Derrell J. Chamblee v. State of Florida ( 2018 )


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  •            Case: 16-16452    Date Filed: 09/28/2018   Page: 1 of 16
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 16-16452
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:15-cv-00483-LC-CJK
    DERRELL J. CHAMBLEE,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    JULIE L. JONES,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (September 28, 2018)
    Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
    Case: 16-16452     Date Filed: 09/28/2018     Page: 2 of 16
    Derrell Chamblee, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district court’s dismissal of
    his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus as untimely. Chamblee
    argues that his § 2254 habeas corpus petition was not untimely because his state
    court judgment never became final within the meaning of the Antiterrorism and
    Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) due to a remand order issued by
    the state appellate court in his direct appeal that the trial court never acted upon.
    He maintains that as long as the remand order is pending in the state trial court, his
    state court judgment never became final and AEDPA’s one-year statute of
    limitations never started running. We affirm.
    I
    In 2010, a Florida jury convicted Chamblee of 1 count of racketeering and
    25 counts of grand theft. The state trial court entered a judgment sentencing
    Chamblee to 25 years in prison and ordering him to pay three different sums that
    are relevant to this appeal: (1) a $225 court cost under Fla. Stat. § 938.05; (2) a $20
    court cost under Fla. Stat. § 938.06; and (3) a $50 fine under Fla. Stat.
    § 775.083(2). Chamblee appealed his conviction and sentence to the Florida First
    District Court of Appeal, arguing, among other things, that the trial court imposed
    the court costs and fine under the wrong version of the Florida Statutes.
    On August 8, 2012, the First District Court of Appeal issued a decision
    affirming Chamblee’s convictions and sentence, but reversing the imposition of the
    2
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    court costs and the fine. See Chamblee v. State, 
    93 So. 3d 1184
    , 1186 (Fla. 1st
    Dist. Ct. App. 2012). In short, the First District Court of Appeal held that the trial
    court had applied the wrong versions of the cost and fine statutes, and that it should
    instead have used the 2003 versions “that were in effect on the beginning date of
    [Chamblee’s] ongoing criminal enterprise.” 
    Id. at 1185.
    With respect to the first
    court cost, the First District Court of Appeal struck the $225 assessment and
    directed the trial court to substitute a $200 cost—the maximum amount that could
    be levied for a felony under the law in 2003. 
    Id. at 1185-86.
    The court struck the
    $20 court cost assessment, noting that the State had conceded that it was imposed
    in error. 
    Id. at 1186.
    Finally, and most significantly here, the court held that the law
    in 2003 “allowed the imposition of a $50.00 fine for a felony conviction,” but only
    “so long as the [trial] court found the defendant had the ability to pay the fine and
    would not be prevented thereby from being rehabilitated or making restitution.”1
    
    Id. In Chamblee’s
    case, the trial court had not determined his ability to pay it and
    that he would not be prevented from being rehabilitated or making restitution.
    Therefore, the First District Court of Appeal struck the fine. The court noted that
    1
    The 2003 version of the Florida Statutes applicable in Chamblee’s case referred to the
    $50 assessment as a “fine,” but the statute was amended in 2004 and reclassified the $50
    assessment as a “court cost.” Compare Fla. Stat. § 775.083(2)(b) (2003) (providing that “[t]he
    fine is $50 for a felony. . . [and] the court may order the defendant to pay such fine if the court
    finds that the defendant has the ability to pay the fine and that the defendant would not be
    prevented thereby from being rehabilitated or making restitution”), with Fla. Stat. § 775.083(2)
    (2004) (providing that “[t]he court costs imposed by this section shall be $50 for a felony”).
    3
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    “[o]n remand the trial court may re-impose th[e] fine after making appropriate
    findings,” thereby leaving the imposition of the fine to the trial court’s discretion.
    
    Id. On August
    24, 2012, the First District Court of Appeal issued the mandate in
    Chamblee’s case. For reasons that remain unknown, the trial court never took—
    and still has not taken—any action in response to the remand order. 2
    Following his direct appeal, notwithstanding the pending remand order,
    Chamblee filed a motion for reduction of sentence, pursuant to Florida Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 3.800(c), on October 23, 2012. In its order denying the motion
    on the merits, the trial court stated that the direct appellate review process “was
    concluded on August 24, 2012.”
    Approximately a year and a half later, on May 20, 2014, Chamblee filed a
    counseled motion for post-conviction relief in the trial court, pursuant to Florida
    Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, followed by an amended motion. This motion
    was dismissed without prejudice because it was facially insufficient. Chamblee,
    through his counsel, filed a second amended Rule 3.850 motion on October 13,
    2014. The state trial court denied the Rule 3.850 motion on the merits. Chamblee
    appealed and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed without written opinion
    on September 15, 2015.
    2
    Notably, despite the fact that the trial court never took any action in response to the
    remand instructions, Chamblee never sought to enforce the mandate.
    4
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    On October 28, 2015, Chamblee filed the underlying § 2254 federal habeas
    corpus petition, asserting several due process violations. The State filed a motion
    to dismiss the § 2254 petition as untimely, arguing that it was not filed within
    AEDPA’s one-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).3 In
    response, Chamblee argued for the first time that his state court judgment never
    became final because the trial court never acted on the remand order issued in his
    direct appeal.
    The district court ultimately agreed with the State and dismissed Chamblee’s
    § 2254 petition as untimely. The district court first observed that “[t]he parties do
    not assert, nor does it appear, that [Chamblee] could have sought direct review” of
    the First District Court of Appeal’s August 2012 decision in the Florida Supreme
    Court—the reason being that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2) does
    not provide for discretionary review of such decisions. The district court then
    reasoned that “[b]ecause discretionary review in the Florida Supreme Court was
    not available,” Chamblee’s conviction became “final”—thereby starting AEDPA’s
    one-year clock—when the “time for filing a petition for certiorari in the United
    States Supreme Court expired.” That occurred, the district court concluded, “ninety
    days after entry of the First District Court of Appeal’s August 8, 2012 decision”—
    3
    Under AEDPA, § 2254 federal habeas corpus petitions are governed by a one-year
    limitations period that begins to run on the latest of four triggering events, including, as
    applicable in this case, “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
    review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
    5
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    or November 6, 2012. Thus, the court concluded, that AEDPA’s one-year
    limitation period expired at the latest in December 2013, long before Chamblee
    filed his § 2254 petition in October 2015, thereby rendering it untimely. 4 The
    district court denied Chamblee’s request for a certificate of appealability.
    Chamblee then moved in this Court for a certificate of appealability, which
    we granted on the following issue: “Whether the district court erred in determining
    that Chamblee’s § 2254 petition was untimely based on its determination that the
    petition was not filed within one year of the date on which his conviction became
    final.” Our review is de novo. See Hepburn v. Moore, 
    215 F.3d 1208
    , 1209 (11th
    Cir. 2000).
    II
    For purposes of AEDPA, the relevant one-year limitations period applicable
    in this case runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by the
    conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”
    28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Under the federal habeas statute, as modified by
    AEDPA, a state habeas petitioner may challenge only the state-court judgment
    “pursuant to” which the petitioner is being held “in custody.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
    Due to this restriction, the only “judgment that matters for purposes of [§] 2244 is
    4
    The district court assumed without deciding that Chamblee was entitled to statutory
    tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) from October 23, 2012 until November 29, 2012, while his
    Rule 3.800(c) motion for reduction of sentence was pending in state court. Accordingly, the
    district court concluded that AEDPA’s one-year limitation period expired in December 2013
    rather than November 2013.
    6
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    ‘the judgment authorizing the prisoner’s confinement.’” Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla.
    Dep’t of Corr., 
    849 F.3d 1321
    , 1325 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting Magwood
    v. Patterson, 
    561 U.S. 320
    , 332 (2010)); see also Ferreira v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
    
    494 F.3d 1286
    , 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (addressing what constitutes a judgment for
    purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) and explaining that “the writ and AEDPA, including
    its limitations provisions, are specifically focused on the judgment which holds the
    petitioner in confinement”). Accordingly, for purposes of AEDPA and federal
    habeas review, the relevant judgment in this case is the 2010 criminal judgment
    authorizing Chamblee’s confinement for a period of 25 years in the Florida
    Department of Corrections.5
    5
    In Chamblee’s direct appeal, the First District Court of Appeal expressly stated in its
    August 8, 2012 decision that it “affirm[ed] the judgment and sentence in all other respects.”
    
    Chamblee, 93 So. 3d at 1186
    . Thus, the vacated $50 fine had no effect on the judgment that
    authorizes Chamblee’s current detention, which is the “judgment that matters for purposes of
    [§] 2244.” 
    Patterson, 849 F.3d at 1325
    . In other words, Chamblee is being held (and will
    continue to be held regardless of whether the trial court re-imposes the vacated discretionary $50
    fine) in custody pursuant to the 2010 judgment. 
    Id. at 1327;
    see also 
    Ferreira, 494 F.3d at 1292
    (explaining that “the judgment to which AEDPA refers is the underlying conviction and most
    recent sentence that authorizes the petitioner’s current detention” (emphasis added)). Even if the
    state trial court re-imposes the $50 fine, it will not create a “new judgment” or have any effect on
    the 2010 judgment because the $50 fine is unrelated to the authorization of Chamblee’s
    confinement. See 
    Patterson, 849 F.3d at 1326-27
    (holding that a subsequent order that alters a
    sentence constitutes a new judgment for purposes of federal habeas review only if it authorizes
    or changes the petitioner’s confinement, noting that state courts often make “[m]any ameliorative
    changes in sentences . . . as a matter of course, such as the removal of a fine or a restitution
    obligation,” and, if each time this was done, it resulted in a new “judgment” for purposes of
    federal habeas review it would conflict with the “‘central purpose’” of AEDPA “to ensure
    greater finality of state and federal judgments in criminal cases” (quoting Gonzalez v. Sec’y for
    Dep’t of Corr., 
    366 F.3d 1253
    , 1269 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc))).
    7
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    Having identified the relevant judgment, we must determine whether the
    2010 judgment was “final” for purposes of triggering the one-year limitations
    period of § 2244(d)(1)(A). 6 We do not need to grapple with the definition of
    finality—a legal term that “has been variously defined” depending on context—
    because federal law, or more precisely AEDPA itself, expressly defines finality of
    a state court judgment as “‘the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the
    time for seeking such review.’” Jimenez v. Quarterman, 
    555 U.S. 113
    , 119 (2009)
    (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)). 7
    However, in order to determine whether the “entirety of the state direct
    appellate review process [has been] completed,” as in Jimenez, this Court must
    look to the actions taken by the state court and the relevant state law. See 
    id. at 120
    (relying upon actions taken by a state court in re-opening direct review of a
    petitioner’s conviction when determining whether entirety of the state appellate
    review process was completed for purposes of determining whether the petitioner’s
    conviction was final for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A)). In this case, the state court
    6
    We rely on Patterson only to identify the relevant judgment that we must scrutinize to
    determine whether it is final. The reason, as noted below, is that the Florida courts have
    themselves treated Chamblee’s judgment of conviction and sentence as final.
    7
    “[D]irect review cannot conclude for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) until the ‘availability
    of direct appeal to the state courts,’ and to [the United States Supreme Court] has been
    exhausted.” 
    Jimenez, 555 U.S. at 119
    (citations omitted). “Until that time, the ‘process of direct
    review’ has not ‘com[e] to an end’ and ‘a presumption of finality and legality’ cannot yet have
    ‘attache[d] to the conviction and sentence.’” 
    Id. at 119-20
    (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 
    463 U.S. 880
    , 887 (1983)). Consequently, AEDPA “requires a federal court, presented with an
    individual’s first petition for habeas relief, to make use of the date on which the entirety of the
    state direct appellate review process was completed.” 
    Id. at 121.
    8
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    treated Chamblee’s judgment as final under Florida law, and, in habeas
    proceedings, we are bound by a state court’s interpretation of its own laws and
    procedures. See Bradshaw v. Richey, 
    546 U.S. 74
    , 76 (2005) (“We have repeatedly
    held that a state court’s interpretation of state law . . . binds a federal court sitting
    in habeas corpus.”).
    Specifically, the First District Court of Appeal expressly stated in its
    August 8, 2012 decision that, although it vacated two court costs and the $50 fine
    (which the trial court could re-impose on remand if it elected to do so), 8 it
    “affirm[ed] the judgment and sentence in all other respects.” Subsequently, in
    denying Chamblee’s Rule 3.800(c) motion for reduction of sentence,
    notwithstanding the remand order, the state trial court treated Chamblee’s
    judgment as final and expressly stated that the direct appellate review process “was
    concluded on August 24, 2012”—the date the First District Court of Appeal’s
    mandate issued.9 Further, by entertaining Chamblee’s Rule 3.850
    8
    Notably, under Florida law, although the trial court may re-impose the fine on remand,
    it may simply elect not to do so. See DeSalvo v. State, 
    107 So. 3d 1185
    , 1187 & n.3 (Fla. 1st
    Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (striking certain fines, costs, and fees, and noting that, although the trial
    court may re-impose some of the fines and costs on remand, it may be an “imprudent use of
    judicial resources” to conduct further proceedings to re-impose the stricken fines and costs on a
    defendant who is serving a lengthy sentence).
    9
    The conclusion that the direct appellate review process was complete with regard to
    Chamblee’s convictions and sentence, notwithstanding the pending remand order, is consistent
    with Florida law. See Anton v. State, 
    976 So. 2d 6
    , 8-9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (expressly
    rejecting the contention that the trial court’s actions on remand in correcting a judgment were an
    extension of the “direct review proceedings”). Specifically, in Anton, the state appellate court
    held that the defendant’s judgment and sentence became final and “[t]he appellate process [was]
    completed on the date the mandate [was] issued,” notwithstanding a pending remand order which
    9
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    post-conviction motion on the merits, the state trial court and the First District
    Court of Appeal—the same court that vacated the court costs and fine and
    remanded on that issue—expressly treated the entirety of the state direct appellate
    review process as complete (notwithstanding the pending remand order), because
    in order to pursue post-conviction relief under Florida law, the judgment and the
    sentence must first be final. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b) (providing that “[n]o
    other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2
    years after the judgment and sentence become final”); Brigham v. State, 
    950 So. 2d 1274
    , 1275 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“Implicit in [Rule 3.850] is the
    requirement that the judgment and sentence be final before the motion is filed.”).
    Because the state courts treated Chamblee’s judgment of conviction and sentence
    as final and the entirety of the state appellate review process as complete, we
    should as well.10 Herring v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 
    397 F.3d 1338
    , 1355 (11th Cir.
    the trial court did not act on for six years, that directed the trial court to correct the judgment and
    sentence to reflect that the offense of conviction was a second-degree felony, not a first-degree
    felony. 
    Id. (first alteration
    in original). Although Anton involved a remand for a non-
    discretionary correction of a judgment while the trial court in Chamblee’s case has the purely
    discretionary authority on remand to re-impose the vacated $50 fine provided that it conducts
    additional fact-finding, this is a distinction without a difference as it applies in this case. Anton
    made clear that “[t]he [state direct review] appellate process is completed on the date the
    mandate is issued,” and actions taken by the trial court on remand are not “an extension of the
    direct review proceedings” because “the trial court does not participate in the ‘review’ of its own
    decisions.” 
    Id. at 9
    (quotations omitted).
    10
    To the extent that Chamblee’s argument before us—that his state court judgment is not
    final because of the pending remand order—implies that the state court erred in treating his
    judgment as final under Florida law, that is a matter he should have raised in the state court, but
    failed to do so. Notably, if in the future, Chamblee were to successfully raise this argument in
    10
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    2005) (“State courts are the final arbiters of state law, and federal habeas courts
    should not second-guess them on such matters.” (quoting Agan v. Vaughn, 
    119 F.3d 1538
    , 1549 (11th Cir. 1997))).
    In sum, notwithstanding the pending remand order, Chamblee’s judgment
    was final under Florida law and the entirety of the state appellate review process
    was complete when the First District Court of Appeal issued its decision
    “affirm[ing] the judgment and sentence in all other respects” on direct appeal. 11
    
    Chamblee, 93 So. 3d at 1186
    . Because Chamblee did not seek direct review of the
    First District Court of Appeal’s decision in the United States Supreme Court, his
    judgment became “final,” as that term is defined in § 2244(d)(1)(A), for purposes
    of triggering AEDPA’s limitations period upon the “expiration of the time for
    seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
    state court and the state court reopened his direct review proceedings, then, as in Jimenez, that
    would also reopen the one-year limitations period under § 
    2244(d)(1)(A). 555 U.S. at 120-21
    (holding that because the state appellate court granted the petitioner’s out of time appeal and
    reopened the direct review proceedings it reopened the limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(A),
    which “carries out AEDPA’s goal of promoting comity, finality, and federalism by giving state
    courts the first opportunity to review [the] claim, and to correct any constitutional violation in the
    first instance” (alteration in original) (quotations omitted)). However, until that happens, the
    mere “possibility that the state court may reopen direct review” if the trial court re-imposes the
    discretionary fine, “does not render convictions and sentences that are no longer subject to direct
    review nonfinal.” 
    Id. at 120
    n.4 (quoting Beard v. Banks, 
    542 U.S. 406
    , 412 (2004)).
    11
    As discussed above, Chamblee could not have sought further review of the First
    District Court of Appeal’s decision in the Florida Supreme Court because Florida Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2) does not provide for discretionary review of such decisions. See
    Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2).
    11
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    Therefore, Chamblee’s judgment was final for purposes of triggering the
    AEDPA’s limitations period on November 6, 2012, when the 90-day window for
    filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court seeking
    direct review of the First District Court of Appeal’s decision affirming his
    convictions and sentence expired. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. At that time, Chamblee had
    a Rule 3.800(c) motion for reduction of sentence pending in state court, which
    entitled him to statutory tolling until the state court disposed of the motion on
    November 29, 2012. See Rogers v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 
    855 F.3d 1274
    , 1277
    (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that “a Rule 3.800(c) motion is an application for
    collateral review, which tolls the limitations period for a federal habeas petition”).
    Thus, as the district court concluded, the one-year limitations period under
    § 2244(d)(1)(A) expired at the latest on December 2, 2013.12 Consequently, his
    § 2254 federal habeas petition filed almost two years later on October 28, 2015
    was untimely.
    For these reasons, we AFFIRM.
    12
    Because November 30, 2013, was a Saturday, the limitations period did not expire until
    the end of the following business day. See Fed. R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(C) (providing that, if the last
    day of the period “is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the
    end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday”).
    12
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    NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    I concur in the judgment affirming the district court’s dismissal of
    Chamblee’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely, and I join the majority opinion.
    I write separately only to mark what I take to be the limits of our decision.
    As a matter of first principles, so to speak, I think it’s a close and difficult
    question whether the Florida trial court’s August 2010 judgment here was (ever)
    sufficiently “final” to start Chamblee’s one-year federal-habeas clock. As the
    majority opinion correctly explains, that judgment—the only state-court judgment
    at issue in this case—embodied (1) a criminal conviction, (2) an associated 25-year
    prison sentence, and (3) a series of fines and court costs. And while, as the
    majority also explains, the Florida First District Court of Appeal “affirm[ed] th[at]
    judgment and sentence in all other respects” in August 2012, it—and herein lies
    the difficulty—vacated one of the criminal fines and remanded to the trial court to
    allow for additional factfinding, which (so far as we know) still hasn’t occurred.
    Chamblee v. State, 
    93 So. 3d 1184
    , 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis
    added). In the usual way of thinking about such things, that just doesn’t sound
    very “final” to me.
    I suppose one might say that even if the fine aspect of the 2010 judgment
    isn’t final, the conviction and prison aspects certainly are—and that because under
    AEDPA’s plain terms only the part of the judgment that imposed “custody” is
    13
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    subject to challenge on federal habeas, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), that’s the only part
    that counts. And indeed, in Patterson v. Secretary of Florida Department of
    Corrections, we observed that the only “judgment that matters”—at least for
    purposes of determining whether a federal habeas petition is impermissibly
    successive—“is the judgment authorizing the prisoner’s confinement.” 
    849 F.3d 1321
    , 1325 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citation omitted). But Patterson addressed
    a different issue—there, we held simply that a state prisoner, having once
    challenged his conviction and confinement under § 2254, could not thereafter
    launch a “new round of federal habeas review” on the ground that a second,
    separate state-court order commuting a non-custodial aspect of his criminal
    sentence (in that case, chemical castration) constituted an entirely new, process-
    restarting “judgment.” 
    Id. at 1327.
    Here, all agree that there was (and is) only one
    judgment—the August 2010 judgment, which embodied Chamblee’s conviction,
    his prison sentence, and the fines and costs. The sole question is whether that
    singular judgment was (or is) “final” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
    Speaking for myself, it’s not immediately apparent that anything in either
    Patterson or § 2254(a)’s “custody”-based limitation on the substantive scope of
    any eventual habeas challenge necessarily requires the conclusion that the lone
    judgment at issue here—which, again, entailed not only a conviction and prison
    14
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    sentence but also a fine that was vacated on appeal and remanded for additional
    factfinding—was sufficiently “final” to start Chamblee’s one-year clock.
    Happily, we needn’t decide today whether as a general matter—under the
    logic of Patterson or otherwise—we can parse the custodial and non-custodial
    aspects of a single, unitary state-court judgment for purposes of evaluating finality
    under § 2244. The reason, as the majority correctly explains, is that in entertaining
    Chamblee’s state post-conviction challenges on the merits, the Florida courts
    themselves unquestionably treated the August 2010 judgment as final. In denying
    Chamblee’s Rule 3.800(c) motion for reduction of sentence, for instance, the state
    trial court—the same court before which the fine-related issue was (and still is?)
    pending on remand—expressly stated—despite the remand—that the direct-appeal
    process had “concluded on August 24, 2012,” when the First DCA issued its
    mandate affirming Chamblee’s conviction and prison sentence and remanding the
    fine. So too, the state trial court—again, the same one—later entertained, and
    denied on the merits, Chamblee’s Rule 3.850 post-conviction motion, which it was
    authorized to do under Florida law only if the underlying 2010 judgment was in
    fact “final.” See, e.g., Fla. R. App. P. 3.850(b) (prescribing two-year time limit
    from the date “the judgment and sentence become final”); Brigham v. State, 
    950 So. 2d 1274
    , 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (observing that Rule 3.850 “require[s]
    that the judgment and sentence be final before the motion is filed”).
    15
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    The Florida courts’ treatment of the August 2010 judgment as final is
    conclusive. It is hornbook law “state courts are the ultimate expositors of state
    law,” Mullaney v. Wilbur, 
    421 U.S. 684
    , 691 (1975), and, more particularly here,
    that “a state court’s interpretation of state law … binds a federal court sitting in
    habeas corpus,” Bradshaw v. Richey, 
    546 U.S. 74
    , 76 (2005); see also, e.g.,
    Herring v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 
    397 F.3d 1338
    , 1355 (11th Cir.
    2005) (“State courts are the final arbiters of state law, and federal habeas courts
    should not second-guess them on such matters.”). In both word and deed, the
    Florida courts have determined that Chamblee’s criminal judgment was “final” as
    of August 24, 2012, when the DCA issued its mandate to enforce its direct-appeal
    decision. For better or worse—rightly or wrongly—that determination binds us
    here.
    16