Monique Nicole Dames v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2018 )


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  •            Case: 17-13473   Date Filed: 08/03/2018   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-13473
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-00259-WTH-CAS
    MONIQUE NICOLE DAMES,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF
    SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (August 3, 2018)
    Before WILSON, MARTIN and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 17-13473     Date Filed: 08/03/2018   Page: 2 of 6
    Monique Dames appeals the district court’s order affirming the decision of
    an administrative law judge to terminate her supplemental security income
    benefits, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 423(f). In 2006, the Social Security
    Administration found Dames to be disabled because she met the criteria for an
    affective or mood disorder under Listing 12.04(C). In this case, the ALJ
    determined Dames had medically improved and was no longer disabled as of
    January 2011. Dames argues the ALJ erred in finding her no longer disabled
    because she presently meets the amended version of Listing 12.05(B), which
    addresses intellectual disability. After careful review, we affirm.
    I.
    “When, as in this case, the ALJ denies benefits and the [Appeals Council]
    denies review, we review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final
    decision.” Doughty v. Apfel, 
    245 F.3d 1274
    , 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). The ALJ’s
    legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Lewis v. Barnhart, 
    285 F.3d 1329
    , 1330
    (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). The ALJ’s factual findings will not be disturbed so
    long as they are “supported by substantial evidence.” Lewis v. Callahan, 
    125 F.3d 1436
    , 1439–40 (11th Cir. 1997). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and
    is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
    support a conclusion.” 
    Id. at 1440.
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    Case: 17-13473      Date Filed: 08/03/2018      Page: 3 of 6
    II.
    An ALJ may terminate a claimant’s benefits upon finding there has been
    medical improvement in the claimant’s impairments related to the claimant’s
    ability to work and the claimant “is now able to engage in substantial gainful
    activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(f)(1). Medical improvement is defined as “any
    decrease in the medical severity of impairment(s) present at the time of the most
    recent favorable medical decision that you were disabled.” 20 C.F.R.
    § 404.1594(c)(1). This determination must be based on medical evidence showing
    an improvement in the symptoms, signs, or laboratory findings associated with the
    impairments. 1 
    Id. In this
    appeal, Dames argues there is no substantial evidence of medical
    improvement in her conditions. However, Dames does not challenge the
    conclusion that she experienced medical improvement sufficient to no longer
    qualify as disabled under Listing 12.04(C). Instead, as a result of IQ tests
    1
    The ALJ conducts a multi-step evaluation to determine whether disability benefits
    should be terminated. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f). Dames’s challenge is to the ALJ’s finding
    on the second step, which addresses whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of
    impairments that meets or equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of 20 C.F.R. § 404 subpart
    P. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(2). To meet the criteria for a condition in the Listing of
    Impairments, a claimant must be diagnosed with a condition included in the Listings, and she
    must provide medical reports documenting the specific criteria of the condition, including the
    duration of the condition. Wilson v. Barnhart, 
    284 F.3d 1219
    , 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (per
    curiam). For a condition to equal a listing, “the medical findings must be at least equal in
    severity and duration to the listed findings.” 
    Id. (quotation omitted).
    When the claimant has
    multiple impairments and, standing alone, none meet the criteria for a listed impairment, the
    Commissioner will review all of a claimant’s impairments to determine whether together they
    medically equal a listed impairment. 
    Id. 3 Case:
    17-13473     Date Filed: 08/03/2018   Page: 4 of 6
    performed in 2006, she argues she qualifies under Listing 12.05(B), as amended in
    2017, and that there has been no medical improvement related to that Listing.
    Under the version of Listing 12.05 in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision
    to terminate Dames’s benefits, “a claimant must at least (1) have significantly
    subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) have deficits in adaptive behavior;
    and (3) have manifested deficits in adaptive behavior before age 22.” Crayton v.
    Callahan, 
    120 F.3d 1217
    , 1219 (11th Cir. 1997). A claimant must also meet one of
    the four sets of criteria found in 12.05(A), (B), (C), and (D) to show her
    impairments are severe enough to meet or equal Listing 12.05. See 20 C.F.R. pt.
    404, subpt. P, app. 1, 12.05 (effective May 18, 2015).
    Amended Listing 12.05 simplified the four sets of criteria into two alternate
    criteria in subsections 12.05(A) and (B). 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, 12.05.
    As relevant here, the amendment simplified the IQ score requirement to a full-scale
    score of 70 or less or a full-scale score of 71–75 accompanied by a verbal or
    performance IQ score of 70 or below. 
    Id. at 12.05(B).
    Dames argues she meets
    the intellectual disability requirements of the amended version of Listing 12.05(B)
    based on IQ tests performed in 2006 that found she had a full-scale score of 62, a
    verbal score of 70, and a performance score of 57.
    This Court’s review is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s decision is
    supported by substantial evidence and correctly applied the law. Barnhart, 285
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    of 6 F.3d at 1330
    . That of course requires us to decide whether remand is required
    because of a change in the law after the ALJ’s decision. In this case, Dames
    argues under a post-decision amendment to Listing 12.05, so we must decide
    whether the amended version applies on review in federal court. When Listing
    12.05 was amended, the Social Security Administration stated the amended rules
    “will apply . . . to new applications filed on or after the effective date of the rules,
    and to claims that are pending on or after the effective date.” Revised Medical
    Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders, 81 Fed. Reg. 66,137, 66,138 (Sept. 26,
    2016). The regulation explained in more detail how this would work for claims
    before the Administration and for claims before the courts. For claims before the
    Administration, the amended rules would apply “after their effective date, in any
    case in which [the Commissioner] make[s] a determination or decision.” 
    Id. at 66,138
    n.1. As for claims before courts, the Administration “expect[ed] that
    Federal courts will review [its] final decisions using the rules that were in effect at
    the time [the Commissioner] issued the decisions.” 2 
    Id. Given the
    regulation’s
    own terms of applicability, we decline to remand for evaluation of Dames’s
    disability under the amended Listing 12.05.
    2
    Upon receiving a case on remand, the Commissioner would apply the amended rules in
    its decisions. Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders, 81 Fed. Reg. at 66,138
    n.1.
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    The pleadings are not clear about whether Dames challenges any other
    aspect of the ALJ’s and the district court’s decisions. Assuming she challenges the
    ALJ’s finding that her medical improvement meant she no longer met or medically
    equaled any listed impairment, this decision was supported by substantial
    evidence. The record contained evidence showing Dames was only mildly
    restricted in her daily life; had only moderate difficulties in social functioning; and
    had only moderate difficulties with regard to concentration, persistence, or pace.
    AFFIRMED.
    6