United States v. Sidney R. Beacher , 156 F. App'x 268 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
November 30, 2005
No. 04-11921 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00358-CR-T-27-TGW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
SIDNEY R. BEACHER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(November 30, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sidney Beacher appeals his conviction for possession of an unregistered
destructive device, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861 and 5871. On appeal, Beacher
argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support either the
district court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal or the jury verdict
because there was no evidence that the device in question was made to be a
destructive device, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 5845. He argues that his device fell
within the § 5845(f) exclusion for devices not designed or redesigned as weapons,
because it was only a firework intended just to produce a loud noise. Pointing to
United States v. Worstine, 808 F.Supp. 663 (N.D. Ind. 1992), and United States v.
Hammond, 371 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 2004), Beacher argues that, because the design
of the device did not contain extra items intended as shrapnel, it was not a
destructive device. Pointing to characteristics mentioned in Hammond, Beacher
further argues that his device was not designed as a weapon, objectively or
subjectively, because his device did not contain any of the items mentioned in
Hammond that could cause a device to be classified as destructive. Beacher also
contends that his device was used only for the entertainment purpose of creating a
loud noise and had no features that would eliminate the entertainment value of the
device.
We review “de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal, applying the same standard used in reviewing the sufficiency of the
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evidence.” United States v. Descent, 292 F.3d 703, 706 (11th Cir. 2002). We must
determine whether, viewing “the facts, and draw[ing] all reasonable inferences
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the government,” a “reasonable fact-finder
could conclude that the evidence established the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1236 (11th Cir. 2001)
(internal quotations and citation omitted); United States v. Pistone, 177 F.3d 957,
958 (11th Cir. 1999).
To convict a defendant of possession of an unregistered destructive device,
in violation of § 5861(d), the government must show that the defendant knowingly
possessed a destructive device that was not registered. United States v. Crawford,
906 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1990). The government also must prove that the
defendant knew of the features of his device that brought it within the scope of the
statute. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1804, 128
L.Ed.2d 608 (1994). However, the government is not required to prove that the
defendant knew that the device was a “firearm” within the meaning of the statute
or that registration was required. United States v. Owens, 103 F.3d 953, 956 (11th
Cir. 1997).
Under § 5845(f), a destructive device is, in relevant part, any (1) explosive
bomb, (2) weapon, by whatever name known, that will, or that readily may be
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converted to, “expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant,
the barrel or barrels of which have a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter,”
or (3) “combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any
device into a destructive device as defined.” 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f)(1)(A), (2), and
(3). “The term ‘destructive device’ shall not include any device which is neither
designed nor redesigned for use as a weapon,” or “any device, although originally
designed for use as a weapon, which is redesigned for use as a signaling,
pyrotechnic, line throwing, safety, or similar device.” Id. In determining whether
a device is designed or redesigned for use as a weapon, the critical inquiry is:
whether the device, as designed, has any value other than as a weapon.
In this inquiry, the presence of design features that eliminate any
claimed entertainment or other benign value supports a finding that
the device was designed as a weapon. On the other hand, evidence
that does not unambiguously support the inference that the explosive
device has no legitimate social value or use does not support a finding
that the device was designed as a weapon.
Hammond, 371 F.3d at 781. Design features that could support a finding that a
device was designed as a weapon include objects that could act as shrapnel upon
explosion, injuring those in the vicinity, and the expulsion of projectiles. Id. at
780-81.
Because a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the evidence
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Beacher knowingly possessed an
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unregistered destructive device while knowing of its destructive characteristics, the
evidence was sufficient. Agent Campbell testified at trial that encasing the
sparklers in PVP pipe, as Beacher had done, did nothing to enhance the loud noise
produced by the explosion and instead created plastic shrapnel. He also testified
that the sparklers Beacher used contained sixteen to eighteen grains, compared to
the standard consumer sparkler, which contains only two. Additionally, he
testified that the plastic shrapnel from the bombs could injure a person standing
nearby and inflict property damage. Finally, Campbell testified that the wrapped
sparklers placed in the PVP pipe “as a fragmenting sleeve . . . would definitely
have no social, industrial or commercial value.” Beacher referred to the device as
a pipe bomb and told one of the agents that it needed to be set off in an alley, for
safety reasons. In light of this sufficient testimony, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.1
1
Beacher’s request for oral argument is denied.
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