were pretextual. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1565 (11th Cir.
1997).
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A plaintiff may show pretext by either directly persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason motivated the defendant or by indirectly showing that the
employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256,
101 S. Ct. at 1095. “The inquiry into pretext centers upon the employer’s beliefs,”
rather than the employee’s own perceptions. Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1565. In other
words, it does not matter whether the plaintiff is actually innocent of the infraction
for which the adverse employment action is taken; the only relevant inquiry is
whether the employer believes he is guilty. Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of
Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999) (“An employer who fires an
employee under the mistaken but honest impression that the employee violated a
work rule is not liable for discriminatory conduct.”). Once a nondiscriminatory
reason is proffered, the “plaintiff is not allowed to recast an employer’s . . .
reasons or substitute his business judgment for that of the employer.” Chapman,
229 F.3d at 1030. Instead, he “must meet [the proffered] reason head on and rebut
it, and the employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that
reason." Id. Therefore, where an employer offers extensive evidence of legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, conclusory allegations by the plaintiff are
insufficient to raise an inference of pretext. Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101
F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Upon review of the record, and upon consideration of the briefs of the
parties, we find no reversible error. MDPD considered Masso’s failure to provide
documentation of the EEOC charge and the apparent inconsistencies between her
PHQ and the discrimination charges to conclude Masso did not follow
departmental procedures and falsified the application. Masso did not present any
evidence indicating that MDPD’s proffered reasons for not hiring her were merely
a pretext. Therefore, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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