Michael Weaver v. Madison City Board of Education , 771 F.3d 748 ( 2014 )


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  •           Case: 13-14182   Date Filed: 11/04/2014   Page: 1 of 18
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-14182 & 13-14927
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cv-00524-RDP
    DARRYL WALKER, et al.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    No. 13-14624
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 5:11-cv-03558-TMP
    MICHAEL WEAVER,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    MADISON CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,
    Case: 13-14182    Date Filed: 11/04/2014   Page: 2 of 18
    Defendants-Appellants.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (November 4, 2014)
    Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, and JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit
    Judges.
    JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
    In these consolidated appeals—Walker and Weaver—the Jefferson County
    Board of Education and the Madison City Board of Education ask us to recede
    from our opinion in Stewart v. Baldwin Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
    908 F.2d 1499
    , 1511
    (11th Cir. 1990), which held that school boards in Alabama are not arms of the
    state and therefore not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.        With the
    benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the Eleventh Amendment ruling in
    Stewart has not been overruled or abrogated, and therefore remains binding
    precedent.
    I
    We begin with a summary of the proceedings in Walker and Weaver.
    In Walker, a number of so-called 240-day employees sued the Jefferson
    County Board of Education, alleging that the Board’s practice of dividing their
    annual salaries by 260 days to obtain their hourly and overtime rates violated the
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    Fair Labor Standards Act, 
    29 U.S.C. § 201
    , et seq. The Walker plaintiffs sought to
    recover wrongfully calculated wages, withheld wages, unpaid wages, overtime
    compensation, and liquidated damages.
    The district court in Walker granted the Jefferson County Board’s motion to
    dismiss. It held that the Board was an arm of the state and therefore entitled to
    assert Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. In so ruling, the district court
    concluded that Stewart did not constitute binding precedent. Relying on Versiglio
    v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of Ala., 
    686 F.3d 1290
    , 1291 (11th Cir. 2012) (Versiglio
    II), the district court looked to decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court declaring
    that school boards have sovereign immunity under the Alabama Constitution from
    suits based on state tort and contract law. Like the panel in Versiglio II, the district
    court declined to interpret Alabama law in a way that it believed was diametrically
    opposed to the decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court. See Walker v. Jefferson
    Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:13-CV-00524-RDP, 
    2013 WL 4056224
    , at *1 (N.D. Ala.
    Aug. 12, 2013); Walker v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:13-CV-00524-RDP,
    Order Denying Relief from Judgment [D.E. 26] at 2-5 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 4, 2013).
    The plaintiffs appeal from that ruling.
    The plaintiff in Weaver, a member of the United States Army Reserve, sued
    his former employer, the Madison City Board of Education, alleging that after his
    nearly two-year tour of duty in Afghanistan, the Board refused to reinstate him to
    3
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    his prior position. He claimed that, by reducing his responsibilities, status, and
    salary upon his return from active duty service, the Board violated the Uniform
    Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 
    38 U.S.C. § 4301
    , et seq.
    The district court in Weaver denied the Madison City Board’s motion to
    dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds. It ruled that our decision in Stewart
    was binding and, alternatively, that the result would be the same even if Stewart
    were not controlling. See Weaver v. Madison City Bd. of Educ., 
    947 F. Supp. 2d 1308
    , 1314-24 (N.D. Ala. 2013). The Board appeals from that decision.
    II
    The Eleventh Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, generally
    provides that Article III’s jurisdictional grant did not and does not limit the
    sovereign immunity that states enjoyed when they joined the Union. See generally
    Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 
    131 S. Ct. 1632
    , 1637 (2011). This
    immunity from suit is available “only” to states and arms of the states. See N. Ins.
    Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham Cnty., Ga., 
    547 U.S. 189
    , 193 (2006) (holding that county
    could not assert Eleventh Amendment immunity because it was not acting as an
    arm of the state when it operated a drawbridge that it owned). See also Odebrecht
    Const., Inc. v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 
    715 F.3d 1268
    , 1289 (11th Cir. 2013)
    (“Odebrecht has no monetary recourse against a state agency like FDOT because
    of the Eleventh Amendment.”). The Boards contend that they are entitled to
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    Eleventh Amendment immunity as arms of the state of Alabama, and insist that our
    1990 decision in Stewart is no longer good law.
    Stewart involved a claim against an Alabama county board of education (and
    others) under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     by a former employee alleging that he was fired for
    exercising his First Amendment rights.          The district court denied the school
    board’s motion for summary judgment, and the school board appealed, arguing that
    it was entitled to absolute immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 
    908 F.2d at 1508
    .       We declined to address whether the denial of Eleventh Amendment
    immunity was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, and
    instead exercised our discretion to entertain the Eleventh Amendment immunity
    question under the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction. 
    Id. at 1509
    . 1
    Turning to the merits, we applied a three-factor test to determine whether the
    school board enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity under federal law. We
    framed the test as follows: “(1) how the state law defines the entity; (2) the degree
    of state control over the entity; and (3) the entity’s fiscal autonomy—i.e., where
    the entity derives its funds and who is responsible for judgments against the
    entity.” 
    Id.
    1
    The Supreme Court later held that the denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity is
    immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer
    Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 
    506 U.S. 139
    , 141 (1993).
    5
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    That test, in conjunction with relevant Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit
    precedent, led us to conclude in Stewart that the school board could not assert
    Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, the Supreme Court, looking in part to state
    law, had held in Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 
    429 U.S. 274
    , 280-81 (1977),
    that an Ohio school board was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, as it
    was more like a county or city than an arm of the state. Stewart, 
    908 F.2d at
    1509-
    10. Second, we had previously denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to school
    boards in Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana because those entities had a
    substantial amount of control over their own affairs and the means to raise funds,
    so that any adverse judgments could be paid out of local funds. 
    Id.
     at 1510 (citing
    cases). Third, the fact that “Alabama state courts provide[d] county boards of
    education with sovereign immunity in state tort law actions d[id] not require a
    similar treatment under the Eleventh Amendment,” as it was improper to “conflate
    sovereign immunity with regard to a state-created tort with Eleventh Amendment
    immunity for a federal cause of action.” 
    Id.
     at 1510 n.6. Fourth, school boards in
    Alabama possessed a “significant amount of flexibility in raising local funding,”
    including the ability to raise revenues by selling interest-bearing tax anticipation
    warrants. 
    Id. at 1510
    . As a result, “it c[ould not] be said that a judgment against a
    county school board w[ould] come from state funds.” 
    Id. at 1510-11
    . Fifth, those
    school boards had the power to establish general education policy, and the
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    authority to assign teachers and place students. 
    Id. at 1511
    . Finally, at least four
    district courts in Alabama had denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to school
    boards in that state. 
    Id.
     2
    III
    Once a panel of this court decides an issue, its holding on that issue is
    binding on all subsequent panels, “unless and until it is overruled or undermined to
    the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.”
    United States v. Sneed, 
    600 F.3d 1326
    , 1332 (11th Cir. 2010) (italics omitted).
    And that is the rule even if the prior panel failed to consider certain arguments or
    contentions. “[W]e have categorically rejected an overlooked reason or argument
    exception to the prior precedent rule.” United States v. Johnson, 
    528 F.3d 1318
    ,
    1320 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing cases), rev’d on other grounds, 
    559 U.S. 133
     (2010).
    A
    A Supreme Court decision abrogates one of our prior cases only if it is
    “clearly on point.” United States v. Lawson, 
    686 F.3d 1317
    , 1319 (11th Cir. 2012).
    The Supreme Court has not decided any cases that abrogate Stewart, and Mt.
    Healthy—its one decision on the Eleventh Amendment immunity of a local school
    board—is still good law today, as it continues to be cited favorably by the Court.
    2
    We followed Stewart in Kendrick v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
    932 F.2d 910
    , 914
    (11th Cir. 1991), and denied Eleventh Amendment immunity to an Alabama county school board
    sued under federal law.
    7
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    See N. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 
    547 U.S. at 193
    ; Alden v. Maine, 
    527 U.S. 706
    , 756 (1999);
    Missouri v. Jenkins, 
    495 U.S. 33
    , 56 n.20 (1990).
    Our circuit, moreover, has not overruled Stewart through an en banc
    decision. Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment test articulated in Stewart remains the
    law of the circuit, though the third Stewart factor (the entity’s fiscal autonomy—
    i.e., where the entity derives its funds and who is responsible for judgments against
    the entity) has now been subdivided into a third factor (where the entity derives its
    funds) and a fourth factor (who is responsible for judgments against the entity).
    See, e.g., Manders v. Lee, 
    338 F.3d 1304
    , 1309 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Ross v.
    Jefferson Cnty. Dep’t of Health, 
    701 F.3d 655
    , 660-61 (11th Cir. 2012).3
    B
    We have recognized that “[i]f state law changes or is clarified in a way that
    is inconsistent with the state law premise of one of our earlier decisions, the prior
    panel precedent rule does not bind us to follow our earlier decision.” Johnson, 
    528 F.3d at 1320
    . The Boards believe that Alabama law has changed significantly with
    respect to how school boards are characterized, and that as a result Stewart is no
    longer binding.
    3
    We therefore do not address whether (or how) the prior panel precedent rule applies
    when one or more factors of a multi-factor test have changed.
    8
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    Quoting one of our recent cases, the Boards begin by pointing out that
    whether an entity “qualifies as an arm of the state is a federal question with a
    federal standard, but whether that standard is met will be determined by carefully
    reviewing how the [entity] is defined by state law.” Versiglio II, 686 F.3d at 1291.
    In that case the panel initially ruled that, “[d]espite the strength of [its] claim” to
    Eleventh Amendment immunity under our four-factor test, the Alabama Board of
    Dental Examiners did not enjoy such immunity because one factor “weigh[ed]
    heavily” against it: the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals had ruled that the Board of
    Dental Examiners was not entitled to sovereign immunity under state law. See
    Versiglio v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs of Ala., 
    651 F.3d 1272
    , 1276-77 (11th Cir.
    2011) (Versiglio I). The Versiglio I panel thought it would be wrong to rule on
    Eleventh Amendment immunity in a way that was “diametrically opposed” to the
    ruling of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals on state sovereign immunity. 
    Id. at 1277
    .
    The Versigilio I panel later granted rehearing, vacated Versiglio I, and ruled
    that the Board of Dental Examiners was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
    from a claim asserted under the FLSA. It did so because, after issuance of the
    initial panel opinion, the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the Board of Dental
    Examiners was a state agency that was immune from a breach of contract suit
    based on state law. See Versiglio II, 686 F.3d at 1292. The Versiglio II panel
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    explained that it did not want to have “the incongruous result of having a ‘state
    agency’ that is immune from suit under state law but not federal law.” Id. It
    concluded by saying that we “give[ ] great deference to how state courts
    characterize the entity in question,” and that “[t]his practice is in keeping with the
    ordinary deference granted state courts when they interpret matters of state
    concern.” Id. at 1292-93.
    C
    We have no quarrel with the general proposition, as expressed in Versiglio
    II, that how state law defines an entity is significant for purposes of the Eleventh
    Amendment. See Mt. Healthy, 
    429 U.S. at 280
     (“The answer depends, at least in
    part, upon the nature of the entity created by state law.”). Accord Manders, 
    338 F.3d at 1309
     (“Given these [four] factors, the resolution of the Eleventh
    Amendment issue . . . depends, in part, on state law.”). But we do not think this
    proposition helps the Boards here.
    The Alabama Supreme Court ruled in 2009 and again in 2012 that county
    school boards enjoy sovereign immunity, under § 14 of the Alabama Constitution,
    from suits based on state tort or contract law. See Ex Parte Hale Cnty. Bd. of
    Educ., 
    14 So. 3d 844
    , 848 (Ala. 2009) (“Because county boards of education are
    local agencies of the [s]tate, they are clothed in constitutional immunity from
    suit[.]”); Ex Parte Montgomery Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
    88 So. 3d 837
    , 841 (Ala. 2012)
    10
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    (“It is well settled in Alabama that ‘[l]ocal school boards are agencies of the state,
    and not of the local governmental units they serve, and they are entitled to the
    same absolute immunity as other agencies of the state.’”) (citation omitted). As the
    Boards see it, the Alabama Supreme Court’s decisions in Hale County and
    Montgomery County require us to revisit our ruling in Stewart, and under Versiglio
    II we should overrule Stewart so that we do not have the incongruous situation of
    having Alabama school boards enjoying sovereign immunity under state law but
    being denied Eleventh Amendment immunity under federal law. Versiglio II,
    however, is not as sweeping as the Boards think.
    First, the Boards’ suggestion that our 2012 decision Versiglio II can be read
    as collapsing the entire Eleventh Amendment multi-factor test into a single
    dispositive inquiry—whether the state courts grant state law immunity to the entity
    for suits based on state law—conflicts not only with our 1990 decision Stewart, but
    also with our 2003 en banc decision in Manders. As the district court in Weaver
    explained, “[h]ow the state courts treat an entity is only one part of the first factor
    of the Stewart and Manders analysis. Within the first factor the court also weighs
    how state statutes treat the particular entity.” Weaver, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1311
    (emphasis and footnote omitted). We decline to read Versiglio II in a way which
    violates our prior panel precedent rule and creates interpretive problems for panels
    in the future. See Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, LLC, 
    369 F.3d 11
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    1197, 1208 n.13 (11th Cir. 2004) (refusing, given prior panel precedent rule, to
    modify multi-factor test previously established by circuit). See also United States
    v. Mozie, 
    752 F.3d 1271
    , 1285 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Under the prior panel precedent
    rule, when two of our decisions conflict, we are obligated to follow the earlier
    one.”); Offshore of the Palm Beaches, Inc. v. Lynch, 
    741 F.3d 1251
    , 1256 (11th
    Cir. 2014) (“[W]hen faced with an intracircuit split, we look to the earliest case not
    abrogated by the Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc.”). 4
    Second, at the time we decided Stewart, Alabama courts had already held
    that school boards were state entities entitled to sovereign immunity from tort suits
    based on state law. See, e.g., Brown v. Covington Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
    524 So. 2d 623
    , 625 (Ala. 1988). Although we recognized that principle of state sovereign
    immunity law in Stewart, we did not find it determinative, and held that Alabama
    school boards could not assert Eleventh Amendment immunity:
    That Alabama state courts provide county boards of education
    with sovereign immunity in state tort law actions does not require a
    similar treatment under the Eleventh Amendment. The Supreme
    Court’s resolution in Mt. Healthy is instructive. At the time that Mt.
    Healthy was decided, the case law in Ohio was clear that a local
    4
    In declining to follow Stewart, the district court in Walker relied in part on Huber, Hunt
    & Nichols, Inc. v. Architectural Stone Co., 
    625 F.2d 22
    , 24 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that whether
    an entity is a “‘second self’ of the state or a ‘separate and distinct’ entity subject to suit ‘must be
    determined by the law of the state’”) (citation omitted). To the extent that Huber held that
    Eleventh Amendment immunity is governed solely by how state law characterizes an entity, it
    has been superseded by the later en banc decision in Manders, 
    338 F.3d at 1309
     (setting out four-
    part Eleventh Amendment immunity test).
    12
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    school board was cloaked in sovereign immunity to the same degree
    as the state itself[.]
    Stewart, 
    908 F.2d at
    1510 n.6 (citing cases). We closed by saying that the school
    board’s “attempt to conflate [state] sovereign immunity with regard to a state-
    created tort with Eleventh Amendment immunity for a federal cause of action is
    unavailaing.” 
    Id.
    Given decisions like Brown, the Alabama Supreme Court’s 2009 decision in
    Hale County and 2012 decision in Montgomery County do not constitute new
    pronouncements of Alabama law on the question of the state sovereign immunity
    enjoyed by local school boards, and did not permit our Versigilio II decision to
    implicitly overrule or prior decision in Stewart. They likewise do not provide a
    basis for us to conclude that Stewart has been abrogated.       Cf. Howlett ex rel.
    Howlett v. Rose, 
    496 U.S. 356
    , 377-78 (1990) (“To the extent that the [state] law
    of sovereign immunity reflects a substantive disagreement with the extent to which
    governmental entities should be held liable for their constitutional violations, that
    disagreement cannot override the dictates of federal law.”). We note, as well, that
    the Alabama courts do not view state sovereign immunity and Eleventh
    Amendment immunity as one and the same. See Ex Parte Ala. Dep’t of Youth
    Servs., 
    880 So. 2d 393
    , 404 (Ala. 2003) (“State law sovereign immunity is relevant
    [in the Eleventh Amendment context] only as it indicates whether the state
    considers the entity to be part of the state. It is at best only a rough, overly
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    inclusive gauge of the arm-of-the-state status under the Eleventh Amendment[.]”)
    (citation omitted).
    D
    Even assuming that Versiglio II now requires us to give more weight to how
    state courts treat the entity in question, the Boards’ attempt to sink Stewart with a
    Versiglio II broadside fares no better. The problem for the Boards is Ex Parte
    Madison Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 
    1 So. 3d 980
    , 989-90 (Ala. 2008), a post-Stewart case
    in which the Alabama Supreme Court held that a local school board is “not an arm
    of the [s]tate for the purposes of § 1983 liability and is not entitled to Eleventh
    Amendment immunity.” In coming to this conclusion, the Alabama Supreme
    Court—which like any state court is generally presumed competent to interpret and
    apply federal law, see Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 
    552 F.3d 1290
    ,
    1301 (11th Cir. 2008)—did not just defer to our decision in Stewart. Instead, it
    correctly recognized that Eleventh Amendment immunity is a question of federal
    law, and independently applied our Manders test over the course of several pages,
    ultimately concluding that “application of [that] test to the facts before us does not
    support a finding that the [school board] has established a right to Eleventh
    Amendment immunity.” Madison County, 
    1 So. 3d at 987-89
    .
    With respect to the first factor of the test, which asks how state law
    characterizes school boards, the Alabama Supreme Court in Madison County
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    explained that a school board’s members are elected by voters in the relevant
    county; that a school board determines its own educational policy and prescribes
    rules and regulations for the schools in its jurisdiction; that a school board may
    suspend or dismiss superintendents, principals, teachers, and other employees; and
    that a school board may transfer teachers as needed to different schools or grades.
    
    Id. at 987-88
    . Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the first factor “len[t]
    little weight to the [school board] being considered an ‘arm of the [s]tate’ and
    thereby entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” 
    Id. at 988
    .
    As for the second factor of the test, which looks at the degree of control
    asserted by the state, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded in Madison County
    that “the legislature . . . specifically vested in county boards of education the
    authority to transfer, suspend, or dismiss teachers[.]” 
    Id.
     As a result, this “second
    factor d[id] not weigh in favor of the [b]oard’s being considered an ‘arm of the
    [s]tate’ and thereby entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.” 
    Id.
    The third and fourth factors (where the board of education derives its funds
    and who is responsible for judgments against the board) also did not weigh in favor
    of according Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled
    that the school board failed to explain from where it derived its funds, and further
    failed to provide any evidentiary support for its assertion that any judgment against
    it would be paid from the state treasury. 
    Id.
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    Madison County is the Alabama Supreme Court’s latest word on whether
    local school boards are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for federal
    causes of action, and its ruling on that issue is consistent with (and identical to) our
    ruling in Stewart. So, even if we were to read Versigilio II as broadly as the
    Boards urge us to do, and look to the more recent decisions of the Alabama
    Supreme Court for definitive guidance on the Eleventh Amendment question
    before us, the result would be the same. Simply stated, we do not create an
    incongruous result by adhering to our Stewart decision because the Alabama
    Supreme Court’s Madison County decision agrees with Stewart that, with respect
    to employment decisions, a local school board in Alabama is not an arm of the
    state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Madison County, 
    1 So. 3d at 988-89
     (explaining that local school boards have statutory authority to
    transfer, suspend, or dismiss teachers and employees). See also 
    Ala. Code § 16
    -
    11-17 (“The city board of education shall fix the salaries of all employees and may
    suspend or dismiss any principal or teacher or supervisor or attendance officer or
    other regular employee so appointed on the written recommendation of the city
    superintendent of schools for immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency,
    willful neglect of duty or when, in the opinion of the board, the best interests of the
    schools may require[.]”); 
    Ala. Code § 16-8-23
     (“The county board [of education]
    may suspend or dismiss for immorality, misconduct in office, insubordination,
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    incompetency or willful neglect of duty, or whenever, in the opinion of the board,
    the best interests of the school require it, superintendents, principals, teachers or
    any other employees or appointees of the board[.]”). 5
    E
    At oral argument, counsel for the Boards represented that the decision to
    compensate employees based upon an allegedly illegal formula in Walker was
    made by the state of Alabama, which had assumed control of the Jefferson County
    Board of Education pursuant to a state financial intervention law. We do not know
    if this factual assertion is correct or not, because the necessary information is not in
    the record. We therefore do not address it. On remand the parties are free to
    pursue discovery on this issue, and to make whatever arguments they deem
    appropriate to the district court in their summary judgment filings.
    III
    “Whether [an entity] is an ‘arm of the [s]tate’ must be assessed in light of the
    particular function in which the [entity] was engaged when taking the actions out
    of which liability is asserted to arise.” Manders, 
    338 F.3d at 1308
    . Both of the
    5
    The Boards may think that the Alabama Supreme Court’s decisions denying Eleventh
    Amendment immunity but granting state sovereign immunity to local school boards are
    schizophrenic, but the “Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that sovereign immunity is a
    flexible defense with multiple aspects that states can independently relinquish without affecting
    others.” Stroud v. McIntosh, 
    722 F.3d 1294
    , 1301 (11th Cir. 2013). And, as we have explained,
    the Alabama courts do not view Eleventh Amendment immunity and state sovereign immunity
    as coterminous concepts. See Ala. Dep’t of Youth Servs., 
    880 So. 2d at 404
    .
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    cases before us concern employment-related decisions (i.e., hiring, assignment, and
    compensation), and under Stewart, 
    908 F.2d at 1509-11
    , local school boards in
    Alabama are not arms of the state with respect to such decisions. Accordingly, the
    Jefferson County Board of Education and the Madison City Board of Education are
    not immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suits challenging those decisions
    under federal law. The district court’s dismissal of the complaint in Walker is
    reversed, and the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss in Weaver is
    affirmed.
    REVERSED and REMANDED in Walker, and AFFIRMED in Weaver.
    18