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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-11468
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:87-cv-08548-KMM
JUPITER WRECK, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
THE UNIDENTIFIED WRECKED AND ABANDONED SAILING VESSEL, her
tackle, armament, apparel, and cargo located within 1,000 yards of a point located
at coordinates 26° 56.4' North Latitude, 80° 04.15' West Longitude
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(March 6, 2019)
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Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and SUTTON, ∗ Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
This appeal concerns the remains of a Spanish Galleon (Vessel) that sunk off
the coast of Florida in the late seventeenth century, and currently lies about 100
yards offshore in the Jupiter Inlet. The underlying case originated in 1987 when
Jupiter Wreck, Inc. filed an in rem action seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief—namely, to acquire title to the Vessel and to enjoin all parties from
interfering with its salvage activities. See Jupiter Wreck, Inc. v. Unidentified,
Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel,
691 F. Supp. 1377, 1381 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(Jupiter Wreck I). After Jupiter Wreck moved for a preliminary injunction, the
court granted the motion “to the extent that [Jupiter Wreck sought] relief as against
any persons or entities other than the State” but denied the motion “to the extent
that [Jupiter Wreck sought] relief as against the State.”
Id. at 1394. The district
court reasoned that the State of Florida’s Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit
prevented Jupiter Wreck from “gaining title or full possession of the res . . .
without the consent to suit by the State.”
Id. at 1383. The district court retained
jurisdiction to administer the distribution of the salvaged treasure on an annual
basis.
∗The Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton, United States Circuit Judge for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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The instant appeal arises out of the 2014 distribution. Jupiter Wreck sought
a distribution of five salvaged coins and requested a status conference. After the
district court ordered Florida—a nonparty 1—to respond, Florida made a limited
appearance to oppose the status conference. The court granted in part the motion
for distribution and denied the request for a status conference. Jupiter Wreck
appeals, arguing that Florida should not be allowed to challenge the distribution
and oppose the status conference without consenting to suit. After the benefit of
oral argument, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
In 1987, Jupiter Wreck filed an in rem action against the Vessel in the
Southern District of Florida. Jupiter Wreck I,
691 F. Supp. 1381. Jupiter Wreck
sought a declaration that it possessed valid title to the Vessel “against all
claimants.”
Id. Florida brought an enforcement action against Jupiter Wreck in
state court to enjoin it from “trespassing, damaging, or using State sovereignty
submerged lands without first obtaining the required consent” from the State.
Id.
Jupiter Wreck removed the action to federal court, and the cases were
consolidated. See
id.
1
This appeal is unusual in that there is no Appellee other than the in rem defendant—the Vessel
itself.
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Jupiter Wreck moved for a preliminary injunction seeking to prevent Florida
(and all others) from interfering with its salvaging. See
id. The district court
granted Jupiter Wreck’s motion for a preliminary injunction to the extent it sought
relief from entities other than Florida, but denied any relief Jupiter Wreck sought
against Florida.
Id. at 1394. The Eleventh Amendment, the district court
reasoned, prevented Jupiter Wreck from “gaining title or full possession of the
res . . . without the consent to suit by the State.”
Id. at 1383.
After the decision, Jupiter Wreck and Florida entered into an agreement—
the Agreement Regarding Research and Recovery of Archaeological Material
Between Florida Division of Historical Resources and Jupiter Wreck, Inc. (1990
Agreement)—that governs the parties’ rights and liabilities and “recognizes the
yearly distribution . . . of artifacts recovered from the [ ] vessel.” At the parties’
request, the district court dismissed the case and closed it for statistical purposes
but retained jurisdiction to administer the annual distribution of recoveries. Jupiter
Wreck and Florida have renewed the 1990 Agreement—or a slightly modified
version of that agreement—each year. For more than twenty years, Jupiter Wreck
and Florida peacefully abided by those agreements and the district court’s annual
distribution of the salvaged goods.
In 2011, Jupiter Wreck filed a motion for a preliminary injunction against
Florida and a motion to reopen the case. In support of its motions, Jupiter Wreck
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argued that California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.,
523 U.S. 491, 494–95,
118 S.
Ct. 1464, 1167 (1998), constituted a change in the controlling law, and therefore
the district court should reconsider the 1988 opinion. The district court denied
both motions, concluding that, in order to obtain the relief sought, Jupiter Wreck
would have to file a new lawsuit seeking injunctive relief against Florida because
Florida was not a party to the pending action.
In 2017, Jupiter Wreck filed a motion for distribution, asking the district
court to adjudicate the title to its 2014 recoveries. Jupiter Wreck also filed a
motion for a status conference. According to Jupiter Wreck, the status conference
was necessary because Florida had “impermissibly attempted to usurp” the court’s
admiralty jurisdiction by interfering with its salvage rights, particularly over the
past five years. The district court ordered Florida to respond to the motion for a
status conference. In doing so, Florida urged the district court to reject Jupiter
Wreck’s veiled attempt at relitigating the case.
The magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant the motion
for distribution in part and deny the motion for a status conference. In its Report
and Recommendation, the magistrate judge concluded: (1) Jupiter Wreck was
entitled to the five gold coins recovered; (2) Jupiter Wreck’s request for a status
conference was an attempt to relitigate the parties’ respective rights to the Vessel;
and (3) the district court’s 1988 and 2012 opinions should not be reconsidered
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because Jupiter Wreck failed to establish that controlling law had changed, that
new evidence had come to light, or that manifest injustice would result if the
motion was denied.
Jupiter Wreck objected to the Report and Recommendation on several
grounds. In its court-ordered response to the objections, Florida again noted that it
was making a limited appearance and was not appearing “for any other purpose.”
Florida stated that it “supports and endorses the Magistrate’s report and
recommendations in full” because Jupiter Wreck was improperly attempting to
relitigate previously resolved issues. Florida attached to its response the 1991 and
2015 iterations of its agreement with Jupiter Wreck (1991 Agreement and 2015
Agreement, respectively). Thereafter, Jupiter Wreck filed a motion to strike
Florida’s response. According to Jupiter Wreck, by attaching the 1991 and 2015
Agreements, “the State attempts to assert a claim of title to the In Rem Defendant
and salvaged items.” Because Florida cannot claim title while simultaneously
invoking the defense of sovereign immunity, Jupiter Wreck argued, its pleadings
should be stricken.
The district court rejected the motion to strike and each objection, adopting
the Report and Recommendation in its entirety. Jupiter Wreck timely appealed.
What exactly Jupiter Wreck is appealing, and what relief it is seeking, however, is
unclear.
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Curiously, Jupiter Wreck frames the issues on appeal as: (1) does “Florida, a
non-party to the proceeding, ha[ve] standing to challenge the exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction of the admiralty court which, heretofore, has exercised
exclusive rights to protect Jupiter Wreck’s ongoing salvage and adjudicate title on
a yearly basis” and (2) does Florida have to “appear in the Federal Court
proceeding and subject its rights to the decision of the Admiralty Court” in order to
“object to a distribution of recovered artifacts and object to a Status Conference.”
Jupiter Wreck then requests that we grant the appeal and that “all pleadings filed
by the State of Florida [ ] be stricken unless the State of Florida consents to this
Court’s In Rem jurisdiction and subjects its rights to decision.”2 We briefly
address the issues as framed by Jupiter Wreck before considering what we believe
2
Oral argument did not clarify the issues on appeal. See, e.g., Oral Arg. at 2:53 (Judge Wilson
asking, “[s]o, what exactly are you seeking in this case? . . . [y]ou asked the Court to strike the
state’s pleadings unless they consent to suit” to which Jupiter Wreck’s counsel responded,
“[t]hat’s correct”); id. at 7:12 (Judge Wilson asking, “[w]hat are you seeking?” to which Jupiter
Wreck’s counsel responded, “[o]nly the title to what is recovered each year”); id. at 9:00 (Judge
Wilson asking, “[w]hat exactly are you appealing?” and Jupiter Wreck counsel responding, “the
order that says that the State owns the wreck because of the Research and Recovery
Agreement”); id. at 13:13 (Judge Wilson stating, “[i]f we write an opinion, our opinion will
affirm or reverse the district court’s denial of your request to strike the State’s pleadings. Is that
what we’re here to resolve this morning?” and Jupiter Wreck’s counsel responding, “I believe
that your decision may very well be exactly what the Supreme Court in the 9-0 decision in Deep
Sea Research said. And that is, the Eleventh Amendment has nothing whatsoever to do with an
in rem salvage case.”); id. at 14:07 (Judge Wilson asking, “you’re trying to bring the State into
this case?” and Jupiter Wreck counsel responding, “I’m only wanting the State . . . if they want
to go ahead and in anyway participate in the salvage that has been going on for thirty years, they
have to come in under the rule and make a claim”).
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to be the issue at the heart of this appeal—whether reconsideration of the 1988
opinion is warranted.
II. Jurisdiction
At the outset, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to review the
district court’s order denying Jupiter Wreck’s motion for a status conference and
motion to strike Florida’s pleadings. “To be appealable, an order must either be
final or fall into a specific class of interlocutory orders that are made appealable by
statute or jurisprudential exception.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City,
235
F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000);
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292. A post-judgment
order is deemed final if it fully resolves all issues raised in the post-judgment
motion that initiated it. See Mayer v. Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc.,
672 F.3d 1222,
1224 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
We have jurisdiction over the instant appeal because the district court’s 2018
order fully resolved all post-judgment motions that sparked it. See
id. While there
is no final judgment on the docket in this case, the 1988 district court opinion held
that Jupiter Wreck was entitled to relief against any party except Florida. See
Jupiter Wreck I,
691 F. Supp. at 1394. After the parties reached an agreement, the
district court dismissed the case and closed it for statistical purposes. Therefore,
Jupiter Wreck’s motions for distribution, for a status conference, and to strike
Florida’s response to its objections to the Report and Recommendation are best
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viewed as post-judgment motions. See Martinez v. Carnival Corp.,
744 F.3d 1240,
1245 (11th Cir. 2014) (“What matters is whether the case, in all practicality, is
finished. In this case, the district court not only administratively closed the case,
but it also denied all pending motions as moot and compelled arbitration. The
district court's order was a functionally final and appealable decision because it left
nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment.”). Because the district
court’s order fully resolved them, we have jurisdiction.
III. Florida’s Standing to Challenge Jurisdiction
Jupiter Wreck first argues that Florida does not have standing to challenge
the district court’s jurisdiction over the ongoing salvage because it is not a party to
the suit. This argument fails because (1) standing concerns are not implicated here,
and (2) Florida made no such jurisdictional challenge.
First, standing concerns are not implicated because Florida has not requested
the federal courts to adjudicate any issue. See Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 99–
100,
88 S. Ct. 1942, 1952 (1968) (“[W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the
question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to
request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is
justiciable.” (emphasis added)). Rather, Florida’s filings were court-ordered
responses to Jupiter Wreck’s request for a status conference and Jupiter Wreck’s
objections to the Report and Recommendation. In these responses, Florida argued
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that the court should not relitigate previously decided issues; in no way did it
attempt to make a claim.
Second, Florida did not challenge the district court’s subject matter
jurisdiction. Jupiter Wreck seemingly construes Florida’s attachments to its court-
ordered filings—the 1991 and 2015 Agreements—as an attempt to evade the
court’s jurisdiction. Language in these agreements indicates that Florida has title
to any recoveries. According to Jupiter Wreck, by referring to this language,
Florida attempted to claim title of the salvaged goods, thereby divesting the district
court of jurisdiction to administer the distribution of the goods. This interpretation
is flawed. Florida included the attachments in support of its argument that a status
conference is not necessary because all operative issues had been resolved either
by the agreements or by previous district court orders.3 Florida never suggested
that the district court lacked jurisdiction.
IV. Florida’s Ability to Object
Jupiter Wreck next argues that Florida should not be able to object to a
distribution of recovered artifacts or a motion for a status conference, or to respond
to an objection to the Report and Recommendation without fully consenting to suit.
In support of this contention, Jupiter Wreck repeats its previous argument—Florida
3
Jupiter Wreck also suggests that Florida breached one of the parties’ shared agreements. See
Oral Arg. at 10:15. If that is the case, Jupiter Wreck should bring a breach of contract claim in
state court.
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improperly “attempt[ed] to assert a claim of title to the In Rem Defendant and
salvaged items” by attaching the 1991 and 2015 Agreements to its response to
Jupiter Wreck’s Report and Recommendation objections. This claim, which
effectively repurposes Jupiter Wreck’s first argument, likewise fails.
Florida’s filings in this case were a result of a court order. Because Florida
was required to file a response, whether it was a party is irrelevant. Moreover, we
disagree with Jupiter Wreck’s interpretation of Florida’s filings.4 Nothing in
Florida’s responses suggests that it was attempting to seek relief—in the form of
title adjudication or otherwise—from the federal courts. Rather, as mentioned,
Florida referenced the 1991 and 2015 Agreements solely in support of its argument
that a status conference was not necessary because all operative issues had been
resolved either by the agreements or the district court.
V. Motion for Reconsideration
Given Jupiter Wreck’s underlying motive—to acquire title to the recovered
artifacts 5—we construe this appeal as a motion for reconsideration. The law of the
case doctrine dictates that we reject such a motion.
4
Even if Florida was seeking title to the Vessel or the recoveries, the district court correctly
stated that “[Jupiter Wreck’s] concerns regarding the Court’s reliance upon any conclusions of
law asserted in the State’s Response are unfounded as the Court has conducted its own
independent review of the issues presently before the Court.” Order Adopting R & R 5.
5
See Oral Arg. at 7:12 (Judge Wilson asking, “[w]hat are you seeking?” to which Jupiter
Wreck’s counsel responded, “[o]nly the title to what is recovered each year”); id. at 13:13 (Judge
Wilson stating, “[i]f we write an opinion, our opinion will affirm or reverse the district court’s
denial of your request to strike the State’s pleadings. Is that what we’re here to resolve this
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The law of the case doctrine prohibits a court from revisiting an issue once it
has been decided in pending litigation. See DeLong Equip. Co. v. Wash. Mills
Electro Minerals Corp.,
990 F.2d 1186, 1196–97 (11th Cir. 1993). But courts may
alter prior holdings based on “a change in controlling authority, new evidence or
the need to avoid manifest injustice.”
Id. at 1196. “A motion for reconsideration
cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that
could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Wilchombe v. TeeVee
Toons, Inc.,
555 F.3d 949, 957 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).
Jupiter Wreck argues that controlling law has changed since the district
court’s 1988 decision. In Jupiter Wreck I, the district court relied on Florida
Department of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc.,
458 U.S. 670,
102 S. Ct. 3304
(1982), in concluding that, “[b]ased on Florida’s immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment, [Jupiter Wreck] is without any possibility of success in
gaining title or full possession of the res in this forum, without the consent to suit
by the State.” Jupiter Wreck I,
691 F. Supp. at 1383. Jupiter Wreck argues that
the Supreme Court’s opinion in California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.,
523 U.S.
491, 494–95,
118 S. Ct. 1464, 1467 (1998), directly undermined the district court’s
morning?” and Jupiter Wreck’s counsel responding, “I believe that your decision may very well
be exactly what the Supreme Court in the 9-0 decision in Deep Sea Research said. And that is,
the Eleventh Amendment has nothing whatsoever to do with an in rem salvage case.”); see also
Pl. Br. 11 (arguing that “Florida was once able to hide behind Eleventh Amendment Immunity
and avoid having to intervene and make its claim to any rights in the Jupiter Wrecksite or claim
title to any of Jupiter Wreck’s recoveries,” but Deep Sea Research changes that).
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reasoning in Jupiter Wreck I. In Deep Sea Research, decided ten years after
Jupiter Wreck I, the Court held that “the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the
jurisdiction of a federal court over an in rem admiralty action where the res is not
within the State’s possession.”
Id. Given this change in controlling law, Jupiter
Wreck argues, the issue of who has title to the Vessel should be reconsidered and
decided in favor of Jupiter Wreck.
Because Jupiter Wreck unsuccessfully argued that Deep Sea Research
constitutes a change in controlling law in 2012, see Req. for Inj. Relief Against the
Dep’t of the Army Corps of Eng’rs, the State of Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. and Fla.
Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n 6, we cannot consider the merits of its
argument. The district court was not persuaded by this argument in 2012, and
Jupiter Wreck did not appeal. Addressing the same argument here would be to
improperly relitigate the issue because there has been no intervening change to the
controlling law since the argument was last addressed in 2012. See DeLong Equip.
Co.,
990 F.2d at 1196–97. Accordingly, we reject what we construe to be a motion
for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.
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