Annie L. Grimes v. Miami Dade County , 552 F. App'x 902 ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-14291
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-23996-MGC
ANNIE L. GRIMES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MIAMI DADE COUNTY,
William Candella, Assistant County Attorney,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(January 14, 2014)
Before WILSON, FAY, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Annie Grimes, an African American woman, appeals pro se the district
court’s granting summary judgment for Miami-Dade County (“the County”) in her
retaliation case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). We affirm.
I.
The County first hired Grimes in May 2001 to work in its Housing Agency.
In 2003, Grimes filed an EEOC charge against the Housing Agency. In August
2004, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which resolved Grimes’s
claims and required the Housing Agency to remove all negative references from
Grimes’s personnel record.
In December 2004, the County hired Grimes to work as an Airport Office
Support Specialist 2 in the Aviation Department, under the direction of Melvin
Payne. From 2004 to 2009, Grimes received several salary increases and merit
increases in pay; she was classified as an Airport Office Support Specialist 2
throughout her employment with the Aviation Department. One of Grimes’s tasks
was to monitor and enter requisitions on the Enterprise Resource Planning (“ERP”)
system. Payne decided to relieve Grimes of her ERP requisition duties in early
2008, based on complaints he had received that Grimes was preparing requisitions
improperly.
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In October 2008, Grimes filed an EEOC charge against the Aviation
Department and alleged it had demoted her in retaliation for her 2003 EEOC
complaint against the Housing Agency. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to
Sue; Grimes subsequently filed a pro se complaint in district court. She alleged the
reduction in her job duties was a demotion, and Payne had demoted her, when he
learned about her 2003 EEOC charge against the Housing Agency.
The County moved for summary judgment and argued Grimes could not
establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The County conceded Grimes had
engaged in protected activity by filing the 2003 EEOC charge against the Housing
Agency. But the County argued Grimes had not suffered a materially adverse
employment action and could not establish a causal connection between the 2003
EEOC charge and the 2008 reduction in her job duties.
The district court agreed, granted summary judgment in favor of the County,
and found Grimes had not been demoted; consequently, she had not suffered a
materially adverse employment action. The court also found Payne was not aware
of the 2003 EEOC charge, when he relieved Grimes of her ERP requisition duties.
Therefore, Grimes had failed to establish a causal connection between her
protected activity and the 2008 adjustment in job duties while working in the
Aviation Department.
II.
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On appeal, Grimes argues the district court erred in granting the County’s
motion for summary judgment. She asserts she has had difficulty finding
employment because of the County’s discrimination and retaliation against her.
She further argues her records are clean, she has never committed a crime, and she
has performed her job duties without any problems. 1
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “applying
the same legal standards as the district court.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d
1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Summary judgment is appropriate if the
evidence before the court shows there is no genuine issue regarding any material
fact. Id. “A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient
evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in
its favor.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In making this
determination, we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
Id. An appellant abandons a claim or argument not briefed on appeal, and we will
not address such a claim or argument on the merits. Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown
& Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009).
1
For the first time on appeal, Grimes argues the County defamed her character, and the
district judge should not have been assigned to her case. Because Grimes did not raise those
issues before the district court, she has waived them, and we will not consider them on the
merits. Ramirez v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 686 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir. 2012)
(recognizing we generally will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal).
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Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of [its] employees . . . because [s]he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or
because [s]he has made a charge” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). To
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show she engaged in
protected activity, she suffered a materially adverse action, and a causal connection
existed between the activity and the adverse action. Dixon v. The Hallmark Cos.,
627 F.3d 849, 856 (11th Cir. 2010). Only those employment actions that result in
“a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” constitute adverse employment actions. Howard v. Walgreen Co.,
605 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). To establish the causal connection, a plaintiff generally must establish
“that the employer was actually aware of the protected expression at the time it
took adverse employment action.” Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346,
1354 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
On appeal, Giles does not challenge the district court’s determination that
she failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. She makes no argument
the removal of her ERP requisition duties constituted an adverse employment
action, and she does not address whether there was a causal connection between
her 2003 EEOC charge against the Housing Agency and the reduction in her job
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duties in 2008 at the Aviation Department. Accordingly, she has abandoned those
issues on appeal. Carmichael, 572 F.3d at 1293.
Nevertheless, the adjustment in her job duties in 2008 was not an adverse
employment action, because it was not a material change in the terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment. Howard, 605 F.3d at 1245. Grimes retained the
same job description and work location, and she did not receive a lower salary or
fewer benefits. Moreover, Grimes received a salary increase and a merit increase
in pay during 2008. In addition, Grimes has not demonstrated Payne was aware of
her 2003 EEOC charge against the Housing Agency, when he adjusted her job
duties in 2008. See Clover, 176 F.3d at 1354. At most, Grimes asserted Payne had
access to the 2003 EEOC charge and 2004 settlement agreement, but she failed to
provide any evidence showing actual knowledge. Accordingly, Grimes cannot
establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
AFFIRMED.
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