Gelu Topa v. Almonte Kerbs ( 2019 )


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  •            Case: 19-10819   Date Filed: 07/29/2019   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 19-10819
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-00475-SPC-MRM
    GELU TOPA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ALMONTE KERBS,
    OFFICER ROCHELLE MEJIAS,
    et al,                                                Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (July 29, 2019)
    Before MARTIN, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 19-10819     Date Filed: 07/29/2019     Page: 2 of 4
    Gelu Topa, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
    action, alleging entrapment and false arrest, for failing to state a claim upon which
    relief may be granted and for improperly serving the complaint. On appeal, Topa
    argues that the police failed to follow procedures during his arrest and
    subsequently filed a false police report. Topa does not argue that process was
    properly served.
    I.
    A district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo.
    Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 
    480 F.3d 1043
    , 1056–57 (11th Cir. 2007).
    The complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all of the
    plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts are accepted as true. 
    Id. at 1057.
    To survive a
    motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s factual allegations must state a claim to relief that is
    plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
    Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007)). A plausible claim is one which
    allows a court to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the
    claims. 
    Id. Pro se
    pleadings are liberally construed and held to less stringent
    standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 
    760 F.3d 1165
    , 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014). However, this leniency does not allow courts to
    serve as de facto counsel or to rewrite pro se pleadings. 
    Id. 2 Case:
    19-10819    Date Filed: 07/29/2019   Page: 3 of 4
    Entrapment is an affirmative defense in criminal prosecutions requiring the
    defendant to produce evidence showing that the government induced the crime and
    that the defendant was otherwise not predisposed to commit the crime. United
    States v. Rutgerson, 
    822 F.3d 1223
    , 1234 (11th Cir. 2016). Whether a defendant
    was predisposed to commit the crime is a “fact-intensive and subjective inquiry”
    centered on the defendant’s readiness and willingness to engage in the crime. 
    Id. at 1235.
    A § 1983 claim for false arrest requires the plaintiff to show he was
    arrested without probable cause. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 
    138 S. Ct. 577
    ,
    584, 589 & n.6 (2018). Probable cause exists where circumstances create a
    probability or substantial chance of criminal activity; probable cause is not a high
    bar. 
    Id. at 586.
    Topa’s second amended complaint, liberally construed, does not assert facts
    sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To the extent
    entrapment provides grounds for a § 1983 claim, Topa has failed to show that he
    was coerced into, or otherwise not predisposed to, solicit a prostitute. Topa
    asserted that when the woman came to his car window, he immediately went along
    with her and gave her the impression he was interested. This readiness to go along
    with the woman suggests instead that Topa was predisposed to solicit a prostitute.
    Topa made no assertions that he was initially hesitant to engage with the woman or
    was in any way coerced into telling the woman he was interested. Thus, the
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    Case: 19-10819    Date Filed: 07/29/2019    Page: 4 of 4
    district court properly dismissed this claim upon the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion.
    Additionally, Topa has failed to show that the officers did not have probable cause
    to arrest him for said crime. By asserting that he showed interest in the woman and
    had her wait for him elsewhere, Topa created circumstances showing a substantial
    chance of criminal activity. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
    not err in dismissing Topa’s second amended complaint for failure to state a claim
    pursuant to the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion and affirm.
    AFFIRMED
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-10819

Filed Date: 7/29/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/29/2019