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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-15156
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cr-00229-MSS-CPT-11
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
REMIGIO ADIRAN CHICUATE SANCHEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(November 15, 2019)
Before JORDAN, BRANCH and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Remigio Adiran Chicuate Sanchez appeals his total 120-month sentence of
imprisonment, imposed after he pled guilty to violations of the Maritime Drug Law
Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”),
46 U.S.C. § 75051 et seq. Specifically, he pled
guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in
violation of
46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(a) & (b), and
21 U.S.C.
§ 960(b)(1)(B)(ii) (Count 2), and possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms
or more of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, in violation of
46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(a), 21 U.S.C. 960(b)(1)(B)(ii),
and
18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count 3).
On appeal, Sanchez argues the district court erred in finding that it could not,
pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)’s “safety valve” provision, sentence him below the
mandatory minimum 120-month sentence provided by his statutes of conviction.
He argues that, even though a panel of this Court held directly to the contrary in
United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz,
679 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2012), defendants
like him, who have been convicted under the MDLEA, are eligible for safety-valve
relief. After review, 1 we affirm.
1
“When reviewing the denial of safety-valve relief, we review for clear error a district
court’s factual determinations.” United States v. Johnson,
375 F.3d 1300, 1301 (11th Cir. 2004).
“We review de novo the court’s legal interpretation of the statutes and sentencing guidelines.”
Id.
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“The Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act grants the United States
jurisdiction over ‘a vessel registered in a foreign nation if that nation has consented
or waived objection to the enforcement of United States law by the United
States,’ and it forbids individuals on such vessels from both ‘possess[ing] with
intent to . . . distribute . . . a controlled substance,’ and conspiring to do the same.”
United States v. Castillo,
899 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139
S. Ct. 796 (2019) (alterations in original) (citing
46 U.S.C. §§ 70502(c)(1)(C),
70503(a) & 70506(b)). “First-time offenders are subject to a mandatory minimum
penalty of 10 years of imprisonment for a violation that ‘involv[es] . . . [five]
kilograms or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
[cocaine].’”
Id. (citing
21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B) &
46 U.S.C. § 70506(a)).
For defendants convicted of certain controlled substances offenses “under”
Title 21, the safety-valve provision permits a court to impose a sentence without
regard to prescribed statutory minimums if the defendant meets certain eligibility
requirements.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a) Of note, § 3553(f)
specifically mentions “offense[s] under . . . section 1010 . . . of the Controlled
Substances Import and Export Act,” which is codified at
21 U.S.C. § 960.
18
U.S.C. § 3553(f). A qualifying defendant may also receive a two-point reduction
in his base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(18). The defendant has the burden to prove that he meets the eligibility
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requirements under § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. See United States v. Cruz,
106 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997).
As noted above, Sanchez argues on appeal that he is eligible for safety-valve
relief as to his MDLEA convictions. He bases this assertion on two premises:
(1) the text of both the MDLEA and § 3553(f) indicate that his MDLEA
convictions qualify as offenses “under”
21 U.S.C. § 960; and (2) legislative
history, including the recent enactment of the First Step Act of 2018, demonstrates
that Congress has long sought to ensure parity between sentences imposed for
drug-trafficking offenses committed in domestic waters and those committed in
international waters.
Importantly, however, we have repeatedly held that defendants convicted
under the MDLEA are not eligible for “safety-valve” relief under § 3553(f).
Pertuz-Pertuz,
679 F.3d at 1329; Castillo, 899 F.3d at 1212–14; United States v.
Valois,
915 F.3d 717, 729 (11th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 13,
2019) (No. 18-9328). Moreover, our prior precedent rule provides that “a prior
panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled
or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this [C]ourt
sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer,
531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).
Thus, our prior decisions, which we are bound to follow, squarely foreclose
any argument that a defendant, like Sanchez, convicted under the MDLEA is
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eligible for safety-valve relief. See, e.g., Pertuz-Pertuz,
679 F.3d at 1329. We
decline Sanchez’s invitation for us to depart from our prior caselaw, as those
decisions have not been overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the
Supreme Court or by this Court sitting en banc. Archer,
531 F.3d at 1352.
In any case, we reject Sanchez’s substantive arguments as to his eligibility
for safety-valve relief. As we noted in Pertuz-Pertuz, Sanchez’s contention that an
MDLEA offense was one that fell “under”
21 U.S.C. § 960 is without merit. This
is because the MDLEA refers to § 960 for penalty purposes only, and § 3553(f)
refers to an “offense under” § 960—not to one penalized under § 960:
Although
46 U.S.C. § 70506(a) references section 960 as the penalty
provision for violations of
46 U.S.C. § 70503, section 960 does not
incorporate section 70503 by reference as an “offense under” section
960. Therefore, the plain text of the statutes shows that convictions
under Title 46 of the U.S. Code . . . entitle a defendant to no safety-valve
sentencing relief.
679 F.3d at 1329 (emphasis added).
We are similarly unpersuaded by Sanchez’s legislative-history arguments,
which include references to the First Step Act’s amendments to § 3553(f)’s safety-
valve provision. To the extent that Sanchez suggests that he can obtain relief
pursuant to those amendments, that contention also fails. The First Step Act of
2018, which was enacted on December 21, 2018, amended, among other things,
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U.S.C. § 3553(f)’s safety-valve provision. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No.
115-391, § 402(a),
132 Stat. 5194. As relevant here, that legislation expanded the
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reach of the safety valve by permitting those defendants convicted of MDLEA
offenses to take advantage of it, provided they can satisfy its other requirements.
Id. However, the Act provides that the aforementioned amendment “shall apply
only to a conviction entered on or after the date of the enactment of the Act.”
Id.
§ 402(b). In other words, this provision of the First Step Act does not apply
retroactively. Sanchez’s convictions—which were entered on November 30,
2018—predated the enactment of the First Step Act, and he therefore is ineligible
for relief under the pertinent amendment. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No.
115-391, § 402(b),
132 Stat. 5194.
For the reasons stated above, Sanchez has not demonstrated that the district
court erred in refusing to grant him safety-valve relief, and we affirm his total 120-
month sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment:
I concur in the judgment because we are bound by circuit precedent to reject
Mr. Sanchez’s claim of eligibility to safety-valve relief under the former version of
18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). See, e.g., United States v. Pertuz-Pertuz,
679 F.3d 1327,
1329 (11th Cir. 2012). If we were writing on a blank slate, however, I would
follow the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Mosquera-Murrillo,
902 F.3d
285, 292-95 (D.D. Cir. 2018), and conclude that MDLEA defendants like Mr.
Sanchez are indeed eligible for safety-valve relief.
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