United States v. Michael Reese Coffman , 188 F. App'x 945 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-14354 JULY 11, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00017-CR-3-RV
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MICHAEL REESE COFFMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 11, 2006)
Before ANDERSON, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Reese Coffman appeals his conviction and life sentence for
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more
of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii), and
846. On appeal, Coffman first argues that there was insufficient evidence to
convict him because the government failed to prove that he was involved in an
ongoing conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
methamphetamine. Coffman also argues that the district court erred when it gave
him a two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
I.
We review de novo the sufficiency of evidence to support convictions,
resolving all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v.
Diaz-Boyzo, 432 F.3d 1264, 1269 (11th Cir. 2005). “The evidence is sufficient so
long as a reasonable trier of fact, choosing among reasonable interpretations of the
evidence, could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. We review a district
court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal de novo, viewing the facts and
drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the government. United
States v. Descent, 292 F.3d 703, 706 (11th Cir. 2002).
“[C]redibility determinations are the exclusive province of the jury.” United
States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 1997). “For testimony of a
government witness to be incredible as a matter of law, it must be ‘unbelievable on
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its face.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir.
1985)). Furthermore, we have concluded that a “jury, hearing the defendant’s
words and seeing his demeanor, [is] entitled to disbelieve his testimony and, in
fact, to believe the opposite of what he said.” United States v. Peters, 403 F.3d
1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
In this case, there was sufficient evidence to justify the jury’s finding that
Coffman was guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than
500 grams of methamphetamine. “To sustain a conviction for conspiracy to
possess [a controlled substance] with intent to distribute, the government must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) an illegal agreement existed; (2) the
defendant knew of it; and (3) the defendant, with knowledge, voluntarily joined it.”
United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2005). “Participation
in a conspiracy can be inferred from ‘a development and collocation of
circumstances.’” Id. (quoting United States v. McDowell, 250, F.3d 1354, 1365
(11th Cir. 2001)). “Although mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient
to support a conspiracy conviction, presence nonetheless is a probative factor
which the jury may consider in determining whether a defendant was a knowing
and intentional participant in a criminal scheme.” Id.The government asserted that a conspiracy existed between Coffman, Karen
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Lowery, and Julia Franklin to possess 500 grams of methamphetamine with intent
to distribute. Coffman’s co-conspirators both testified to his involvement in the
scheme. Julia Franklin testified that she, Lowery, and Coffman made an agreement
that she, Franklin, would buy methamphetamine from Lowery and Coffman
because they had a cheaper source. Franklin further testified that she openly dealt
with Lowery in front of Coffman because she considered him part of the
conspiracy. Karen Lowery, the other co-conspirator, testified that Coffman lived
with her on-and-off during the time-frame of the conspiracy. She testified that
Coffman brought Robert Smith to their trailer for the purpose of arranging a deal to
get methamphetamine at a better price. She further testified that Coffman carried
the money (pooled by Lowery and Julia Franklin) on 12 trips to Atlanta with
Robert Smith to purchase methamphetamine. Lowery stated that she paid Coffman
with methamphetamine for making the trips to Atlanta. Franklin accompanied
Coffman and Smith on one of their trips to Atlanta and she testified that she saw
Coffman and Smith get a phone call, leave the motel, and then return with
methamphetamine.
Christopher Cade, the government informant, testified that when he
purchased one ounce of methamphetamine, he gave the money to Lowery and
Coffman handed him the methamphetamine. Joshua Mauldin, another government
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witness, testified that he witnessed Coffman’s purchase of methamphetamine in
Atlanta.
Coffman argues that these witnesses are not credible because they were
motivated to testify by the hope of receiving favorable treatment in their own
criminal cases. In addition, Coffman claims that Cade and Mauldin were housed in
the same cell unit at the jail and traveled to court together. Therefore, Coffman
argues, we can presume that Cade and Mauldin shared information about Coffman
despite their denials. Coffman made these same arguments at trial but the jury still
convicted. The jury knew that the witnesses were felons, and that they were
cooperating with the government. Nonetheless, the jury made its credibility
determinations and decided that there was sufficient evidence to convict Coffman.
This Court has held that a defendant’s conviction is not subject to reversal, even
though it relies on the testimony of “an array of scoundrels, liars and brigands,”
unless that testimony is “unbelievable on its face” – i.e., if the testimony is about
facts that the witness “physically could not have possibly observed or events that
could not possibly have occurred under the laws of nature.” United States v.
Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1324 (11th Cir. 1997).
We conclude that the testimony at trial provided sufficient evidence to
support Coffman’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine
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because it established that: (1) an illegal agreement existed; (2) Coffman knew
about it; and (3) he knowingly and voluntarily joined it. Credibility determinations
are solely within the jury’s province, and the jury chose to believe other witnesses
instead of Coffman’s own testimony. Therefore, the district court did not err when
it denied Coffman’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
II.
Coffman asserts that the trial judge erred in giving him a two-point
Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for obstruction of justice. However, Coffman
also acknowledges that the issue may be moot, or harmless error, because
Coffman’s two prior felony drug convictions required a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment.
Federal law requires that a person who is convicted of violating § 841
involving 50 grams or more of methamphetamine shall receive a minimum
sentence of ten years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). However, if a person
violates this statute after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense,
there is a minimum mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without release. Id.Coffman’s previous drug convictions compelled the life sentence and, therefore,
the Guidelines calculation did not affect Coffman’s sentence.
This Circuit has concluded that, when a district court correctly imposes the
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statutory mandatory minimum sentence for an offense, any error in the Guidelines
calculations is harmless, and a defendant’s claim that his sentence is
unconstitutional in light of Booker lacks merit. United States v. Raad, 406 F.3d
1322, 1323 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, we find no reversible error. We conclude
that the district court had no choice but to sentence Coffman to life imprisonment,
pursuant to the statutory requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii).
Accordingly, we affirm Coffman’s conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.1
1
Appellant’s request for oral argument is denied.
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