United States v. Angela Blount , 194 F. App'x 690 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-15835 AUGUST 25, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-60129-CR-JAL
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANGELA BLOUNT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(August 25, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Angela Blount, a federal prisoner, appeals her sentences for four counts of
unlawful use of another person’s identification, 18 U.S.C. § 1028, and two counts
of use of an unauthorized access device, 18 U.S.C. § 1029.
On appeal, Blount argues that the district court erred in failing to require
medical evidence as to her psychiatric condition and the mental effects of the
medication that she was taking for bipolar disorder, which she contends prevented
her from knowingly waiving her right to appeal. Blount contends that there was a
bona fide doubt as to her competency, as shown by the district court’s concerns
about her medication at the initial change-of-plea hearing. Therefore, she argues
that an evidentiary hearing on the matter should have been held. Blount, however,
does not ask that her guilty plea be vacated, but only that the appeal waiver
provision be severed from the plea agreement.
In Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385, 86 S.Ct. 836, 842, 15 L.Ed.2d 815(1966), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the prohibition against trying an
incompetent defendant requires a trial court to hold a competency hearing sua
sponte when presented with information that raises a “bona fide doubt as to the
petitioner’s competency.” Johnston v. Singletary, 162 F.3d 630, 634 (11th Cir.
1998).
Defendants who are not competent to participate in the proceedings cannot
waive their constitutional rights. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-01, 113
2
S.Ct. 2680, 2687-88, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993). “A defendant is considered
competent to stand trial if he has sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and if he has a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Johnston, 162
F.3d at 634 n.4 (internal quotation omitted). Three factors are to be considered
when determining whether a trial court violated a defendant’s procedural due
process rights by failing to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte: (1) evidence
of the defendant’s irrational behavior; (2) the defendant’s demeanor; and (3) prior
medical opinion regarding the defendant’s competence to participate in the
proceedings. Tiller v. Esposito, 911 F.2d 575, 576 (11th Cir. 1990). “[T]he mere
presence of mental illness or other mental disability at the time [the defendant]
entered his plea does not necessarily mean that he was incompetent to plead . . . .
The mental illness or disability must have been so debilitating that [the defendant]
was unable to consult with his lawyer and did not have a rational and factual
understanding of the proceedings.” Bolius v. Wainwright, 597 F.2d 986, 990 (5th
Cir. 1979).
Blount did not raise the issue of competency before the district court, but the
court had a duty to raise the issue sua sponte if a bona fide doubt existed as to her
competency. Johnston, 162 F.3d at 634. Such doubt is not present within the
3
record, however. The district court was in the best position to determine Blount’s
demeanor throughout the proceedings, and the court found that she was competent
to proceed after lengthy questioning. The record does not evince erratic or
irrational behavior by Blount. The district court did decide to postpone the initial
change-of-plea hearing because Blount’s medication dosage had been increased the
previous day. This one-week postponement was a cautious response to the change
in dosage, rather than a response to any indication of incompetency. Although
there was evidence in the record that Blount had a history of mental illness, such a
history by itself is not enough to find that a defendant is incompetent to plead.
Bolius, 597 F.2d at 990. In 2000, a state court determined that Blount was
incompetent to plead guilty, but that case proceeded in 2001 when she was on
medication. All indications in the record are that Blount was competent when she
was receiving treatment for her bipolar disorder, as she was at the time of the plea
hearing in the instant case. Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err in
finding Blount competent to plead guilty.
Once it has been determined that a defendant was competent to plead guilty,
the court must ensure that the waiver of her constitutional rights was knowing and
voluntary. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400, 113 S.Ct. at 2687. We review de novo the
knowing and voluntary nature of a sentence appeal waiver. United States v.
4
Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 1993). A sentence appeal waiver may be
enforced, so long as it was knowingly and voluntarily made. Id. at 1350.
To prevail upon its contention that the sentencing claim is waived, we have
indicated that “[t]he government must show that either (1) the district court
specifically questioned the defendant concerning the sentence appeal waiver during
the Rule 11 colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the record that the defendant
otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver.” Id. at 1351. A sentence
appeal waiver that is otherwise valid is not rendered invalid by a sentencing court’s
statement that a defendant can appeal. See United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166,
1168 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that district court’s statement to defendant that “I
cannot depart in this case but I invite and welcome an appeal” did not modify the
sentencing appeal waiver in the plea agreement); United States v. Benitez-Zapata,
131 F.3d 1444, 1446-47 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the court’s statement, after
imposing the sentence, that the defendant could appeal within ten days did not
nullify the plea agreement).
In this case, the district court specifically questioned Blount concerning the
sentence appeal waiver during the Rule 11 colloquy after first reading the waiver to
her. See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351. Although the district court made references to
Blount’s ability to appeal the judgment and sentence, those were made only in
5
passing and were corrected by the government after the court already had made a
direct inquiry into Blount’s understanding of the waiver. Therefore, Blount
knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to appeal, and we will not address her
arguments that challenge aspects of her sentence because we are precluded from
reviewing them by the appeal waiver. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we
affirm.
AFFIRMED.1
1
Appellant’s request for oral argument is denied.
6