Rickey Edward Fillmore v. Sheriff Neil Perry ( 2006 )


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  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                   FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-12201
    January 20, 2006
    Non-Argument Calendar             THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________                CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 04-00087-CV-J-32-MCR
    RICKEY EDWARD FILLMORE,
    a.k.a.
    Johnny Leslie Simmons,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    SHERIFF NEIL PERRY,
    ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Respondents-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (January 20, 2006)
    Before TJOFLAT, BIRCH and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Rickey Edward Fillmore, a Florida prisoner, proceeding pro se, appeals the
    district court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     habeas corpus petition. The
    Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No.
    104-32, 
    110 Stat. 1214
     (1996), governs this appeal because Fillmore filed his
    motion after the AEDPA’s effective date. We granted a certificate of appealability
    solely on the following question: whether the district court, based on the record
    before it, erred in denying appellant’s claim that his state court guilty plea was
    involuntary.
    On appeal, Fillmore argues that the state circuit court participated in his plea
    negotiation by stating that it would recommend that Fillmore serve his probation in
    Indiana and, because of the court’s participation and promise, Fillmore was
    induced to plead guilty. Fillmore further contends that the district court erred in
    denying his involuntary plea claim without reviewing the transcript from the state
    court plea hearing and in failing to compel the State to submit the transcript to the
    court for review. He also maintains that the transcript is crucial to the district
    court’s determination that he was given a full and fair hearing in the state court and
    whether the state court’s participation in the plea hearing resulted in an involuntary
    plea.
    When reviewing a district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition, we review
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    “questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings of fact
    for clear error.” LeCroy v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, 
    421 F.3d 1237
    , 1259
    (11th Cir. 2005). Moreover, “[t]he district court’s determination of whether the
    state court decision was reasonable . . . is subject to de novo review.” 
    Id.
     (internal
    quotation and citation omitted).
    A § 2254 petition shall not be granted unless a “claim that was adjudicated
    on the merits” by the state court:
    (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
    unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
    determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
    (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
    determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
    State court proceeding.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d). In a § 2254 proceeding, “a determination of a factual issue
    made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the
    burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
    evidence.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (e)(1). Further, “[a] petitioner has the burden of
    establishing his right to federal habeas relief and of proving all facts necessary to
    show a constitutional violation.” Romine v. Head, 
    253 F.3d 1349
    , 1357 (11th Cir.
    2001). Rule 5 of the rules governing § 2254 cases, however, requires that the
    State’s answer to the petition contain the following:
    what transcripts (of pretrial, trial, sentencing, or post-conviction
    3
    proceedings) are available, when they can be furnished, and what
    proceedings have been recorded but not transcribed. The [State] must
    attach to the answer parts of the transcript that the [State] considers
    relevant. The judge may order that the [State] furnish other parts of
    existing transcripts or that parts of untranscribed recordings be
    transcribed and furnished. If a transcript cannot be obtained, the
    [State] may submit a narrative summary of the evidence.
    Rule 5(c), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Such transcripts
    are crucial because without them, a petitioner would find it difficult if not
    impossible to satisfy the steep burden of being entitled to habeas relief.
    As an initial matter, Fillmore’s involuntary plea claim is not procedurally
    barred because of a failure to exhaust the claim in the state court proceedings.
    Based on a liberal construction of Fillmore’s pleadings, he raised his claim in his
    Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion before the state circuit court and
    the Fifth District Court of Appeal (“DCA”), and in his petition for writ of habeas
    corpus in the DCA.
    As to the merits of Fillmore’s claim, Fillmore bears the burden of proving
    the facts that establish a constitutional violation and his right to habeas relief. See
    Romine, 253 F.3d at 1357 (explaining that where “the evidence does not clearly
    explain what happened, or more accurately why something failed to happen, the
    party with the burden loses”). However, under Rule 5 of the rules governing
    § 2254 cases, the State must provide, and indicate the availability of, any relevant
    4
    transcripts, and, if such transcripts are not available, the State may submit a
    narrative summary of the evidence. Rule 5(c), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28
    U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The State failed to provide or indicate the availability of the
    transcript from Fillmore’s plea hearing in its response to Fillmore’s petition.
    Without receiving such a transcript or narrative, Fillmore was not afforded an
    opportunity to meet his burden with regards to overcoming the presumption of
    correctness of the state court’s factual findings. Accordingly, the district court
    inappropriately applied this presumption of correctness regarding whether
    Fillmore’s plea was voluntary without Fillmore having access to all of the
    information guaranteed under Rule 5 and needed to rebut this presumption. Cf.
    Wilson v. Cooke, 
    814 F.2d 614
    , 615 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (district court
    could not rely on magistrate’s recommendation regarding habeas petition when the
    magistrate did not meet its obligation to furnish a transcript of the evidentiary
    hearing that was the basis for the recommendation). Additionally, we cannot give
    appropriate appellate review without either a transcript or narrative on the record.
    See 
    id.
    Accordingly, we vacate and remand to the district court with instructions for
    the court to require the State to comply with Rule 5 and to determine whether a
    transcript of Fillmore’s plea hearing exists or a recording of it is available for
    transcription.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-12201; D.C. Docket 04-00087-CV-J-32-MCR

Judges: Birch, Per Curiam, Tjoflat, Wilson

Filed Date: 1/20/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024