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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-13732
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
Agency No. A205-006-539
VERONICA ALONSO-DIAZ,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
________________________
(July 22, 2019)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Veronica Alonso-Diaz, a native and citizen of Mexico, seeks review of a
Board of Immigrations Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing her appeal from the
denial of her application for cancellation of removal. Alonso-Diaz argues that the
immigration judge (“IJ”) erred in determining that she was not credible and in
finding that she had not met the ten-year physical-presence requirement for
cancellation of removal. We dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
Alonso-Diaz entered the United States without admission or parole on an
unknown date. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served
her with a Notice to Appear, which charged her with being removable as an alien
present in the United States without admission or parole. She conceded
removability and applied for cancellation of removal on the ground that her
removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to her son,
who is a United States citizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
Alonso-Diaz testified at her removal hearing, answering questions posed by
her attorney, counsel for DHS, and the IJ. The IJ found that she was not credible
in light of factual discrepancies in information she provided about her marriage
and residency, contradictions between representations she made in her application
for cancellation of removal and her hearing testimony, and her admission that she
had used her sister’s Social Security number to file her taxes and had falsely
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claimed her nieces and nephews as dependent children on her tax returns. After
giving little or no weight to Alonso-Diaz’s testimony and the conflicting
documentation regarding the duration of her residency in the United States, the IJ
denied her application for cancellation of removal because she had not met her
burden of showing that she had been continuously present in the United States for
ten years. As an alternative ground for denial, the IJ also found that her removal
would not cause exceptional or extremely unusual hardship to a United States
citizen family member. The BIA agreed with the IJ’s findings and dismissed
Alonso-Diaz’s appeal, and this petition for review followed.
II.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has the
discretion to cancel the removal of an alien who, among other things, has been
physically present in this country continuously for at least ten years and has shown
“that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to” an
immediate family member who is a United States citizen or lawful permanent
resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(D). We lack jurisdiction to review the
agency’s denial of this discretionary relief, except to the extent that the petitioner
raises constitutional claims or questions of law. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) & (D);
Jimenez-Galicia v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
690 F.3d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 2012). Our
jurisdiction is further limited to claims for which “the alien has exhausted all
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administrative remedies available to the alien as of right” by raising the claims
before the BIA. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
463
F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006).
We are obligated to consider our own jurisdiction as a threshold question.
Madu v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
470 F.3d 1362, 1365 (11th Cir. 2006). Whether we have
subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we decide de novo. Arias v.
U.S. Att’y Gen.,
482 F.3d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir. 2007).
A.
Alonso-Diaz first contends that, in determining that she had not been present
in the United States for ten years, the IJ failed to give “reasoned consideration” to
the evidence and instead viewed the inconsistencies between various documents
and her testimony in the most negative light. Although she characterizes this claim
as a legal question, her real argument is that the IJ gave too much weight to the
discrepancies in the evidence and too little weight to her hearing testimony when
making his credibility determination, which in turn influenced his conclusion that
she had not been present in the United States as long as she claimed. In
considering whether we have subject-matter jurisdiction, “we must look hard at
Petitioner’s actual arguments—not just [her] description of [her] claims.” Jimenez-
Galicia, 690 F.3d at 1211. A challenge to “the agency’s credibility determination
and the relative weight accorded to the evidence” really is nothing more than “a
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‘garden-variety abuse of discretion argument’ that is insufficient to state a legal
claim over which we have jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D).” Fynn v. U.S. Att’y
Gen.,
752 F.3d 1250, 1253 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Alvarez Acosta v. U.S. Att’y
Gen.,
524 F.3d 1191, 1196–97 (11th Cir. 2008)).
B.
Next, Alonso-Diaz argues that the IJ misapplied 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B)
(“Sustaining burden”) by concluding that she did not meet the physical-presence
requirement without first requesting that she provide additional evidence
corroborating her testimony that she had been in the United States since May 2001.
Even if the cited statute could be interpreted to support this argument, we lack
jurisdiction to consider the claim because she did not raise it on appeal to the BIA.
Although she challenged the IJ’s determination that she had not met the ten-year
requirement, she did not argue that the IJ should have requested—or even that she
should have been allowed to submit—supplemental evidence first. “A petitioner
has not exhausted a claim unless he has both raised the ‘core issue’ before the BIA
and also set out any discrete arguments he relies on in support of that claim.”
Jeune v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,
810 F.3d 792, 800 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal citations
omitted).
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Because Alonso-Diaz does not raise any legal or constitutional claim for
which she has exhausted her administrative remedies, we dismiss her petition for
lack of jurisdiction.
PETITION DISMISSED.
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.
The immigration judge and the BIA ruled, in the alternative, that Ms. Alonso-Diaz failed
to show that her removal would cause extreme hardship to her child, who is a U.S. citizen. I would
dismiss Ms. Alonso-Diaz’s petition on the ground that this ruling is unreviewable, and not reach
the other issues. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); Martinez v. U.S. Atty. General,
446 F.3d 1219,
1221-23 (11th Cir. 2006).
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