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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-12512
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket Nos. 6:16-cv-01029-GKS-GJK,
6:93-cr-00047-GKS-GJK-1
WILLIE ROBERTSON, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(September 28, 2018)
Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In July 1993, a jury found Willie Robertson, Jr., guilty of being in
possession of a sawed-off shotgun after having been convicted of a felony, in
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violation of 924(g)(1), and of possession of two, unregistered sawed-off shotguns,
one without a serial number, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d) and 5871.
The District Court, finding that, under this Court’s precedent, Robertson’s 1975
Florida robbery conviction, a violation of Fla. Stat. § 811.011, qualified as a
violent felony under the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”), sentenced Robertson as a career offender, imposing prison sentences
totaling 300 months. 1 He appealed his convictions and sentences, and we
summarily affirmed. United States v. Robertson,
55 F.3d 635 (Table) (11th Cir.
1995).
On June 13, 2016, Robertson moved the District Court to vacate his
sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on the ground that his 1975 Florida
robbery conviction no longer qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA
following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States,
___ U.S. ____,
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), because, in theory, the crime could be
committed with non-violent force. The District Court disagreed and denied
Robertson’s motion. He filed a notice of appeal, and we granted a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) on the issue of whether the District Court erred in
1
When Robertson was convicted, Florida law defined robbery as: “the taking of money
or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by
force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.” See Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) (1975). Section 812.13
was the same as Fla. Stat. § 811.011. See Cochran v. State,
899 So. 2d 490, 492 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2005) (stating that § 811.011 was changed to § 812.13 when it was published by the Florida
Division of Statutory Revision).
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dismissing Robertson’s motion on the ground that his 1975 Florida robbery
conviction qualified as a violent felony under the elements clause of the ACCA. 2
The scope of our review of an unsuccessful § 2255 motion is limited to the
issues enumerated in the COA.3 McKay v. United States,
657 F.3d 1190, 1195
(11th Cir. 2011). But we may sua sponte expand the COA. Mays v. United States,
817 F.3d 728, 733 (11th Cir. 2016). In a post-conviction case, the district court
must develop a record sufficient to facilitate our review of all issues pertinent to an
application for a COA and, by extension, the ultimate merit of any issues for which
a COA is granted. Long v. United States,
626 F.3d 1167, 1170 (11th Cir. 2010). A
COA is not required for “the defense of a judgment on alternative grounds.”
Jennings v. Stephens,
135 S. Ct. 793, 802 (2015). And, regardless of the ground
stated in the district court’s order or judgment, we may affirm on any ground
supported by the record. Castillo v. United States,
816 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir.
2016).
2
We sua sponte expand the COA to pose the issue as whether, under Beeman v. United
States,
871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017), Robertson has carried his burden of proving from the
record of his sentencing proceedings that it was more likely than not that the District Court found
that his 1975 Florida robbery conviction was a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause.
As we conclude infra, the sentencing record does not enable Robertson to prove the point.
3
When reviewing a district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion, we review questions of law
de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Jeffries v. United States,
748 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th
Cir. 2014).
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The ACCA defines the term “violent felony” as any crime punishable by a
term of imprisonment exceeding one year that:
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk
of physical injury to another.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The first prong of this definition is sometimes referred
to as the “elements clause,” while the second prong contains the “enumerated
crimes” and, finally, what is commonly called the “residual clause.” United States
v. Owens,
672 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir. 2012). On June 26, 2015, the Supreme
Court held that the residual clause of the ACCA is unconstitutionally vague
because it creates uncertainty about how to evaluate the risks posed by a crime and
how much risk it takes to qualify as a violent felony. Johnson v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557-58, 2563 (2015). Thus, under Johnson, a defendant’s
sentence cannot be enhanced using the residual clause because the residual clause
is unconstitutionally vague.
Id. at 2563. Thereafter, the Supreme Court held that
Johnson announced a new substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases on
collateral review. Welch v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264-65, 1268 (2016).
We recently explained that a Johnson claim argues that the defendant was
sentenced as an armed career criminal under the residual clause. Beeman v. United
States,
871 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 2017). In Beeman, we held that a § 2255
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movant must prove that it was “more likely than not” that the use of the residual
clause led the sentencing court to impose the ACCA enhancement.
Id. at 1221-22.
In doing so, we rejected the movant’s premise that a Johnson movant had met his
burden unless the record affirmatively showed that the district court relied upon the
ACCA’s elements clause.
Id. at 1223. We stated that each case must be judged on
its own facts and that different kinds of evidence could be used to show that a
sentencing court relied on the residual clause.
Id. at 1224 n.4. As examples, we
stated that a record may contain direct evidence in the form of a sentencing judge’s
comments or findings indicating that the residual clause was essential to an ACCA
enhancement.
Id. Further, we stated that a record may contain sufficient
circumstantial evidence, such as unobjected-to PSI statements recommending that
the enumerated-offenses and elements clauses did not apply or concessions made
by the prosecutor that those two clauses did not apply.
Id. We clarified, however,
that the relevant issue is one of historical fact—whether at the time of sentencing
the defendant was sentenced solely under the residual clause.
Id. at 1224 n.5.
Accordingly, we noted that precedent issuing after sentencing “casts very little
light, if any, on the key question” of whether the defendant was, in fact, sentenced
under the residual clause only.
Id.
As to the movant in Beeman, we rejected the District Court’s dismissal of
the § 2255 motion as untimely because the movant timely raised a Johnson claim.
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Id. at 1221. But we addressed the merits of the Johnson claim, even though the
District Court did not, because we may affirm on any ground supported by the
record, the record was clear that the movant could not meet his burden, and the
movant had not requested a remand for an evidentiary hearing and agreed to
proceed on the record as it was.
Id. As nothing in the record showed that the
sentencing court relied on the residual clause, rather than the elements clause, and
the movant cited no precedent from the time of sentencing showing that his
conviction qualified as a violent felony only under the residual clause, we
concluded that the movant could not carry his burden.
Id. at 1224-25.
As it was in Beeman, it is clear from the record before the District Court at
sentencing in this case that Robertson cannot prove that it was more likely than not
that his sentences were enhanced solely under the ACCA’s residual clause. The
record is entirely silent as to the issue. Neither the presentence report nor the
District Court at sentencing explained or indicated in any way whether the ACCA
enhancement applied because the 1975 Florida robbery conviction was a violent
felony under the elements clause or the residual clause.4 The District Court’s
judgment is therefore
AFFIRMED.
4
Robertson has not asked us to remand the case to the District Court for an evidentiary
hearing on the residual clause issue, so that he could question the District Judge on whether he
found the robbery conviction a violent felony under that clause.
6
