United States v. Elizabeth Linkel ( 2016 )


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  •                 Case: 15-10083        Date Filed: 02/02/2016      Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-10083
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cr-00174-GKS-TBS-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ELIZABETH LINKEL,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (February 2, 2016)
    Before TJOFLAT and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI, * Judge.
    *
    Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade,
    sitting by designation.
    Case: 15-10083     Date Filed: 02/02/2016   Page: 2 of 6
    PER CURIAM:
    Elizabeth Linkel (“Linkel”) appeals her sentence of sixty months’
    imprisonment after pleading guilty to access device fraud, under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1029
    (a)(2). See 
    18 U.S.C. § 1029
    (c). Linkel argues that her sentence is both
    procedurally and substantively unreasonable. She also argues that this case should
    be reassigned to a different district judge on remand. Because we determine, and
    the parties agree, that Linkel’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable, we do not
    reach the issue of substantive reasonableness, as the record does not provide for
    meaningful review of that issue. We vacate and remand for resentencing without
    direction of reassignment.
    I.
    We review the reasonableness of a sentence under the abuse of discretion
    standard. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41, 51 (2007). A district court
    commits “significant procedural error” by “failing to calculate (or improperly
    calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
    consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
    erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an
    explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Id. at 51.
    The district court committed several procedural errors in this case. First, the
    district court failed to calculate the Guidelines range for Linkel. Although “the
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    Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark” of any sentence,
    id. at 49, here the district court never even mentioned Linkel’s Guidelines range of
    twelve to eighteen months. Instead, the district court cursorily mentioned the
    Guidelines, stating only that “the guidelines are not presumed to be reasonable”
    and that she “ha[d] an exposure of ten years.” Doc. 48 at 12. These statements are
    not sufficient to demonstrate that the district court used the Guidelines range as a
    benchmark.
    Second, the district court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors. The
    district court was required to consider those factors “to determine whether they
    support the sentence” and “make an individualized assessment based on the facts
    presented.” Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 50
    . Linkel is a first time offender, has two children,
    requested probation or alternatively home confinement, and cooperated with law
    enforcement. The government requested a guideline sentence. Rather than apply
    the § 3553(a) factors to Linkel’s case, the district court spoke generally about the
    nature of identity and credit card theft, but failed to reference any of Linkel’s
    potentially mitigating circumstances. Tellingly, Linkel’s co-defendant, and the
    person who recruited her to commit the crime of access device fraud, received the
    same sixty-month sentence, despite the more serious nature of his involvement in
    the crime. The district court, therefore, appears not to have considered the
    § 3553(a) factors as they relate to Linkel.
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    Third, the district court failed to adequately explain the chosen sentence,
    which contained a forty-two month upward variance. The district court “must give
    serious consideration to the extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must
    explain his conclusion” to demonstrate that any variance is supported by
    “sufficient justifications.” Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 46
    . To justify the sentence, the district
    court stated only its belief that “the guidelines are not reasonable” because they
    were “set out . . . before this credit card fraud has gone viral in this country.” Doc.
    48 at 12. This statement, in the light of the clear Guidelines range, does not
    adequately explain a forty-two month upward variance, from eighteen months to
    sixty. Kimbrough v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 85
    , 109 (2007) (recognizing the
    expertise of the Sentencing Commission and stating that a “closer review may be
    in order when the sentencing judge varies from the Guidelines based solely on the
    judge’s view that the Guidelines range ‘fails properly to reflect § 3553(a)
    considerations’”). In the absence of such explanations or justifications, the record
    does not “allow for meaningful appellate review” in this case. Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 50
    .
    Thus, the district court abused its discretion by committing significant
    procedural errors. As we have done in similar cases, we decline to reach the
    substantive reasonability of Linkel’s sentence, finding instead that the record is
    insufficient for meaningful review of her sentence. See, e.g., United States v.
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    Cruz, No. 14-15776 (11th Cir. Jan. 6, 2016). Instead, we remand to the district
    court to resentence Linkel.
    II.
    We may “order reassignment of a criminal case to another district judge as
    part of our supervisory authority over the district courts in this Circuit.” United
    States v. Torkington, 
    874 F.2d 1441
    , 1446 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing 
    28 U.S.C. § 2106
    ). When there is no actual bias, we consider the following factors:
    “(1) whether the original judge would have difficulty putting his previous views
    and findings aside; (2) whether reassignment is appropriate to preserve the
    appearance of justice; (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication
    out of proportion to gains realized from reassignment.” United States v. Gupta,
    
    572 F.3d 878
    , 891 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Torkington, 
    874 F.2d 1447
    ).
    Linkel has failed to demonstrate that reassignment, in this case, is
    appropriate. The district judge in this case has demonstrated his ability to properly
    sentence individuals convicted of access device fraud, see United States v.
    Oquendo, No. 14-14462, 
    2016 WL 209861
    , at *1 (11th Cir. Jan. 19, 2016), even
    having reduced the sentence of Linkel’s co-defendant to twenty-six months.
    Therefore, based on the first two factors alone, it appears that the district judge will
    be able to avoid the procedural errors discussed above. On remand, the district
    court shall start with the Guidelines range as a benchmark, and if the district court
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    determines that a variance is appropriate, it shall state what the purpose of the
    variance is and provide an adequate explanation for any such variance.1
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    1
    This is not a case where the record reveals that the district court intended to impose a sentence
    that departed from the Guidelines by engaging in the relevant procedure and analysis. Instead, as
    discussed above, the district court appears to have intended to impose an upward variance.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-10083

Judges: Tjoflat, Rosenbaum, Restani

Filed Date: 2/2/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024