Celeste L. Guice v. Secretary, Department of Labor ( 2018 )


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  •              Case: 17-12183    Date Filed: 10/25/2018   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-12183
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cv-02935-JDW-TBM
    CELESTE L. GUICE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (October 25, 2018)
    Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Celeste Guice is a Group Leader Mail Handler with the United States Postal
    Service. Pursuant to the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 8101
    Case: 17-12183      Date Filed: 10/25/2018   Page: 2 of 7
    et seq. (“FECA”), she filed a complaint in federal court against the Secretary of the
    Department of Labor challenging administrative decisions leading to the denial of
    her claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Guice, who is proceeding pro se,
    now appeals the district court’s orders dismissing her amended complaint and
    denying her motion to vacate all orders entered by the district court after August 8,
    2016. First, Guice argues that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over
    her FECA claim because she colorably alleged a constitutional violation. Second,
    she contends that the district court abused its discretion when it entered orders after
    August 8, 2016, the date the Department’s answer to the amended complaint was
    due. Third, she asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it
    dismissed her amended complaint without a hearing. Finding no reversible error,
    we affirm.
    I
    Whether a district court has subject matter jurisdiction to decide a case is a
    question of law to be reviewed de novo. See Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous.
    Agency, 
    501 F.3d 1241
    , 1242 (11th Cir. 2007).
    FECA is a federal employee’s exclusive remedy against the federal
    government for job-related injuries. Noble v. United States, 
    216 F.3d 1229
    , 1234
    (11th Cir. 2000). Under FECA, a federal employee is guaranteed the right “to
    receive immediate, fixed benefits, regardless of fault and without need for
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    litigation, but in return [she] lose[s] the right to sue the Government.” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 
    460 U.S. 190
    , 194 (1983)). Instead of
    pursuing claims through the courts, the employee must appeal any adverse decision
    of the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs administratively to the
    Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board in the Department of Labor. A federal
    court retains jurisdiction, however, to review a claim that the government violated
    a clear statutory mandate or constitutional right. Woodruff v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
    
    954 F.2d 634
    , 639 (11th Cir. 1992).
    Guice contends that because the Department administratively consolidated
    her similar occupational injury/disease claims she was deprived of a “full and fair
    adjudication” in violation of her constitutional right to due process. The central
    tenet of due process is that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or
    property without notice and the opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature
    of the case. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
    470 U.S. 532
    , 542 (1985). In
    making her due process claim, however, Guice does not allege that the Department
    failed to give her notice or an opportunity to be heard on the substance of her
    worker’s compensation claim. 1 A consolidation of claims is not in and of itself a
    1
    Guice perfunctorily alleges that her right to “[r]easonable [n]otice and the [o]pportunity to [be
    h]eard” was violated, but she points to no process failure or lack of hearing. Even with the
    latitude afforded pro se plaintiffs, a bare allegation such as this fails to establish a claim. See
    Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 
    787 F.3d 1105
    , 1107 (11th Cir. 2015) (“A pro se pleading is held
    to a less stringent standard than a pleading drafted by an attorney; a pro se pleading is liberally
    construed. Even so, a pro se pleading must suggest (even if inartfully) that there is at least some
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    constitutional violation—it is merely an administrative procedure. Without
    claiming (beyond the consolidation) that she was not “heard at a meaningful time
    and in a meaningful manner,” Guice fails to establish a constitutional or statutory
    violation. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 333 (1976) (quotations
    omitted).
    II
    Guice next argues—in various ways—that the district court should not have
    entered orders after the due date for the Department’s answer to her amended
    complaint had passed.
    We review a district court’s decisions about how to manage its docket for
    abuse of discretion. Young v. City of Palm Bay, 
    358 F.3d 859
    , 863–64 (11th Cir.
    2004). A district court has unquestionable authority to control its own docket and
    broad discretion in deciding how best to manage the cases before it, Smith v.
    Psychiatric Sols., Inc., 
    750 F.3d 1253
    , 1262 (11th Cir. 2014), but it must dismiss
    an action as soon as it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Arbaugh
    v. Y&H Corp., 
    546 U.S. 500
    , 506 (2006).
    First, Guice contends that the district court lost jurisdiction when the
    Department filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than an answer.
    factual support for a claim; it is not enough just to invoke a legal theory devoid of any factual
    basis.”) (citations omitted).
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    That is incorrect. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(2), a United
    States agency must serve a response to a complaint within 60 days of service. In
    lieu of filing an answer, a defendant may file a motion asserting that the court lacks
    subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Only if the court denies
    that motion is the defendant then required to file an answer. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(a)(4)(A). Moreover, and in any event, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
    neither confer nor deny subject matter jurisdiction; rather, subject matter
    jurisdiction is created exclusively by statute. See generally 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1331
    ,
    1332; Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 et seq. (establishing that the purpose of the Federal Rules is
    “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
    proceeding”).
    Second, Guice claims that the district court was required to place the
    Department in default, pursuant to Rule 55(a), for not filing an answer to her
    amended complaint. A default judgment may be entered against the United States
    only when a plaintiff “establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence that
    satisfies the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d). But Guice did not show evidence of
    procedural default; rather, as we have already concluded, the Department’s Rule 12
    jurisdictional motion was filed in compliance with the Rules.
    Third, contrary to Guice’s contention, it was not an abuse of discretion for
    the district court to deny Guice’s motions after August 8, 2016, the date the
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    Department’s answer to the amended complaint was due—or, for that matter, after
    October 20, 2016, the date that the district court entered the order dismissing the
    case for lack of jurisdiction. Even after dismissing the case, the district court had
    the inherent authority to dispose of the numerous motions filed by Guice so that
    the court could administratively close the case. See Smith, 750 F.3d at 1262.
    Fourth, and again contrary to Guice’s contention, the district court was under
    no compulsion to state the basis of subject matter jurisdiction in each order it
    issued in relation to Guice’s case. Not only did the court not reach the merits in
    any of these orders, but district courts are not required to reiterate that they have
    subject matter jurisdiction each time they rule on a motion. The two cases that
    Guice cites—Elliott v. Peirsol’s Lessee, 
    26 U.S. 328
     (1828), and Vallely v.
    Northern Fire & Marine Insurance. Co., 
    254 U.S. 348
     (1920)—hold that courts
    may not act beyond the authority delegated to them, but neither requires a district
    court to explicitly establish its subject matter jurisdiction each time it rules in a
    case.
    Finally, the district court was not divested of jurisdiction to enter orders after
    August 8, 2016 simply because the Department filed a motion to dismiss, rather
    than an answer, to the amended complaint. As already explained, a motion to
    dismiss is an acceptable response to an amended complaint and complies with Rule
    12(b)(1).
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    III
    We review Guice’s final claim—pertaining to the district court’s decision to
    rule on a motion to dismiss without an evidentiary hearing—for abuse of
    discretion. Sunseri v. Macro Cellular Partners, 
    412 F.3d 1247
    , 1250 (11th Cir.
    2005). Generally, we will not disturb a district court’s decision to dismiss without
    a hearing when the plaintiff did not request such a hearing. 
    Id.
    The district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Guice’s
    amended complaint without a hearing. Guice had notice of the Department’s
    motion to dismiss, and she also had an opportunity to respond. Moreover, Guice
    did not request a hearing on the motion to dismiss. The district court therefore did
    not deprive Guice of due process.
    AFFIRMED.
    7