George Carlton Davis, III v. Jim Holley Daniels, Jr. ( 2016 )


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  •           Case: 15-15741   Date Filed: 07/14/2016   Page: 1 of 11
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-15741
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-03806-RWS
    GEORGE CARLTON DAVIS, III,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JIM HOLLEY DANIELS, JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (July 14, 2016)
    Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 15-15741    Date Filed: 07/14/2016    Page: 2 of 11
    Defendant-Appellant Jim Holley Daniels, Jr., (“Daniels”) appeals from a
    final order of the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granting
    summary judgment to Plaintiff-Appellee George Carlton Davis, III, (“Davis”) and
    denying Daniels’ motion for reconsideration. Upon review of the record and briefs,
    we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Davis’s complaint alleges in relevant part that Daniels had breached each of
    five promissory notes executed between 1997 and 2000 and sought liquidated
    damages and attorney’s fees. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district
    court granted summary judgment to Davis on the issues of liability and granted
    partial summary judgment to Davis on the issue of damages. Specifically, while
    the court found that Davis was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees as a matter
    of law, genuine questions of material fact existed about the calculation of those
    damages. Accordingly Davis’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part
    and denied in part and Daniels’ motion for summary judgment was denied. Davis
    then filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to the damages portion of the
    summary judgment order and Daniels filed a motion for reconsideration of the
    entire order. The district court granted Davis’ motion for reconsideration with
    respect to damages and denied Daniels’s motion for reconsideration. The court
    then granted judgment in the amount of $2,076,325.38 in favor of Davis.
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    On appeal, Daniels argues that the district court erred in granting Davis’
    motion for summary judgment on liability with respect to three of the notes.
    Daniels concedes that the remaining two notes are under seal. Daniels also argues
    that the district court abused its discretion in granting Davis’ motion for
    reconsideration and denying his motion for reconsideration. Upon review of the
    record and the briefs, we affirm.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This Court reviews the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo.
    Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 
    120 F.3d 1181
    , 1184 (11th Cir. 1997). Summary
    judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show there is no
    genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
    This Court reviews the denial of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of
    discretion. Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 
    243 F.3d 1282
    , 1285 (11th Cir.
    2001). A motion for reconsideration cannot be used “to relitigate old matters, raise
    argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
    judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 
    408 F.3d 757
    , 763 (11th
    Cir. 2005).
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    III. DISCUSSION
    A.    Summary Judgment Order
    1. Statute of Limitations
    Daniels’ first argument is that the district court erred in the summary
    judgment order in holding that there was no genuine question of fact that Notes 1,
    3, and 4 were executed under seal. Under Georgia law, actions on written contracts
    are generally governed by the six-year period of limitations of OCGA § 9-3-24. In
    contrast, contracts under seal are governed by the 20-year period of limitations of
    OCGA § 9-3-23. Because the claim was brought more than six years after the right
    of action accrued, the parties agree that Davis’ claim is barred if the Notes were
    not executed under seal
    Under Georgia law, “to constitute a sealed instrument, ‘there must be both a
    recital in the body of the instrument of an intention to use a seal and the affixing of
    the seal or scroll after the signature.’” McCalla v. Stuckey, 
    504 S.E.2d 269
    , 270
    (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Chastain v. L. Moss Music Co., 
    64 S.E.2d 205
    (Ga.
    Ct. App. 1951)). “‘Words traced with a pen, or stamped, printed, or made legible
    by any other device whereby such act is for the purpose of putting down a
    [person's] name at the end of an instrument to attest its validity, and is adopted by
    the party whose name is so signed, is a sufficient signature and signing of the
    instrument to which it is signed.’” Davis v. Harpagon Co., LLC, 
    637 S.E.2d 1
    , 2–3
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    (Ga. 2006) (quoting Bank of Ringgold v. Poarch, 
    117 S.E. 114
    (Ga. Ct. App.
    1923)).
    In the instant case, it is undisputed that all of the Notes contain both a recital
    in the body of the instrument of an intention to use a seal, the affixing of a seal,
    and Daniels’ signature. Daniels’ only argument is that on Notes 1, 3, and 4, his
    cursive signature appears roughly two inches to the left of the word SEAL rather
    than immediately adjacent to it, and that he has written his name in block print
    rather than cursive immediately next to the word SEAL. According to Daniels, the
    location of the cursive signature relative to the word SEAL raises a genuine
    question of fact as to whether the seal is affixed “after the signature.” We disagree.
    Whether or not the cursive writing suffices for the purpose of the sealing
    requirement, it is clear under Georgia law that the printed writing immediately
    adjacent to the word SEAL constitutes a signature and thereby satisfies the seal
    requirements.
    2. Consideration
    Daniels next argues that the district court erred “in reversing its initial Order
    and finding that no material facts exist with respect to Daniels’ defense of lack of
    consideration” for Note 5.1 On its face, this argument, which appears to challenge
    the district court’s order on cross motions for reconsideration, is difficult to
    1
    These arguments have been re-ordered for the purposes of logical consistency and flow.
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    understand. The consideration issue was decided in favor of Davis on summary
    judgment and the order on cross motions for reconsideration denied Daniels’
    motion for reconsideration with respect to that part of the summary judgment
    order. The motion for reconsideration did not “reverse” the summary judgment
    order with respect to this issue. Therefore, we construe this argument as a
    challenge to the summary judgment order.
    Under Georgia law, a plaintiff in a suit to enforce a promissory note
    “establishes a prima facie case by producing the note and showing that it was
    executed.” Trendmark Homes, Inc. v. Bank of N. Ga., 
    726 S.E.2d 138
    , 139 (Ga.
    Ct. App. 2012). “Once a holder of a promissory note establishes prima facie right
    to judgment as a matter of law, as would support holder's motion for summary
    judgment in action on note, burden then shifts to the obligor to establish an
    affirmative defense to the claim, such as the lack of consideration.” Han v. Han,
    
    670 S.E.2d 842
    (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). “A contract under seal raises a prima facie
    presumption of consideration, which is rebuttable.” Autrey v. UAP/GA AG Chem,
    Inc., 
    497 S.E.2d 402
    , 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998).
    Daniels argues that there is a genuine question of fact as to consideration
    because “neither party has been able to produce a single check showing that
    consideration was given for Note 5” and because Daniels’ responses to Davis’
    Request for Admissions denied receiving the $281,000 from Davis. We disagree.
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    Daniels has not satisfied his burden of adducing evidence sufficient to create a
    genuine question of material fact as to consideration.
    B.    Motion to Reconsider
    1. Accord and Satisfaction
    Daniels’ next argument is that the district court erred in “reversing its initial
    Order and finding that no material facts exist with respect to the apparent
    consolidation of Notes 1, 2, 3, and 4.” On its face, this argument is difficult to
    understand. Daniels first raised the consolidation argument in his motion for
    reconsideration. Because Daniels did not raise this defense at the summary
    judgment stage, the district court did not address it in the summary judgment order.
    Accordingly, the district court’s denial of Daniels’ motion to reconsider did not
    “reverse” its initial Order. Instead, the district court held that it was abandoned.
    “A motion for reconsideration cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise
    argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of
    judgment.” Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 
    555 F.3d 949
    , 957 (11th Cir. 2009)
    (citation omitted). “A district court has sound discretion whether to alter or amend
    a judgment pursuant to a motion for reconsideration, and its decision will only be
    reversed if it abused that discretion.” 
    Id. “Denial of
    a motion to amend is especially
    soundly exercised when a party gives no reason for not previously raising an
    issue.” 
    Id. (quotation marks
    and citation omitted).
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    Daniels gives no reason for his failure to previously raise the consolidation
    argument at the summary judgment stage. Nor do we believe that the district court
    abused its discretion in declining to entertain this argument at the motion to
    reconsider stage.
    In any event, Daniels’ consolidation argument lacked merit. As discussed
    above, under Georgia law, a plaintiff in a suit to enforce a promissory note
    “establishes a prima facie case by producing the note and showing that it was
    executed. Once that prima facie case has been made, the plaintiff is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law unless the defendant can establish a defense.”
    Trendmark 
    Homes, 726 S.E.2d at 139
    . One such defense is accord and satisfaction.
    “Accord and satisfaction occurs where the parties to an agreement, by a subsequent
    agreement, have satisfied the former agreement, and the latter agreement has been
    executed.” O.C.G.A. § 13-4-101. “Under Georgia law, an accord and satisfaction is
    a contract which, like other contracts, requires a ‘meeting of the minds.’” ADP-
    Financial Computer Services, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Cobb County, 
    703 F.2d 1261
    , 1266 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Myers v. American Finance System of
    Decatur, Inc., 
    615 F.2d 368
    (5th Cir. 1980) 2).
    2
    In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
    court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
    October 1, 1981.
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    Daniels argues that the grant of summary judgment to Davis on the issue of
    liability was error because there is a genuine question of fact as to whether the
    parties released the debt obligations in Notes 1, 2, 3, and 4 by accord and
    satisfaction and whether Note 5 is a “consolidation” of the earlier four notes.
    Specifically, Daniels points to two pieces of record evidence: (1) the handwritten
    words “Note Update” in the “Date of Transaction” field of Note 5 and (2)
    deposition testimony from Daniels that he received only “about $300,000” in total
    consideration from Davis. Because the face value of Note 5 was $281,000, Daniels
    claims that there is a fact issue as to whether Note 5 was a consolidation of the
    Notes 1, 2, 3, and 4. We disagree. While it is not entirely clear what the words
    “Note Update” mean, the record does not contain sufficient evidence such that a
    reasonable trier of fact could find that Notes 1, 2, 3, and 4 were released through
    accord and satisfaction. Moreover, the signed and sealed note recites that Daniels
    received $281,000 as an “amount given to me directly.”
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    declining to consider this argument below.
    2. Calculation of Liquidated Damages
    Daniels next argues that the district court abused its discretion in granting
    Davis’ motion to reconsider the damages portion of the summary judgment order
    because there were genuine questions of fact about whether Davis had credited
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    certain payments made by Daniels to the interest accrued on the principal value of
    the Notes.
    A motion for reconsideration is only appropriate when “absolutely
    necessary” to present: (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) an intervening
    development or change in controlling law; or (3) a need to correct a clear error of
    law or fact. Bryan v. Murphy, 
    246 F. Supp. 2d 1256
    , 1258–59 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
    Daniels argues that the district court abused its discretion because none of
    the three grounds for granting a motion for reconsideration existed. We disagree.
    The order on motion for reconsideration recognizes that the summary judgment
    order “clearly erred” with regard to its finding that it was impossible to calculate
    the exact amount of liquidated damages due to the insufficiency of evidence about
    whether Davis had credited certain payments made by Daniels to the interest
    accrued on the principal value of the Notes. As Davis pointed out in his motion for
    reconsideration, Daniels’ response to Davis’ statement of material fact admits that
    Davis properly credited the payments at issue to the outstanding interest.
    Accordingly, there was no genuine question of fact that Davis credited the
    payments made by Daniels to the interest accrued on the principal value of the
    Notes. The district court correctly recognized its earlier clear error and did not
    abuse its discretion in granting Davis’ motion to reconsider the damages portion of
    the summary judgment order.
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    3. Calculation of Interest and Attorney’s Fees
    Daniels’ final argument is that the district court abused its discretion “in
    reversing its initial Order and finding that no material facts exist with respect to the
    calculation of interest and attorneys’ fees.” But Daniels offers no argument—
    beyond a reiteration of his claims about lack of consideration and accord and
    satisfaction—as to why the district court’s express conclusion that it “clearly
    erred” with regard to its earlier finding that it was impossible to calculate the exact
    amount of liquidated damages was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we cannot
    conclude that the district court abused its discretion.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s orders granting Davis’ motion
    for summary judgment and motion to reconsider and denying Daniels’ motion for
    summary judgment and motion to reconsider are affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
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