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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-14450
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:05-cr-00008-TWT-LTW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM WALKER,
Defendant - Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(May 2, 2019)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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William Walker appeals the district court’s revocation of his supervised
release and sentence upon revocation. Walker argues that the government failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated the terms of his
supervised release by possessing with intent to distribute marijuana. He also
argues that the 24-month, below guidelines sentence the district court imposed
upon revocation of supervised release was substantively unreasonable. After
careful review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Walker completed a term of incarceration in 2018 and began a five year term
of supervised release. As a condition of Walker’s supervised release, he was to
refrain from committing another federal, state, or local crime. After Walker was
arrested for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, the probation office
petitioned to revoke his supervised release. The probation office’s violation report
listed four violations: (1) committing a possession with intent to distribute offense;
(2) failing to truthfully answer all inquiries from the probation officer regarding the
offense; (3) using a controlled substance; and (4) failing to report for drug screens.
Walker admitted to the third and fourth violations but denied that he
committed the first. He also denied committing the second violation, but he does
not challenge that violation on appeal. Due to Walker’s denial of the first
violation, the government offered testimony from Atlanta Police Department
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Officer Walter Clark about the circumstances of Walker’s arrest. Clark, as part of
a team consisting of plain clothes and uniformed officers, was working in a high-
crime area known for illegal narcotics transactions. One of the team’s plain
clothes officers, Officer Travis, observed Walker walk to the base of a tree with
high grass surrounding it, grab something from within the grass, and then make a
hand-to-hand transaction with another man whom Clark identified as Pope. Travis
suspected that the transaction involved illegal narcotics. The officers waited for
Pope to walk away from the transaction and then stopped him; Pope voluntarily
supplied officers with the marijuana he had just purchased. The marijuana was in a
small green plastic baggie.
Pope identified the seller of the marijuana by his clothing, including his
white shirt and camouflage shorts, and that description, according to Clark,
matched Walker’s clothing and “distinguished [him] from everybody else out
there.” Doc. 57 at 9.1 Clark then detained Walker, who was carrying $117 in cash
in small denominations—a fact that was indicative, in Clark’s experience, with
drug sales. The officers then went to the tree near where Walker had been standing
and found a plastic bag containing 17 smaller baggies of marijuana. The baggies
looked the same as the one Pope handed over to police. Clark arrested Walker. In
addition to Clark’s testimony, the government introduced three low-quality
1
“Doc. #” refers to the numbered entry on the district court’s docket.
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photographs Travis took, one of which Clark testified depicted the tree area where
Walker stashed the marijuana baggies, and two of which he testified depicted
Walker and Pope engaging in the transaction.
Based on this evidence, the district court found that Walker had violated the
terms of his supervised release by committing the offense of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute. Based on the four violations, Walker’s criminal
history category of VI, and a statutory maximum sentence of 60 months’
imprisonment, Walker’s guidelines range was 51 to 60 months. The probation
office suggested a sentence of 60 months, and the government recommended a
sentence of 30 months. In support of its recommendation, the government cited
Walker’s significant criminal history, that he had been on supervised release for
less than six months when he was arrested, and that the circumstances of his
arrest—specifically, that police found 17 baggies of marijuana—suggested that the
transaction with Pope was not a one-time drug deal. Walker requested
reinstatement of supervised release without a term of imprisonment. In support, he
argued that he had been working full time, was integrated into a family (living with
his sister and planning to get married), had tested negative on the drug screening
after his missed screenings, had only failed a drug test because he took a pain pill
for a chronic injury, and had possessed only a small amount of marijuana on the
day of his arrest.
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The district court imposed a sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment—a
downward variance of 27 months—with no subsequent supervised release. The
court noted Walker’s extensive criminal history and explained that the crime for
which he had been serving a term of supervised release was serious—it involved
an argument over selling drugs that resulted in Walker shooting a man and fleeing
the scene. The court also emphasized that Walker’s arrest came less than six
months after his release from serving time for that prior serious offense, showing
that he failed to become “an honest, law-abiding member of society.” Doc. 58 at
17-18. Walker objected to the district court’s finding that he had committed the
possession with intent to distribute offense and to the reasonableness of the
sentence the court imposed.
This is Walker’s appeal.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A district court may revoke a defendant’s supervised release and sentence
the defendant to serve all or part of the supervised release term in prison if the
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a
condition of supervised release.
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We review the district
court’s revocation decision for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Cunningham,
607 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010). We are bound by the district
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court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Almand,
992 F.2d 316, 318 (11th Cir. 1993).
Upon revocation of supervised release, a district court must impose a
sentence that is substantively reasonable. United States v. Gonzalez,
550 F.3d
1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Sweeting,
437 F.3d 1105, 1106-07
(11th Cir. 2006). We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential
abuse of discretion standard, considering the totality of the circumstances and the
sentencing factors set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Gall v. United States,
552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007).
Under § 3553(a), the district court is required to impose a sentence
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of
§ 3553(a)(2)—the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense; promote respect
for the law; provide just punishment; deter criminal conduct; protect the public
from the defendant’s future criminal conduct; and effectively provide the
defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also consider the
nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the
defendant; the kinds of sentences available; the applicable guideline range, the
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; the need to avoid
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unwarranted sentencing disparities; and the need to provide restitution to victims.
Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of proving the sentence is
unreasonable. United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). A
district court imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence when it fails to afford
consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, gives significant
weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or commits a clear error of judgment in
considering the proper factors. United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th
Cir. 2010) (en banc). Generally the weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a)
factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court, United
States v. Williams,
526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008); a district court commits a
clear error of judgment when it “considers the proper factors but balances them
unreasonably” and imposes a sentence that “does not achieve the purposes of
sentencing as stated in § 3553(a),” Irey,
612 F.3d at 1189 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Ordinarily we expect (but do not automatically presume) a within-
guidelines sentence to be reasonable. United States v. Hunt,
526 F.3d 739, 746
(11th Cir. 2008).
III. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Walker argues that the district court erred in finding by a
preponderance of the evidence that he possessed marijuana with intent to distribute
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it. He also argues that the 24-month sentence the district court imposed was
substantively unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we reject both arguments.
A. The district court’s finding that Walker possessed marijuana with
intent to distribute it was not clearly erroneous.
Walker asserts that Clark’s testimony was insufficient to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he committed the offense of possession with
intent to distribute marijuana. Specifically, Walker cites Clark’s reliance on
Travis’s description of the suspect as wearing a white shirt and camouflage shorts
“in an area that was well populated”; argues that there was no evidence
“connecting . . . Walker to the plastic bag that contained several small bags of
marijuana”; represents that Clark “provided no testimony to link [the] money
[found on Walker’s person] to the drug transaction Officer Travis observed”; and
criticizes the government’s photographs as insufficiently clear to show that the
person in the photographs was Walker or that the two men in the photos engaged in
a hand-to-hand transaction. Appellant’s Br. at 13.
We discern no clear error in the district court’s finding that Walker
possessed marijuana with intent to distribute it. Even if the area in which Clark
apprehended Walker was well populated, Clark testified that Walker’s clothing
“distinguished [him] from everybody else out there.” Doc. 57 at 9. So by Clark’s
testimony, Walker was the only person who matched the descriptions Pope and
Travis gave. Further, there is evidence connecting Walker to the plastic bag that
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contained the smaller baggies of marijuana: Clark testified that Travis observed
Walker pick something up from the grass near a tree, and after Clark arrested
Walker officers found the plastic bag next to that same tree. There is also evidence
connecting the money Walker was carrying to the drug transaction Travis
observed: Clark testified that the cash was in small denominations which, in his
experience, denoted drug sales. Finally, although the photographs the government
admitted into evidence were of low quality, they support Travis and Pope’s
description of the suspect and Clark’s testimony about Walker’s actions and
surroundings.
Walker’s arguments amount to an assertion that he fell victim to mistaken
identity, but he has failed to demonstrate that the district court’s rejection of that
theory and finding that Walker was the person possessing with intent to distribute
marijuana was clearly erroneous. We therefore conclude that the district court was
within its discretion to revoke Walker’s supervised release based on the violation.
B. The 24-month, below guidelines sentence, was substantively reasonable.
Walker next argues that the sentence the district court imposed was
substantively unreasonable, citing in mitigation evidence that he was willing to be
a law-abiding citizen (his full-time employment and the fact that he remained on
and complied with the terms of bond while his revocation petition was pending);
his work history despite his chronic pain; his committed relationship with a partner
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whom he planned to marry; and the fact that he had just completed a lengthy prison
sentence.2 But the record makes clear that the district court entertained argument
on Walker’s personal mitigating circumstances, and there is no indication that the
district court failed to consider these circumstances. Walker’s challenge at bottom
is to the greater weight the court assigned to his criminal conduct, including his
criminal history and the possession with intent to distribute marijuana offense. We
cannot say that the district court balanced Walker’s criminal conduct and his
personal mitigating circumstances unreasonably, especially in light of the sentence
it imposed—a significant downward variance from the applicable guidelines range.
See Irey,
612 F.3d at 1189-90; see also Hunt,
526 F.3d at 746. Thus, we reject
Walker’s challenge to the 24-month sentence the district court imposed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having concluded that each of Walker’s challenges is without merit, we
affirm the district court’s revocation of supervised release and the sentence the
court imposed.
AFFIRMED.
2
Walker also argues that his sentence was unreasonable because it should not have been
based on the offense of possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Since we have rejected
Walker’s claim that the district court erred in adjudicating him in violation of the terms of his
supervised release based on that offense, we focus here on his argument that his sentence was
substantively unreasonable even if it properly accounted for all four violations.
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