United States v. Alfred Wayne Lee, Jr. ( 2019 )


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  •            Case: 18-15337   Date Filed: 10/25/2019   Page: 1 of 3
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-15337
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20604-FAM-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ALFRED WAYNE LEE, JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (October 25, 2019)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 18-15337     Date Filed: 10/25/2019    Page: 2 of 3
    Alfred Lee, Jr. appeals his sentence of 180 months of imprisonment for
    possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1). Lee argues that
    section 922(g) is unconstitutional because intrastate gun possession by a convicted
    felon does not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and he argues that
    the enhancement of his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e), based on facts about prior convictions not alleged in his indictment and
    that were not proved to a jury violated his rights under the Fifth and Sixth
    Amendments. We affirm.
    We ordinarily review de novo the constitutionality of a statute and a
    sentence, but because Lee raises his arguments for the first time on appeal, we
    review for plain error. See United States v. Wright, 
    607 F.3d 708
    , 715 (11th Cir.
    2010) (section 922(g)); United States v. Harris, 
    741 F.3d 1245
    , 1248 (11th Cir.
    2014).(sentence enhancement). To establish plain error, Lee must prove that error
    occurred that was plain and that affected his substantial rights. See Wright, 
    607 F.3d at 715
    .
    No error, much less plain error, occurred in sentencing Lee because, as he
    concedes, his arguments are foreclosed by our precedents. We have held that “the
    jurisdictional element of the statute, i.e., the requirement that the felon ‘possess in
    or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition,’ immunizes § 922(g)(1) from
    [a] facial constitutional attack,” United States v. Scott, 
    263 F.3d 1270
    , 1273 (11th
    2
    Case: 18-15337     Date Filed: 10/25/2019   Page: 3 of 3
    Cir. 2001), and that section 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to a defendant
    who possesses a firearm that “traveled in interstate commerce,” United States v.
    McAllister, 
    77 F.3d 387
    , 390 (11th Cir. 1996). See Wright, 
    607 F.3d at
    715–16.
    And in Almendarez–Torres v. United States, 
    523 U.S. 224
    , 228–47 (1998), the
    Supreme Court held that a prior conviction “relevant only to the sentencing of an
    offender found guilty of the charged crime” does not have to be charged in an
    indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury, even if it increases the
    defendant’s maximum statutory sentence. Almendarez-Torres remains the law until
    overruled by the Supreme Court, and it expressly refused to do so in Alleyne v.
    United States, 
    570 U.S. 99
     (2013). Harris, 741 F.3d at 1249.
    We AFFIRM Lee’s sentence.
    3