Case: 18-13913 Date Filed: 10/31/2019 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-13913
Non-Argument Calendar
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Agency No. A089-157-290
ETEM ALAJBEGU,
Petitioner,
versus
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
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Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
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(October 31, 2019)
Before MARTIN, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Etem Alajbegu, a native and citizen of Macedonia, seeks review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals order denying his motion to terminate his removal
proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act and dismissing his appeal
from the immigration judge’s order of removal. Alajbegu argues that the agency
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his removal proceedings because the
charging document used to commence the proceedings failed to meet the
requirements of
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). Because Alajbegu’s jurisdictional
argument is foreclosed by our decision in Perez-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
935
F.3d 1148 (2019), we deny the petition.
I.
The Department of Homeland Security charged Alajbegu as removable
based on his conviction of a felony crime involving moral turpitude within five
years after his admission to the United States. The charging document, a Notice to
Appear, ordered Alajbegu to appear for removal proceedings at a place “to be
determined” on a date and time “to be set.” Several months later, the government
filed a notice of hearing providing the date, time, and location of the removal
proceedings. Alajbegu subsequently conceded service of the Notice to Appear,
waived a formal reading, and argued the merits of his claims before the
immigration judge. He sought relief from removal in the form of an adjustment of
status and a waiver of inadmissibility under § 212(h) of the Immigration and
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Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). The immigration judge denied relief as a
matter of discretion and ordered Alajbegu removed.
On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, Alajbegu argued among
other things that the immigration judge lacked jurisdiction over his removal
proceedings. The Board dismissed Alajbegu’s appeal, and this petition followed.
II.
The sole issue raised in the petition is whether the incomplete Notice to
Appear deprived the immigration judge of jurisdiction. If the immigration judge
lacked jurisdiction to issue the order of removal, then we also lack jurisdiction to
review it. See Perez-Sanchez, 935 F.3d at 1153. We review our subject-matter
jurisdiction de novo. Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
482 F.3d 1281, 1283 (11th Cir.
2007) (per curiam). We also review the agency’s interpretations of law de novo.
Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
446 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2006).
Alejbegu argues that, pursuant to agency regulations, jurisdiction “vests, and
proceedings before an Immigration Judge commence, when a charging
document”—in this case, a Notice to Appear—“is filed with the Immigration
Court.”
8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a); see
id. § 1003.13. Under Pereira v. Sessions,
138
S. Ct. 2105 (2018), a Notice to Appear that does not specify the time and place of
removal proceedings as required under
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) is not a “Notice to
Appear” as that term is defined by statute. See Pereira,
138 S. Ct. at 2113–14.
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Consequently, Alajbegu argues, a charging document that is styled a “Notice to
Appear” but does not include the time and place of removal proceedings is
insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the immigration court.
We considered and rejected this argument in Perez-Sanchez, 935 F.3d at
1150, 1155. In that case, we explained that Congress granted immigration judges
broad statutory authority to “conduct proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility
or deportability of an alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1); see Perez-Sanchez, 935 F.3d
at 1156. Because “an agency cannot fashion a procedural rule to limit jurisdiction
bestowed upon it by Congress,” the regulation governing the commencement of
removal proceedings—despite its terms—cannot and does not limit immigration
courts’ jurisdiction over the proceedings. Perez-Sanchez, 935 F.3d at 1155–56.
Instead, that regulation creates a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. Id. at
1155.
Likewise, the time-and-place requirement in
8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) is a claim-
processing rule, not a jurisdictional one. See
id. at 1150, 1156. The immigration
judge had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) to conduct Alajbegu’s removal
proceedings, and a defect in the initiating document under § 1229(a) was
insufficient to deprive the immigration judge of that authority. See id. at 1156.
Accordingly, we deny the petition.
PETITION DENIED.
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