Century Surety Company v. Hallandale Beach Service Station, LLC , 490 F. App'x 237 ( 2012 )


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  •             Case: 11-11858   Date Filed: 09/19/2012   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    Nos. 11-11858 & 11-12142
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-21430-AJ
    CENTURY SURETY COMPANY,
    Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross Appellant,
    versus
    HALLANDALE BEACH
    SERVICE STATION, LLC, et al.,
    Defendants,
    JOHNNY JOE VARIS,
    JONATHAN VARIS,
    EDWIN TOWNSEND,
    BRANDON COOPER,
    KIMBERLY VARIS,
    Defendants-Appellants-Cross Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (September 19, 2012)
    Case: 11-11858     Date Filed: 09/19/2012    Page: 2 of 5
    Before PRYOR, KRAVITCH and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Plaintiff-Appellee Century Surety Company (“Century)” sought a
    declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify its insureds,
    Urbieta Oil Inc. and Hallandale Beach Service Station, LLC (“Insureds”), in a suit
    filed against the Insureds in state court in Florida by persons injured while they
    were working on underground storage tanks at the Insureds’ gas station. The
    district court granted summary judgment in favor of Century, concluding that no
    duty to defend or indemnify against liability arising out of the Florida state court
    proceedings existed. We affirm the decision of the district court.
    Century issued a commercial general liability insurance policy (“Policy”) to
    the Insureds. The Insureds hired Petrofusezp, LLC to upgrade the underground
    storage tanks at its gas station. During the course of this upgrade work,
    Petrofusezp employees sustained injuries from a fireball explosion. The fireball
    explosion occurred when a container of acetone spilled. The fumes migrated to
    customized lights used by the employees, resulting in a violent oxidation reaction.
    2
    Case: 11-11858     Date Filed: 09/19/2012    Page: 3 of 5
    The employees brought suit against Petrofusezp; they also sued the
    Insureds. They alleged the Insureds were vicariously liable for Petrofusezp’s acts
    and strictly liable for carrying on inherently hazardous work. Century defended
    the Insureds in the state court proceedings but reserved its right to challenge
    coverage under the Policy. Century maintained that two Policy exclusions applied
    to exclude coverage.
    The policy provision that the district court concluded applied to exclude
    coverage was entitled “Mold, Fungi, Virus, Bacteria, Air Quality, Contaminants or
    Other Harmful Materials.” Subsection (d) of that provision excluded coverage for
    ‘Bodily injury’ ... arising out of, caused by, or alleging to
    be contributed to in any way by toxic or hazardous
    properties of minerals or other substances.
    The complaint filed in state court by the employees characterized acetone as a
    hazardous chemical. And the employees’ brief on appeal recognizes the
    combustibility of acetone.
    We agree with the district court that the exclusion is clear and unambiguous.
    Excepted from coverage under the hazardous materials endorsement to the Policy
    is bodily injury “arising out of,” or “contributed in any way” by the “hazardous
    properties” of “substances.” As we have noted, the state court complaint alleged
    that acetone is a hazardous chemical. It alleged further that the acetone spilled and
    3
    Case: 11-11858     Date Filed: 09/19/2012    Page: 4 of 5
    immediately migrated to some customized lights and caused a fireball explosion,
    setting the workers ablaze. The applicability of the hazardous materials exclusion
    is set out in the pleadings: the alleged injuries arose out of or were contributed in
    some way (or both) by a hazardous property (combustibility) of acetone (a
    substance).
    We accept that Florida courts will construe an exclusionary provision in an
    insurance contract in favor of the insured when a genuine ambiguity exists. See
    State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen, 
    498 So.2d 1245
    , 1248 (Fla. 1986).
    But as more fully explained in the district court opinion, the construction of the
    harmful-materials exclusion advanced by the employees would require the court to
    engraft new terms on the exclusion and to ignore other operative terms set out
    unambiguously in the exclusion. Where, as here, the policy language is plain and
    unambiguous, no special construction or interpretation is required. See id;
    Admiral Ins. Co. v. Feit Management Co., 
    321 F.3d 1326
    , 1329 (11th Cir. 2003).
    Under the harmful-materials endorsement, Century had no duty to defend or to
    indemnify its Insureds.
    Century cross-appeals, arguing that another Policy provision -- the “Total
    Pollution Exclusion” -- also applied to exclude coverage; the district court
    concluded otherwise. Because we affirm the district court on the applicability of
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    Case: 11-11858   Date Filed: 09/19/2012   Page: 5 of 5
    the harmful-materials endorsement, Century’s cross-appeal lacks practical
    significance and is moot.
    Summary judgment in favor of Century is AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-11858, 11-12142

Citation Numbers: 490 F. App'x 237

Judges: Edmondson, Kravitch, Per Curiam, Pryor

Filed Date: 9/19/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023