United States v. Michael Owens ( 2016 )


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  •            Case: 15-10358   Date Filed: 02/03/2016   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-10358
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cr-00009-TCB-RGV-2
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    MICHAEL OWENS,
    DWAYNE TYRONE COGGINS
    Defendants-Appellants.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (February 3, 2016)
    Before HULL, MARCUS and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 15-10358       Date Filed: 02/03/2016       Page: 2 of 7
    Michael Owens and Dwayne Tyrone Coggins appeal their convictions for
    conspiring to use a communication facility to facilitate the possession of a
    controlled substance with the intent to distribute, and for using a communication
    facility to facilitate the possession of a controlled substance with the intent to
    distribute, 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 843
    (b), 846. After review, 1 we affirm Owens’ and
    Coggins’ convictions.
    I. DISCUSSION
    A. Owens’ and Coggins’ arguments
    Owens contends the Government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to
    convict him of conspiring to use a communication facility to facilitate the
    possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, because by the
    time he was involved in the Government’s investigation, the drugs were already
    removed from Coggins’ nephew’s home, and the nephew was gone. Also, he
    argues the Government failed to introduce sufficient evidence to convict him of the
    use conviction, because by the time he called the nephew, the nephew already
    knew the information he told him.
    Coggins asserts the evidence was insufficient to convict him, because he did
    not make the possession of any drugs for distribution easier. There was no
    1
    We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence and all
    reasonable inferences in favor of the Government and the jury’s verdict. United States v. Garcia,
    
    405 F.3d 1260
    , 1269 (11th Cir. 2005).
    2
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    evidence his nephew had drugs when he called, and if he did, he already had
    possession before he called. The Government did not provide evidence his nephew
    and the other drug dealers distributed any drugs as a result of his calls, and
    Coggins did not receive anything of value for his actions nor was he involved in
    any drug transactions. Coggins argues the Government stretches “facilitate” in 
    21 U.S.C. § 843
    (b) beyond its appropriate reading.
    B. Sufficiency of the evidence – Conspiracy conviction
    Conspiracy requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) “there existed
    an agreement between two or more persons” to commit the underlying crime; and
    (2) “the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in that agreement.”
    United States v. Arbane, 
    446 F.3d 1223
    , 1228 (11th Cir. 2006). A defendant’s
    knowing participation in a conspiracy may be established through proof of
    surrounding circumstances such as acts committed by the defendant which
    furthered the purpose of the conspiracy. See United States v. Parrado, 
    911 F.2d 1567
    , 1571 (11th Cir. 1990). The government does not need to demonstrate the
    existence of a formal agreement. United States v. Gold, 
    743 F.2d 800
    , 824 (11th
    Cir. 1984). To sustain a conviction for a violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) based
    on possession with intent to distribute, the government must establish:
    (1) knowledge; (2) possession; and (3) intent to distribute. United States v.
    Mercer, 
    541 F.3d 1070
    , 1076 (11th Cir. 2008).
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    To sustain a conviction under 
    21 U.S.C. § 843
    (b), the government must
    show that the defendant knowingly and intentionally used a communications
    facility, e.g., a telephone, to facilitate the commission of a narcotics offense. See
    United States v. Mertilus, 
    111 F.3d 870
    , 872 (11th Cir. 1997). To prove
    facilitation, “the [g]overnment must show that the telephone call comes within the
    common meaning of facilitate-to make easier or less difficult, or to assist or aid.”
    United States v. Rivera, 
    775 F.2d 1559
    , 1562 (11th Cir. 1985). Where a defendant
    is not convicted of the underlying felony, a conviction under § 843(b) may not be
    sustained because there is no felony to facilitate. United States v. Arrow, 
    739 F.2d 549
    , 550 (11th Cir. 1984).
    There was sufficient evidence that Owens and Coggins conspired to use a
    telephone to aid the nephew’s continued possession of narcotics with the intent to
    distribute. Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the
    Government and the jury’s verdict, evidence showed that Owens and Coggins
    agreed to use a telephone to aid the nephew’s continued possession of narcotics
    with the intent to distribute and did so knowingly and voluntarily. 
    Id.
     The
    wiretapped phone calls, telephone toll records, pole camera footage of the nephew
    removing drugs from his home, and Owens’ and Coggins’ interviews introduced at
    trial showed they knowingly and voluntarily agreed with each other, the nephew’s
    mother, and the nephew to warn him over the telephone about police activity at the
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    nearby fire station, so he could remove his drugs from his home. See Arbane, 
    446 F.3d at 1228
    .
    Regarding the nephew’s possession of drugs with the intent to distribute,
    Owens and Coggins knew that the nephew was a drug dealer who had a stash
    house near the fire station. On May 8th, Coggins did not want his warning to be
    detected by police, so he advised his nephew’s mother that his nephew’s phone
    may be tapped. As the object of their conspiracy, Owens’ and Coggins’ calls
    allowed the nephew to avoid surveillance, seizure of his drugs, and possible arrest.
    The calls let the nephew know he was a target of the police’s investigation and he
    needed to take immediate steps to avoid the police. The nephew’s drug trafficking
    continued until he was arrested on May 28th.
    In sum, there was sufficient evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact
    could conclude that Owens and Coggins were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for
    conspiring to use a communication facility to facilitate the possession of a
    controlled substance with the intent to distribute, and that Owens and Coggins
    were not entitled to a judgment of acquittal, so we affirm in this respect.
    C. Sufficiency of the evidence – Use conviction
    There was also sufficient evidence that Coggins and Owens violated 
    21 U.S.C. § 843
    (b). As noted above, evidence showed Owens and Coggins
    knowingly and intentionally used a telephone to aid the nephew and other drug
    5
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    dealers in coordinating their efforts to possess drugs with the intent to distribute.
    See Mertilus, 
    111 F.3d at 872
    . To facilitate the possession of drugs with the intent
    to distribute, Owens called the nephew on May 8th and confirmed what the
    nephew’s mother had told the nephew about the police’s location and reinforced
    that the nephew was under investigation. See Rivera, 
    775 F.2d at 1562
    . Owens
    also assisted the nephew by telling him to remove the drugs from his home. 
    Id.
    After Owens called the nephew, news of the investigation spread among the drug
    dealers in the area creating a “ripple effect,” which helped them to avoid detection
    and coordinate their drug trafficking. See 
    id.
     The police were concerned about
    this “ripple effect” because of the expense of wiretaps, the safety of officers, and
    the potential destruction of evidence. As evidence of the “ripple effect,” the drugs
    the nephew removed from his home on May 8th were never found, one drug dealer
    got rid of his cell phone, and another drug trafficker that fled has not been found.
    Also, to facilitate the possession of drugs with the intent to distribute,
    Coggins’ call on April 8th placed his nephew and other drug dealers on notice that
    law enforcement officers were investigating them. This call included the location
    of law enforcement, so his nephew could avoid the seizure of his drugs and
    potentially his own arrest. This call made it easier for his nephew and other drug
    dealers to continue to traffic drugs, which evidence showed they did because drugs
    were found in his nephew’s home when he and other drug dealers were arrested in
    6
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    late May. See Rivera, 
    775 F.2d at 1562
    ; Mercer, 
    541 F.3d at 1076
    . Also, after
    Coggins’ call on April 8th, law enforcement officers’ ability to dismantle the drug
    organization by conducting surveillance and gathering evidence was negatively
    impaired, because the agents could no longer be covert and safe at the Spaulding
    County fire stations. For example, on April 8th, law enforcement left the area near
    the fire station immediately and surveillance was suspended for the day because
    their position had been compromised.
    Thus, there was sufficient evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could
    conclude that Owens and Coggins were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of using
    a communication facility to facilitate the possession of a controlled substance with
    the intent to distribute, and that Owens and Coggins2 were not entitled to a
    judgment of acquittal. See Garcia, 405 F.3d at 1269.
    II. CONCLUSION
    We affirm Owens’ and Coggins’ convictions.
    AFFIRMED.
    2
    Coggins argues for the first time on appeal that the rule of lenity should apply because
    the meaning of “facilitate” in § 843(b) is ambiguous. The rule of lenity is inapplicable here,
    because there is not a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty” in § 843(b). See United States v.
    Maupin, 
    520 F.3d 1304
    , 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining in order to invoke the rule of lenity,
    there must be a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute). We have defined “facilitate” to
    mean “to make easier or less difficult, or to assist or aid.” See Rivera, 
    775 F.2d at 1562
    .
    Moreover, while making phone calls to set up misdemeanor drug sales may not violate § 843(b),
    see Abuelhawa v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 816
    , 818 (2009), Coggins did more than that here,
    which was sufficient to violate § 843(b). See e.g., United States v. Russo, 
    796 F.2d 1443
    , 1463-
    64 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming a § 843(b) conviction where the telephone call facilitated efforts
    to conceal the drug source and crimes).
    7