Case: 18-10217 Date Filed: 12/04/2018 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-10217
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:17-cv-81275-WPD
MICHAEL D. ARRINGTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHERRY GREEN,
SENATOR PHILIP D. LEWIS RESOURCE CENTER,
UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICER,
THE RESERVE AT LAKESIDE,
RAPID AUTO LOAN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(December 4, 2018)
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Before TJOFLAT, NEWSOM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Arrington, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s sua sponte
dismissal of his amended complaint and its denial of his motion seeking
reconsideration of its order dismissing the state-law claims in his original
complaint. Arrington contends the district court erred when it dismissed his
amended complaint as a “shotgun” pleading and, alternatively, by concluding that
his amended complaint failed to state a federal claim. He further contends the
district court abused its discretion by failing to reconsider its dismissal of the state-
law claims in Arrington’s original complaint. After review, we affirm.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal1
Arrington first contends the district court abused its discretion by dismissing
his amended complaint as an impermissible shotgun pleading. We construe pro se
pleadings liberally, holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys. Hughes v. Lott,
350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003). Nevertheless, we
“have little tolerance for shotgun pleadings.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets,
878
F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018); see also Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
1
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal on grounds that a
complaint is an impermissible shotgun pleading. Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets,
878 F.3d 1291,
1294 (11th Cir. 2018).
2
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Consol.,
516 F.3d 955, 979 & n.54 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases), abrogated
on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007). Shotgun
pleadings are improper in that they fail “to give the defendants adequate notice of
the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Vibe
Micro, 878 F.3d at 1294; see also Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff’s Office,
792
F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015) (identifying four rough categories of shotgun
pleadings). Further, they “waste scarce judicial resources, inexorably broaden the
scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appellate court dockets, and undermine the
public’s respect for the courts.” Vibe
Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295 (quotation and
alteration omitted). Before dismissing a complaint with prejudice on shotgun-
pleading grounds, the district court must first explain how the pleading violates the
shotgun-pleading rule and give the plaintiff at least one opportunity to re-plead the
complaint.
Id. at 1296.
Throughout the section of Arrington’s amended complaint titled “Factual
Allegation[s] Related to All Causes of Action,” Arrington scattered legal
arguments, legal standards, legal conclusions, and even (incomplete) citations to
legal authorities. Arrington then incorporated those so-called “factual allegations”
into his various causes of action. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion by determining that Arrington’s amended complaint was “replete with
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular
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cause of action.” See
Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1322. Further, in its order dismissing
Arrington’s original complaint, the district court informed Arrington of the
shotgun-nature of his pleading and gave him an opportunity to re-plead his federal
claims. We therefore conclude the district court acted within its discretion in
dismissing Arrington’s amended complaint, which failed to correct the deficiencies
previously identified by the district court.
B. Reconsideration 2
Arrington next challenges the district court’s denial of his motion seeking
reconsideration as to the dismissal of the state-law claims in his original complaint.
Arrington’s sole contention—both before the district court and on appeal—is that
the district court misapplied the amount-in-controversy standard for diversity
jurisdiction.
We need not determine whether the district court misapplied the amount-in-
controversy standard, because Arrington has abandoned review of the district
court’s order dismissing his original complaint. To obtain reversal of a judgment
that is based on multiple, independent grounds, an appellant must challenge every
stated ground. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir.
2014). In its order dismissing Arrington’s state-law claims, the district court
2
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion brought under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
235 F.3d 1307, 1316
(11th Cir. 2000).
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stated: “The entire Complaint is subject to dismissal as an impermissible shotgun
pleading.” USDC Doc. 4 at 3 (emphasis added). This provided a ground for
dismissal completely independent of the amount-in-controversy requirement.
Because Arrington failed to challenge this independent ground on appeal, he is
deemed to have abandoned any challenge to the district court’s conclusion that his
original complaint was an impermissible shotgun pleading. See
id. Consequently,
even if we were to assume the district court misapplied the amount-in-controversy
requirement, we would be compelled to affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Arrington’s state-law claims on shotgun-pleading grounds. Thus, the issue of
whether the district court abused its discretion by not reconsidering the other
grounds for its dismissal is moot.
II. CONCLUSION
The district court did not err by dismissing Arrington’s amended complaint
as an impermissible shotgun pleading. And Arrington has abandoned any
challenge to the dismissal of his state-law claims by failing to challenge the district
court’s conclusion that his original complaint was also an impermissible shotgun
pleading. Therefore, we need not consider whether the district court should have
reconsidered the other reason it gave for dismissing Arrington’s state-law claims.
AFFIRMED.
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