United States v. David L. Dixon , 491 F. App'x 120 ( 2012 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-12941
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00135-JSM-MAP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAVID L. DIXON,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(October 3, 2012)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, MARCUS and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Appellant David Dixon appeals his convictions for possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924 (a)(2);
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(1); and possession with intent to distribute cocaine
and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).
Specifically, Dixon argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to
suppress the statements and physical evidence obtained during a warrantless stop
and frisk and a search of his residence. He contends that the district court should
have disregarded entirely the officers’ testimony because it contained
inconsistencies. Accordingly, he argues there was no probable cause to stop the
taxicab in which he was a passenger or to search his person and bag. Finally, he
argues that he involuntarily consented to the search of his home because officers
elicited his consent after a promise of immunity.
We review the district court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress only
for clear error, but review its application of law to those facts de novo. United
States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000). “[W]hen considering a
ruling on a motion to suppress, all facts are construed in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below.” Id.The resolution of a credibility dispute is within the province of the fact
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finder, and will not be reversed for clear error unless the testimony is contrary to
the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no
reasonable factfinder could accept it. United States v. Pineiro, 389 F.3d 1359,
1366 (11th Cir. 2004). The suppression hearing often pits the testimony of law
enforcement officers against the testimony of the defendant and his friends. The
factfinder must not base a credibility determination solely on the relative status of
the different witnesses, but should weigh the testimony of all witnesses, taking
into account their demeanors and interests, and the consistencies or
inconsistencies in their testimonies. See United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d
744, 749-50 (11th Cir. 2002).
A traffic stop, to satisfy constitutional concerns, requires that the officer
have either probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred or reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th
Cir. 2008). The standard is an objective one, and an officer’s subjective motivation
does not invalidate any “otherwise objectively justifiable behavior under the
Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th Cir.
1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Where the initial traffic stop is legal, the officer has the duty to investigate
suspicious circumstances that then come to his attention. United States v. Harris,
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928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d
753, 757 (11th Cir. 1988)). “[A]n officer making a traffic stop may order
passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.” Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S. Ct. 882, 886, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997). “To
justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however . . . ,
the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk
is armed and dangerous.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327, 129 S. Ct. 781,
784, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009).When determining whether reasonable suspicion
exists, we must review the “totality of the circumstances” of each case to ascertain
“whether the detaining officer had a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for
suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.
Ct. 744, 750, 151 L. Ed. 2d. 740 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). As
part of the review of the totality of the circumstances, we examine the collective
knowledge of all the officers involved in the stop. United States v. Cotton, 721
F.2d 350, 352 (11th Cir. 1983).
The inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule permits
admission of evidence that in fact resulted from an illegal search but would have
been discovered without that illegal police action. United States v. Brookins, 614
F.2d 1037, 1044 (5th Cir. 1980). “At the stationhouse, it is entirely proper for
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police to remove and list or inventory property found on the person or in the
possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed.” Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S.
640, 646, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2609, 77 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1983).
All of Dixon’s arguments on appeal are founded upon the premise that the
officers’ testimony should be disregarded as incredible. Because none of the
testimony was contrary to the laws of nature or so inconsistent or improbable on
its face that no factfinder could accept it, we are unable to discern error in the
district court’s factual findings. Therefore, we conclude from the record that the
stop of the taxicab was supported by objective criteria and was constitutional. The
totality of the circumstances based on the collective knowledge of the officers
indicated that Dixon might be armed, making the search of his person reasonable.
The officers lawfully searched the bag containing illegal drugs incident to Dixon’s
arrest. Alternatively, officers would have inevitably searched the bag during an
inventory. Finally, we conclude that the credited testimony established that Dixon
voluntarily consented to a search of his residence. Accordingly, we hold that the
district court properly denied the motion to suppress, and we affirm Dixon’s
convictions.
AFFIRMED.
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