Carolina Casualty Insurance Company v. Red Coats Inc. , 624 F. App'x 992 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-12002
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-00232-MP-GRJ
CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee,
versus
RED COATS INC.,
d.b.a. Admiral Security Services, Inc.,
Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant,
ROGER F. KUZNIK, et al.,
Defendants,
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY,
NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE CO OF PITTSBURGH PA ,
Counter Defendants-Appellees,
TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND SURETY
COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Counter Defendant.
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________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(August 17, 2015)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge, and
SMITH, * District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Because the parties are well aware of the facts and procedural history of this
complex insurance dispute, we will leave off a discussion of them and get to the
point.
I.
The district court determined that either Florida or Maryland law applied to
this lawsuit. We review de novo its choice of law determination and apply
Florida’s choice of law rules. See Schippers v. United States, 715 F.3d 879, 884
(11th Cir. 2013); Menendez v. Perishable Distribs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1378
(11th Cir. 1985).
In contract cases, Florida applies the lex loci contractus: “the law of the
jurisdiction where the contract was executed.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Roach, 945 So. 2d 1160, 1163 (Fla. 2006). “The determination of where a contract
*
Honorable C. Lynwood Smith, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Alabama, sitting by designation.
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was executed is fact-intensive, and requires a determination of where the last act
necessary to complete the contract was done.” Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc. v. B.J.
Handley Trucking, Inc., 363 F.3d 1089, 1092–93 (11th Cir. 2004) (alteration and
quotation marks omitted) (applying Florida law). The district court did not
perform that fact-intensive inquiry and did not decide whether Florida or Maryland
law applied. Instead, it ruled that the result in this lawsuit would be the same no
matter which state’s law applied. That is not entirely correct.
When construing insurance policies Florida and Maryland courts start in the
same place: They interpret the plain language of the policy as a whole. Compare
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000) with Collier v.
MD-Individual Practice Ass’n, Inc., 607 A.2d 537, 539 (Md. 1992). But their
constructions of ambiguous language differ in an important way. Florida courts
construe ambiguous terms in insurance contracts “liberally in favor of the insured
and strictly against the drafter who prepared the policy.” Anderson, 756 So. 2d at
34; see id. (“[E]xclusionary clauses are construed even more strictly against the
insurer than coverage clauses.”). Maryland courts, however, construe insurance
policies “in the same manner as contracts generally,” without construing them
“most strongly against the insurer.” Collier, 607 A.2d at 539.
When the district court ruled that Florida and Maryland law led to the same
result in this lawsuit, it failed to acknowledge that the two are different. We must
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determine whether that failure led the district court to the wrong result. See
Collado v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 419 F.3d 1143, 1151 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Our
review is, as we have said, de novo. That means we review the judgment, not the
soundness of the district court’s explanation for it.”).
The district court’s failure to recognize the distinctions between Florida and
Maryland law did not, however, affect its judgment in favor of Carolina Casualty.
The dispute between Admiral and Carolina Casualty turns on the meaning of the
phrase “employment relationship” and whether that phrase applies to Admiral’s
relationship with AvMed. The Carolina Casualty insurance policy covers
Admiral’s settlement payment to AvMed only if Admiral and AvMed were in an
“employment relationship” within the meaning of the policy.
Even if we apply Florida’s rule that ambiguous terms in insurance contracts
are construed “liberally in favor of the insured,” Anderson, 756 So. 2d at 34,
Admiral and AvMed did not have such an “employment relationship.” Reviewing
the policy as a whole, we hold that it was designed to apply to damages arising
from disputes between Admiral and its own employees, not between Admiral and
another entity employing it. Admiral’s relationship with AvMed, therefore, was
not an “employment relationship” under the Carolina Casualty policy, and the
policy provides no coverage for the settlement amount paid by Admiral.
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Admiral additionally contends that Carolina Casualty breached its duty to
defend Admiral against AvMed’s complaint. Under both Florida and Maryland
law, Carolina Casualty had a duty to defend Admiral if AvMed’s complaint alleged
a claim that was even potentially covered under the policy. See Jones v. Fla. Ins.
Guar. Ass’n, 908 So. 2d 435, 442–43 (Fla. 2005); Walk v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co.,
852 A.2d 98, 106–07 (Md. 2004). We have just held that the Carolina Casualty
policy covers only claims brought against Admiral by its own employees.
AvMed’s complaint against Admiral made clear that AvMed was not an employee
of Admiral. In fact, it suggested just the opposite — that Admiral was an
employee of AvMed. As a result, AvMed’s complaint was not even potentially
covered by the policy, and Carolina Casualty had no duty to defend Admiral.
Although the district court misinterpreted Florida and Maryland law, it
correctly entered judgment for Carolina Casualty. We must affirm. See Turner v.
Am. Fed’n of Teachers, 138 F.3d 878, 880 n.1 (11th Cir. 1998) (“We must affirm
the judgment of the district court if the result is correct even if the district court
relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.”).
II.
Unlike Admiral’s dispute with Carolina Casualty, the choice of law
governing Admiral’s dispute with its two comprehensive general liability (CGL)
insurers, National Union and Continental, may be dispositive.
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Two questions about that CGL dispute could turn on which state’s law
applies. The first is whether the CGL policies covered Admiral’s settlement
payment to AvMed. Whether the CGL policies provide coverage depends on
whether the damages alleged by AvMed were “damages because of . . . ‘property
damage.’” If the CGL policies cover Admiral’s claim, then a second question
might turn on which state’s law applies: whether the electronic-data exclusion
applies to Admiral’s attempt to recover its payments to AvMed. Both CGL
policies exclude coverage for damages “arising out of the loss of [or] loss of use
of . . . electronic data.” Those two phrases may be ambiguous. If they are
ambiguous, then the difference between Florida and Maryland law may determine
whether Admiral’s claim succeeds or fails.
We choose not to attempt the “fact-intensive” determination of which state’s
law applies. Prime Ins. Syndicate, Inc., 363 F.3d at 1092. And we choose not to
resolve the legal issues in this dispute without knowing which state’s law applies.
See Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998)
(“[T]he general rule [is] that a court of appeals will not consider issues not reached
by the district court, especially where the issues involve questions of fact.”). We
will therefore vacate the judgment in favor of National Union and Continental and
remand for the district court to decide whether Florida law or Maryland law applies
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and whether, under the applicable state law, the CGL policies provide coverage for
Admiral.
III.
The district court’s judgment in favor of Carolina Casualty is AFFIRMED.
Its judgment in favor of National Union and Continental is VACATED, and the
case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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