Joseph Edwin Mitchell v. Scott Middlebrooks , 287 F. App'x 772 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 18, 2008
No. 07-15047
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00373-CV-T-N
JOSEPH EDWIN MITCHELL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SCOTT MIDDLEBROOKS,
Warden,
MICHAEL ZENK,
Warden of the United States Prison
in Atlanta, Georgia,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(July 18, 2008)
Before CARNES, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Mitchell, a former federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition as moot. Mitchell contends
that, even though he has already been released from prison, his case is not moot
because the Bureau of Prisons improperly denied him a one year reduction to his
sentence, causing him to serve an extra year of prison time and delaying the
commencement of his supervised release.
I.
At the time Mitchell filed his § 2241 petition in the district court, he was
serving a forty-six month sentence, with three years of supervised release to
follow, for trafficking in counterfeit labels for copies of computer programs, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2318. While incarcerated, Mitchell was initially advised
by the BOP that he was eligible for up to a one year reduction of his sentence if he
completed the prison’s residential drug abuse program. Mitchell entered the
program on April 1, 2004. Although Mitchell continued in the program, the BOP
withdrew its approval of any reduction of his sentence on that basis because it
determined that Mitchell’s prior felony conviction for DUI manslaughter
2
constituted non-negligent homicide, which disqualified him for early release under
the criteria used by the BOP. Mitchell did complete the program.
After unsuccessfully challenging that decision through the appropriate
administrative review process, Mitchell filed a § 2241 petition in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The petition requested
Mitchell’s “immediate release to community corrections to complete the
requirements of his early release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e).”
While his § 2241 petition was pending before the district court, however,
Mitchell completed his full forty-six month sentence and was released from prison
on October 20, 2006. In light of those events, the magistrate judge issued a report
and recommendation suggesting that the district court dismiss Mitchell’s petition
as moot. The magistrate noted that Mitchell’s petition requested release to a
community corrections center for completion of the early release requirements but
that his sentence had already expired. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended
that the petition be dismissed because there was no longer a live case or
controversy.
Mitchell objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,
arguing that his petition was not moot because, had he received the one year
sentence reduction, he would complete his supervised release a year earlier. He
3
also requested permission to modify the request for relief in his habeas petition to
include the termination of his supervised release. The district court overruled
Mitchell’s objections, adopted the magistrate’s report and recommendation, and
denied Mitchell’s § 2241 petition as moot. Mitchell timely appealed.1
II.
“The issue of whether a case is moot is a question of law that we review de
novo.” Mattern v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir.
2007). The respondent carries the burden of establishing that a claim is moot. Id.Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to the
consideration of “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. “The
doctrine of mootness derives directly from the case or controversy limitation
because ‘an action that is moot cannot be characterized as an active case or
controversy.’” Soliman v. United States ex rel. INS, 296 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “[A] case is moot when the issues presented are no
longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id.(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original). Thus, if an
event occurring after the filing of the lawsuit deprives “the court of the ability to
1
Although the district court also denied Mitchell’s motion for a certificate of appealability,
this Court may nonetheless review the appeal because “a federal prisoner who proceeds under § 2241
does not need a COA to proceed.” Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1364 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003).
4
give the plaintiff or appellant meaningful relief, then the case is moot and must be
dismissed.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Spencer
v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1998) (“Throughout the litigation,
the plaintiff ‘must have suffered or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to
the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’”
(citation omitted)).
In Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884 (11th Cir. 1995), this Court addressed a
mootness argument similar to the one made by the government here. Dawson had
pleaded guilty to drug-related charges and was sentenced to a term of
imprisonment as well as three years of supervised release. Id. at 886. While still a
federal prisoner, Dawson filed a § 2241 petition seeking credit against his
sentence for the time he had spent in halfway and safe houses following his arrest.
Id. After the district court denied Dawson’s petition, he appealed. Id. Because
Dawson was subsequently released from prison, however, the government moved
this Court to dismiss the appeal as moot. Id. at 886 n.2. We rejected the
government’s mootness argument, noting that Dawson was “still serving his term
of supervised release, which is part of his sentence and involves some restrictions
upon his liberty.” Id. We held that Dawson’s appeal was not moot “[b]ecause
success for Dawson could alter the supervised release portion of his sentence.”
5
Id.; see also United States v. Page, 69 F.3d 482, 488 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding
that an appeal was not moot where the defendants had been released from prison
but were still serving their terms of supervised release).
The facts of this case are materially indistinguishable from Dawson.
Mitchell filed his § 2241 petition while he was still a federal prisoner and his
petition alleged that he was being forced to serve too much time in prison. As in
Dawson, Mitchell was released from prison and began serving his supervised
release during the pendency of the action. The fact that he was released from
prison, however, does not by itself render Mitchell’s petition moot because, as in
Dawson, the supervised release he is currently serving “is part of his sentence and
involves some restrictions upon his liberty.” Dawson, 50 F.3d at 886 n.2.
Moreover, although Mitchell’s original petition requested release, he has since
asked for permission to modify the request for relief to include the termination of
his supervised release. Success for Mitchell in his § 2241 petition could,
therefore, “alter the supervised release portion of his sentence.” Id.
In support of its mootness argument, the government’s brief cites to United
States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 120 S. Ct. 1114 (2000), which the Supreme Court
issued after our Dawson decision. In Johnson, a federal prisoner was set free after
serving too much prison time. Id. at 54, 120 S. Ct. at 1116. The question before
6
the Supreme Court was “whether the excess prison time should be credited to the
supervised release term, reducing its length.” Id. The Court interpreted the
language of 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) to mean that supervised release “does not run
while an individual remains in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.” Id. at 57,
120 S. Ct. at 1117–18. However, the Court in Johnson went on to observe that
“[t]here can be no doubt that equitable considerations of great weight exist when
an individual is incarcerated beyond the proper expiration of his prison term” and
noted that trial courts have discretion to modify the conditions and length of an
individual’s supervised release under § 3583(e). Id. at 60, 120 S. Ct. at 1119.
The Supreme Court’s Johnson decision does not undermine our reasoning in
Dawson. Our rejection of the government’s mootness argument in Dawson hinged
upon the liberty restrictions that supervised release imposes as well as the fact that
success on appeal could have altered the supervised release portion of the
petitioner’s sentence. See Dawson, 50 F.3d at 886. Although Johnson stands for
the proposition that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) does not “by its own necessary operation .
. . reduce the length of a supervised release term by reason of excess time served
in prison,” the decision also recognized that sentencing courts have the authority
both to modify conditions of supervised release and to terminate supervised
release altogether after the completion of one year. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 60, 120
7
S. Ct. at 1119; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1) & (2). Johnson did not, therefore,
alter our holding in Dawson that an appeal is not moot where a former prisoner is
still serving a term of supervised release, which imposes restrictions on his liberty
and could be altered following success on appeal.
Although we express no views on the merits of the petition, we hold that
Mitchell’s § 2241 petition is not moot because it is possible he could receive a
reduced or modified term of supervised release from the sentencing court if he
succeeds in this habeas proceeding.2 We note that every other circuit to consider
the issue has reached the same result. See Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918
(5th Cir. 2006); Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 76–77 (2d Cir. 2006); United States
v. Larson, 417 F.3d 741, 747 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Castro-Rocha, 323
F.3d 846, 847 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Lopez v.
Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2006); United States v. Molak, 276 F.3d
45, 48–49 (1st Cir. 2002); United States v. McCoy, 313 F.3d 561, 564 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (en banc); Gunderson v. Hood, 268 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
2
Mitchell additionally contends on appeal that the rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), which requires a successful habeas petition before filing a § 1983 lawsuit,
constitutes a collateral consequence and therefore renders his claim not moot. Because we have
already determined that his petition is not moot, we need not address that argument.
8