United States v. Lamar Eady, Jr. , 591 F. App'x 711 ( 2014 )


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  •            Case: 14-10592   Date Filed: 11/06/2014   Page: 1 of 19
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-10592
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20551-WJZ-2
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    LAMAR EADY, JR.,
    DEONDRE BAIN,
    Defendants - Appellants.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (November 6, 2014)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 14-10592     Date Filed: 11/06/2014   Page: 2 of 19
    A jury convicted Deondre Bain and Lamar Eady on one count each of being
    a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Mr. Bain
    appeals six of the district court’s evidentiary rulings at trial. Mr. Eady does not
    appeal his conviction.    Instead, he challenges the district court’s sentencing
    determination that he was an armed career criminal. He argues that his prior
    conviction of felony battery under Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1) should not qualify as a
    “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 924(e).
    For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    I
    On June 30, 2013, Detective Derek Rodriguez of the City of Miami Gardens
    Police Department saw a man holding a long rifle standing next to a car parked on
    the side of the road. Detective Rodriguez thought he recognized the man as Henry
    Carter, a person of interest in a criminal investigation. In fact, the man was later
    identified as Lloyd Hulse. Detective Rodriguez activated his police vehicle lights
    and ordered Mr. Hulse to drop his weapon. Mr. Hulse threw the rifle into the car’s
    back seat through an open rear door and raised his hands.
    Two other detectives and FBI Special Agent Brett McDaniel accompanied
    Detective Rodriguez to the car. Three men were seated inside: Andre Beach in the
    front driver’s seat, Mr. Eady in the front passenger’s seat, and Mr. Bain in the back
    seat. The officers found three firearms inside the car: a Glock Model 27 .40 caliber
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    handgun lying on the floor of the front passenger seat next to Mr. Eady, a Glock
    Model 22 .40 caliber handgun under the front passenger seat and partially sticking
    out the back of the seat next to Mr. Bain; and the AR-15 rifle Mr. Hulse threw in
    the back seat next to Mr. Bain.
    A federal grand jury indicted Mr. Hulse, Mr. Bain, and Mr. Eady each on
    one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
    922(g)(1). Mr. Hulse pled guilty, while Mr. Bain and Mr. Eady proceeded to trial.
    The government presented testimony from the arresting officers, DNA evidence
    from the firearms, recordings of Mr. Bain’s phone calls from jail, and evidence that
    Mr. Bain and Mr. Eady each had a prior felony conviction involving a firearm.
    Mr. Bain called one witness, Travonna Shantavia Gosier, who testified that she
    spent several hours alone with Mr. Bain until moments before the officers found
    him in the car.
    The jury found Mr. Bain guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 111
    months in prison. The jury also found Mr. Eady guilty. At sentencing, the district
    court determined that Mr. Eady was an armed career criminal under the ACCA.
    The court found Mr. Eady had three prior violent felony convictions: (1)
    aggravated assault with a firearm; (2) strong arm robbery; and (3) felony battery.
    Mr. Eady objected to his felony battery conviction being considered a violent
    felony under the ACCA. After concluding that felony battery was a violent felony,
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    the district court sentenced Mr. Eady to 188 months, the low end of the guideline
    range for his criminal history category and total offense level.
    Both Mr. Bain and Mr. Eady timely appealed.
    II
    To prove a defendant is guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm
    under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must establish beyond a reasonable
    doubt “(1) that the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) that the defendant was in
    knowing possession of a firearm; and (3) that the firearm was in or affecting
    interstate commerce.” United States v. Jernigan, 
    341 F.3d 1273
    , 1279 (11th Cir.
    2003). Mr. Bain does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
    Mr. Bain argues instead that he is entitled to a new trial because the district
    court erred in six of its evidentiary rulings. Specifically, he asserts that the district
    court wrongfully (1) admitted evidence that he was previously convicted of a
    felony involving a firearm; (2) prevented him from asking a detective a question on
    cross examination under the rule of completeness; (3) allowed the government to
    ask a burden-shifting question on cross-examination; (4) excluded evidence that
    Mr. Beach had a prior felony conviction; (5) excluded evidence of Mr. Hulse’s
    guilty plea; and (6) violated his Confrontation Clause rights by admitting DNA
    evidence without testimony from the crime scene investigator who collected it.
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    We start with Mr. Bain’s arguments regarding the district court’s
    nonconstitutional evidentiary rulings before discussing his argument regarding the
    Confrontation Clause.
    A
    We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
    See United States v. Malol, 
    476 F.3d 1283
    , 1291 (11th Cir. 2007). But “[e]ven if
    an abuse of discretion is shown, nonconstitutional evidentiary errors are not
    grounds for reversal absent a reasonable likelihood that the defendant’s substantial
    rights were affected.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). A
    defendant’s substantial rights are not affected “[w]here there is overwhelming
    evidence of guilt” or where the error had only “a very slight effect.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted). See also United States v. Frazier, 
    387 F.3d 1244
    , 1266 n.20 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (explaining that erroneous evidentiary
    rulings are not reversible if they do not have a “substantial influence . . . or leave
    grave doubt as to whether they affected the outcome of a case” (internal quotation
    marks and citation omitted)).
    First, Mr. Bain challenges the district court’s denial of his motion in limine
    to exclude a prior felony conviction of his that involved a firearm. In September of
    2010, Mr. Bain was convicted in state court of attempted second-degree murder
    involving the discharge of a firearm. The government filed a notice of intent to
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    offer evidence of the conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show
    that Mr. Bain’s possession was knowing and intentional. Mr. Bain moved to
    exclude the evidence, arguing that his prior crime was not closely related enough
    to his pending charges to be admissible. The district court denied Mr. Bain’s
    motion. It allowed the government to admit into evidence the fact that Mr. Bain
    was previously convicted of a felony involving the knowing and intentional
    possession of a firearm. The jury was not informed, however, that Mr. Bain’s
    conviction was for attempted second-degree murder.
    We use a three-part test to determine whether a district court abused its
    discretion by admitting evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts under Rule 404(b):
    (1) “the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s
    character”; (2) there must be sufficient proof so that a jury could find that the
    defendant committed the extrinsic act”; and (3) the evidence must have probative
    value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice and meet other
    Rule 403 requirements. United States v. Miller, 
    959 F.2d 1535
    , 1538 (11th Cir.
    1992) (en banc).   A logical connection exists between a convicted felon’s
    knowing possession of a firearm at one time and the felon’s knowledge that a
    firearm was present at a later time or that the subsequent possession was not
    accidental. See United States v. Jernigan, 
    341 F.3d 1273
    , 1281 (11th Cir. 2003).
    And the government is permitted to use qualifying Rule 404(b) evidence to show
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    intent when a defendant pleads not guilty and fail to remove intent as an issue. See
    United States v. Edouard, 
    485 F.3d 1324
    , 1345 (11th Cir. 2007).
    Here, Mr. Bain put both his intent and knowledge at issue by pleading not
    guilty and arguing that he did not know that firearms were present in the car. The
    district court excluded the prejudicial nature of Mr. Bain’s attempted second-
    degree murder conviction and limited the evidence to the fact that Mr. Bain had a
    prior felony conviction involving the knowing possession of a firearm. And the
    district court appropriately instructed the jury that it could not consider Mr. Bain’s
    prior conviction to prove that he was guilty of the current crime but only to prove
    Mr. Bain’s state of mind. In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    admitting the evidence.
    Next, Mr. Bain argues that the district court abused its discretion by
    sustaining the government’s objection when he asked Special Agent McDaniel a
    question on cross examination. While Mr. Bain was in custody, he made more
    than one hundred phone calls that were recorded. Portions of Mr. Bain’s recorded
    calls were played for the jury and admitted into evidence.          Mr. Bain made
    statements that he needed to “get another hammer,” that he needed to get back his
    “walk around,” and that the police took his “baby, with that green beam on it.”
    Special Agent McDaniel testified at trial that a “hammer” and a “walk around” are
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    slang terms for guns and that one of the guns seized from the car had a laser that
    shot a green beam.
    During cross examination, Mr. Bain asked Special Agent McDaniel whether
    “in listening to those hundreds of recordings at no point in time did you ever hear
    Mr. Bain ever make a statement stating that he knew that guns were in the car,
    correct?” The government objected on the basis of hearsay. Mr. Bain argued that
    he should be allowed to ask the question under the rule of completeness. The
    district court sustained the objection.
    Mr. Bain does not argue that the government’s hearsay objection was
    improper.1 He argues only that he should have been able to ask his question under
    the rule of completeness. The rule of completeness, as codified in the Federal
    Rules of Evidence, states that “[i]f a party introduces all or part of a . . . recorded
    statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other
    part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be
    considered at the same time.” Fed. R. Evid. 106. The rule “permits introduction
    only of additional material that is relevant and is necessary to qualify, explain, or
    place into context the portion already introduced.” United States v. Simms, 
    385 F.3d 1347
    , 1359 (11th Cir. 2004).
    1
    We therefore do not address whether a district court should sustain a hearsay objection to a
    question asking whether a declarant never made a certain statement.
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    Mr. Bain did not ask to admit into evidence any additional portions of his
    recorded phone calls and does not argue on appeal that any other part of the
    recordings was “necessary to qualify, explain, or place into context” what he meant
    when he spoke about a needing to get a “hammer” or a “walk around” or losing his
    “baby, with that green beam on it.” Instead, he wanted the jury to know that he did
    not admit to knowing that guns were in the car. Although the lack of a statement
    acknowledging the presence of guns might be relevant to Mr. Bain’s guilt, it was
    not necessary to explain the portions of the phone calls admitted into evidence.
    Further, even if the district court’s ruling constituted an abuse of discretion,
    it did not affect Mr. Bain’s substantial rights.       Because he never made the
    statement during a recorded phone call, Mr. Bain was free to argue to the jury that
    the government offered no evidence that he ever admitted to knowing the guns
    were in the car. Thus, we affirm the district court’s ruling.
    B
    Next, Mr. Bain appeals the district court’s denial of Mr. Eady’s request to
    admit evidence that Mr. Beach had a prior felony conviction involving the
    knowing and intentional possession of a firearm. Mr. Bain also appeals the district
    court’s denial of Mr. Eady’s request to admit evidence that Mr. Hulse pled guilty
    to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Mr. Bain adopted Mr.
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    Eady’s arguments and objections on these two issues during the trial. We review
    these issues for abuse of discretion.
    Mr. Bain’s arguments on these two issues lack merit. Mr. Beach was not a
    witness for either the government or the defense, and was not charged in the
    indictment.     Moreover, there was no testimony or evidence that Mr. Beach
    possessed the firearms in the car. Nonetheless, Mr. Eady sought to introduce
    irrelevant evidence about Mr. Beach’s prior firearms-related felony conviction.
    Given the circumstances, the district court properly ruled the evidence was
    prohibited character evidence under Rule 404(b) and misleading and confusing to
    the jury under Rule 403.
    Similarly, Mr. Eady wanted to ask Special Agent McDaniel whether Mr.
    Hulse—a codefendant—had pled guilty. The district court properly ruled Mr.
    Eady was soliciting inadmissible hearsay testimony. Additionally, there was a
    substantial likelihood that knowledge of Mr. Hulse’s guilty plea would confuse and
    mislead the jury. See United States v. Griffin, 
    778 F.2d 707
    , 710 (11th Cir. 1985)
    (“Due to the extreme and unfair prejudice suffered by defendants . . . courts and
    prosecutors generally are forbidden from mentioning that a codefendant has either
    pled guilty or been convicted.”).       Thus, the district court did not abuse its
    discretion by excluding evidence of Mr. Beach’s prior conviction or Mr. Hulse’s
    guilty plea.
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    C
    Next, Mr. Bain argues that the government impermissibly shifted the burden
    of proof when it asked a defense witness whether anyone could corroborate her
    testimony. Ms. Gosier was a former girlfriend of Mr. Bain’s. She testified that she
    spent several hours with Mr. Bain at her house prior to his arrest. She then drove
    him home.     She also testified that she lived with her parents.           On cross
    examination, the government asked whether “anyone [existed] who can say
    whether or not [Mr.] Bain was at your house besides you?” Mr. Bain objected.
    The district court overruled his objection. Ms. Gosier then testified that no one
    else could confirm that Mr. Bain was at her house.
    Where a defendant objects to the government’s cross examination questions
    on the basis of improper burden shifting, we review the claim de novo. See United
    States v. Schmitz, 
    643 F.3d 1247
    , 1266-67 (11th Cir. 1998).              Prosecutorial
    misconduct occurs when the government’s remarks are improper, and those
    remarks prejudicially affect the defendant’s substantial rights. See United States v.
    Wilson, 
    149 F.3d 1298
    , 1301 (11th Cir. 1998).
    Under the first prong, “a prosecutor may not comment about the absence of
    witnesses or otherwise attempt to shift the burden of proof . . . .” United States v.
    Hernandez, 
    145 F.3d 1433
    , 1439 (11th Cir. 1998). Under the second prong,
    prejudice exists when there is a reasonable probability that but for the remarks, the
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    outcome of the trial would be different.          See 
    Wilson, 149 F.3d at 1301
    .
    Importantly, “clear and repeated instructions on the prosecution’s burden of proof”
    will “cure[] any possibility of prejudice.” 
    Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1267
    .
    We doubt that the government’s question about whether anyone could
    corroborate that Mr. Bain spent time at Ms. Gosier’s house constituted a comment
    on the absence of witnesses sufficient to improperly shift the burden of proof. But
    even if it did, it is not reasonable to conclude, based on the evidence admitted, that
    the outcome of Mr. Bain’s trial would be different had the question not been asked.
    Additionally, the district court properly instructed the jury that Mr. Bain was not
    required to present any evidence during trial and that the government had the
    burden of proof. Thus, we find no reversible error.
    D
    Finally, Mr. Bain appeals the district court’s denial of his objection
    regarding testimony about DNA results. The facts relevant to this claim are as
    follows. Special Agent McDaniel testified that he was present when another FBI
    agent took DNA samples from Mr. Bain and Mr. Eady. He saw the other agent
    place the samples in a secure evidence envelope. Detective Rodriguez testified
    that he directed a crime scene investigator to take DNA samples of the Glock
    Model 22 .40 caliber handgun and Glock Model 27 .40 caliber handgun found in
    the car when Mr. Bain and Mr. Eady were arrested. The crime scene investigator
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    apparently prepared property receipts for the DNA evidence. But the crime scene
    investigator was not called to testify, and the property receipts were not admitted
    into evidence. Later the government called Toby Wolson, a criminalist supervisor
    in the Miami Dade Police Department Crime Laboratory.            Mr. Wolson was
    qualified without objection as an expert in DNA analysis and comparison. He
    testified that the DNA samples arrived with property receipts that identified the
    origin of the sample and the people who handled the items from their creation to
    their delivery to him. The property receipts indicated that two of the swabs were
    from the Glock Model 22 .40 caliber handgun and Glock Model 27 .40 caliber
    handgun found in the car. Other swabs were from Mr. Eady and Mr. Bain.
    Mr. Bain objected several times that Mr. Wolson’s testimony regarding the
    DNA swabs from the two guns was hearsay and based on a lack of a proper chain
    of custody. Mr. Bain never mentioned the Confrontation Clause. The government
    argued that any defects in the chain of custody went to the weight of the evidence,
    not its admissibility.
    The district court overruled Mr. Bain’s objections and allowed Mr. Wolson’s
    testimony. Mr. Wolson testified that Mr. Bain’s DNA could not be excluded as
    having contributed to the samples from the two guns, there was a 25% probability
    that Mr. Bain contributed to the DNA on the Glock Model 27 .40 caliber handgun,
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    and there was a 20% probability that Mr. Bain contributed to the DNA sample
    from the Glock Model 22 .40 caliber handgun.
    Mr. Bain argues that the district court erred when it allowed Mr. Wolson to
    testify without calling the crime scene investigator who collected the DNA
    samples, and without admitting into evidence the written property receipts. He
    argues that Mr. Wolson’s testimony regarding the property receipts was hearsay
    and was not supported by a proper predicate or a chain of custody. As support, Mr.
    Bain cites cases involving the Confrontation Clause.2
    We review preserved Confrontation Clause errors de novo. See United
    States v. Curbelo, 
    726 F.3d 1260
    , 1271-72 (11th Cir. 2013). If, however, defense
    counsel made only a hearsay objection and failed to make a timely Confrontation
    Clause objection, we review for only plain error. See United States v. Baker, 
    432 F.3d 1189
    , 1207 & n.12 (11th Cir. 2005). “Under plain error review, we cannot
    correct an error that was not raised at trial unless: (1) there was error; (2) that was
    plain; (3) that affected the defendant's substantial rights; and (4) we determine that
    2
    It is not entirely clear whether Mr. Bain is asserting a Confrontation Clause violation on
    appeal or simply citing cases involving the Confrontation Clause to make his argument about
    hearsay and a lack of a chain of custody. But Mr. Bain does not make any substantial argument
    on hearsay grounds, so we consider it abandoned. To the extent Mr. Bain raises an objection
    regarding the chain of custody, “gaps in the chain of custody affect only the weight of the
    evidence and not its admissibility.” United States v. Roberson, 
    897 F.2d 1092
    , 1096 (11th Cir.
    1990).
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    it that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial
    proceedings.” United States v. Charles, 
    722 F.3d 1319
    , 1322 (11th Cir. 2013).
    To the extent Mr. Bain asserts a violation of the Confrontation Clause
    because the crime scene investigator did not testify, the government is not required
    to produce every witness “who laid hands on the evidence.” See Melendez-Diaz v.
    Massachusetts, 
    557 U.S. 305
    , 311 n.1 (2009) (“[W]e do not hold, and it is not the
    case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of
    custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear
    in person as part of the prosecution's case . . . .”). Unlike the cases Mr. Bain cites,
    the government here made the person who tested the DNA available for cross
    examination.
    Insofar as Mr. Bain argues that the Confrontation Clause required the
    government to admit into evidence written property receipts establishing the chain
    of custody, he is wrong. The Confrontation Clause assures defendants the right to
    test evidence through cross examination. See Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 61 (2004) (requiring that reliability be “tested in the crucible of cross-
    examination”). The Confrontation Clause does not require the government to
    introduce documentary evidence.
    Finally, even if the admission of Mr. Wolson’s testimony was a
    constitutional error, it did not affect Mr. Bain’s substantial rights. The testimony
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    revealed a 20-25% probability that Mr. Bain contributed to the DNA found on the
    two Glock handguns. This evidence had a minor effect, if any, given that the jury
    heard recorded phone calls in which Mr. Bain talked about needing more guns and
    that the police took his “baby” away. Thus, Mr. Bain is not entitled to reversal.
    III
    Mr. Eady appeals the district court’s determination that he was an armed
    career criminal under the ACCA. Specifically, he objects to the district court’s
    ruling that his conviction for felony battery under Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1) is a
    qualifying felony under the ACCA.
    We review de novo a district court’s determination that a conviction
    qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA. See United States v. Canty, 
    570 F.3d 1251
    , 1254 (11th Cir. 2009). The ACCA provides that a defendant convicted
    of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and who has three prior convictions
    “for a violent felony,” is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of at least 15
    years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). A “violent felony” is defined as “any crime
    punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” which also (1) “has as
    an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
    person of another”; or (2) “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
    explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
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    physical injury to another.” 
    Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).
    These two prongs are known as
    the elements and residual clauses.
    The United States Supreme Court has defined “physical force” under the
    elements clause as “violent force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or
    injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States, 
    559 U.S. 133
    , 140 (2010). In
    Johnson, the Court held that simple felony battery under Fla. Stat. § 784.03 is not a
    violent felony under the ACCA. 
    Id. at 1271-72.
    Because a violation of § 784.03
    can be proven in multiple ways, and the lessor of the violations involves “only the
    slightest unwanted physical touch,” simple battery is not a violent felony under the
    ACCA, provided the government cannot show through Shepard-approved
    documents that the defendant’s conviction was based on more violent acts. 
    Id. at 1269.
    Mr. Eady asks us to rule the same for felony battery under § 784.041(1). We
    decline to do so. Although simple felony battery does not require actual harm to
    the victim, felony battery under § 784.041 does. The latter statute requires that the
    offender (1) “[a]ctually and intentionally touch[] or strike[] another person”; and
    (2) “cause[] great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement.”
    Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1) (emphasis added). Thus, unlike convictions for simple
    felony battery where no injury is required, convictions under § 784.041 require
    significant bodily harm, disability, or disfigurement. It is incorrect to say that a
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    person can “actually and intentionally” hit another person and cause “great bodily
    harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement” without using “force
    capable of causing physical pain or injury.” 3
    Even if § 784.041(1) does not meet the requirements of the elements clause,
    it certainly meets the requirements of the residual clause.                 See 18 U.S.C. §
    924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (requiring “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
    physical injury to another”). See also Begay v. United States, 
    553 U.S. 137
    , 144-
    45 (2008) (holding that crimes must include “purposeful, violent, and aggressive
    conduct” to constitute violent felonies under the ACCA). Felony battery under §
    784.041(1) requires not just a “potential risk” of physical injury, but also that the
    physical injury actually occur. And an intentional battery that causes “great bodily
    harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement” will ordinarily be
    committed by conduct that is purposeful, violent, and aggressive. See United
    States v. Alexander, 
    609 F.3d 1250
    , 1254 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that under
    the residual clause, we evaluate how the crime is “ordinarily committed”).
    Mr. Eady, however, asks us to consider that, although he pled guilty to
    felony battery under Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1), he was initially charged with a lewd
    and lascivious offense against a minor under Fla. Stat. § 800.04(4), an offense that
    3
    Mr. Eady’s argument that § 784.041(1)—unlike aggravated felony battery under § 784.075—
    lacks an intent to cause great bodily harm is unavailing. The elements clause requires only that
    the physical force be “capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person,” not that the
    use of such force be coupled with an intention to injure.
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    is not a violent felony under the ACCA. See United States v. Harris, 
    608 F.3d 1222
    , 1233 (11th Cir. 2010).    Unfortunately for Mr. Eady, we cannot do so.
    First, we do not look at the crime for which a defendant was initially charged.
    Second, nor do we look at any other Shepard-approved documents. “[S]entencing
    courts may not apply the modified categorical approach when the crime of which
    the defendant was convicted has a single, indivisible set of elements.” Descamps
    v. United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2276
    , 2282 (2013). Because felony battery under §
    784.041 has a single, indivisible set of elements, we apply only the categorical
    approach discussed above.
    For the above reasons, felony battery under Florida Statutes § 784.041(1) is
    a qualifying violent felony under the ACCA. We affirm the district court’s ruling.
    IV
    The conviction of Mr. Bain and the sentence of Mr. Eady are affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
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