USCA11 Case: 21-13195 Document: 47-1 Date Filed: 02/17/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13195
____________________
LINDA HARDNETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC,
a Georgia limited liability company,
TRANS UNION, LLC,
an Illinois limited liability company,
CREDIT COLLECTION SERVICES, INC.,
a foreign corporation,
Defendants-Appellees,
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13195
MERRICK BANK CORPORATION,
a foreign corporation
d.b.a. Merrick Bank, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-03017-LMM
____________________
Before BRANCH, BRASHER, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Linda Hardnett sued multiple defendants, alleging
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”). After the
district court granted one of the defendant’s motion to dismiss,
Hardnett appealed to this Court. But we do not reach the merits
of Hardnett’s appeal today. After a careful review for appellate
jurisdiction in this case, we conclude that we have none.
Accordingly, we dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.
Hardnett sued seven defendants for alleged violations of the
FCRA. Four defendants were dismissed through notices of
voluntary dismissal before they answered. Another defendant,
Credit Collection Services, Inc. (“CCS”), moved to dismiss
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21-13195 Opinion of the Court 3
Hardnett’s claims against it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court granted CCS’s
motion. The dismissal of CCS, however, still left two defendants
in the case—Trans Union, LLC and Equifax Information Services,
LLC.
Shortly after CCS was dismissed, Hardnett informed the
district court that she had settled her claims with Trans Union and
Equifax and that she anticipated filing stipulations of dismissal
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). On July 2, 2021,
Hardnett and Trans Union filed a “Stipulation of Dismissal with
Prejudice of Trans Union Only,” which was signed by counsel for
Hardnett, Trans Union, and Equifax. They also provided a draft
order, and the district court entered an order dismissing Hardnett’s
claims against Trans Union on July 23, 2021, leaving Equifax as the
last remaining defendant.
Hardnett and Equifax then filed a “Stipulation of Dismissal
with Prejudice” as to Equifax, which was signed by counsel for
Hardnett and Equifax only. Unlike the Trans Union dismissal, the
district court did not enter an order dismissing Hardnett’s claims
against Equifax. After filing the Equifax stipulation of dismissal,
Hardnett appealed.
It is well-established that we must raise concerns about our
jurisdiction at any point in the appellate process and that we are
ordinarily limited to reviewing only final decisions of district
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13195
courts.1 See
28 U.S.C. § 1291; Acheron Capital, Ltd. v. Mukamal,
22 F.4th 979, 986 (11th Cir. 2022). After this appeal was set for oral
argument on the merits, we asked the parties to address whether
the Equifax stipulation was effective given that it was signed only
by counsel for Hardnett and Equifax. We asked because Rule
41(a)(1)(A)(ii) permits a plaintiff to dismiss an action by filing “a
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). While Equifax was
the sole remaining defendant, other defendants had appeared in
this case.
Although we have “h[e]ld that [a] plaintiff is entitled to a
dismissal against one defendant under Rule 41(a), even though the
action against another defendant would remain pending,” we have
not addressed who must sign a stipulation of dismissal. Plains
Growers, Inc. by Florists’ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ickes-Braun Glasshouses,
Inc.,
474 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1973) (discussing only Rule 41(a)
notices and motions in a case not involving a stipulation of
dismissal). 2 The parties do not point us to a published decision
from another circuit examining this issue in any depth nor has our
1 Although exceptions to this rule exist, they are not relevant to this appeal.
2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
this Court adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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21-13195 Opinion of the Court 5
research revealed one. 3 Nevertheless, in interpreting Rule 41(a)(1),
we have repeatedly said that the Rule “means precisely what it
says.” Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
506
F.2d 914, 916 (5th Cir. 1975); Est. of W. v. Smith,
9 F.4th 1361,
1367–68 (11th Cir. 2021). And Hardnett and CCS both concede that
the Equifax stipulation was not signed by all parties who have
appeared in this case and was therefore not a valid stipulation of
dismissal.
Because the district court did not order dismissal under Rule
41(a)(2), the claims against Equifax remain pending. Without a
final resolution of all of the claims of all the parties, there is not a
final judgment. 4 See Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant,
689
F.3d 1244, 1245–46 (11th Cir. 2012).
Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
3 We acknowledge that the Fifth Circuit noted in 2018 that “only the dismissed
defendant need sign the stipulation.” Nat’l City Golf Fin. v. Scott,
899 F.3d
412, 415 n.3 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Plains Growers, 474 F.2d at 253). But the
Fifth Circuit provided no reasoning for its conclusion and the only case it cited
(Plains Growers, 474 F.2d at 253) did not address stipulations of dismissal
under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii).
4 Indeed, both Hardnett and CCS concede that, in light of Equifax’s ineffective
dismissal stipulation, “the district court’s judgment that is the subject of [this]
appeal was not final and appealable.”
