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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-12144
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-20784-CMA
CARLOS L. WOODSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR
MIAMI DADE COUNTY, FL,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(November 1, 2019)
Before MARCUS, JORDAN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Woodson, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the sua sponte
dismissal without leave to amend of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and requests that we treat his original
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complaint as a Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the district court’s 2004 denial of his
initial 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas corpus petition. On appeal, Woodson argues
that: (1) the district court erred when it applied the collateral estoppel doctrine to his
§ 1983 claim because he was not given a fair opportunity to litigate this claim in
prior cases and that the Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine does not apply because the
success of his claims would not nullify any state court judgment, but rather would
address only the constitutionality of the statutes that he is challenging; and (2) the
district court should have allowed him leave to amend his original complaint to
change the named defendants. After thorough review, we affirm.
Section 1915(e) provides, inter alia, that an in forma pauperis action shall be
dismissed at any time if the court determines that it fails to state a claim for which
relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review de novo a district
court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)
for failure to state a claim. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr.,
254 F.3d 1276, 1278–79 (11th
Cir. 2001). We review de novo whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the
district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Doe v. Fla. Bar,
630 F.3d 1336, 1340
(11th Cir. 2011). A district court’s conclusions on collateral estoppel are reviewed
de novo, while its legal conclusion that an issue was actually litigated in a prior
1
Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S.
462 (1983).
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action is reviewed for clear error. Richardson v. Miller,
101 F.3d 665, 667-68 (11th
Cir. 1996). We review a district court’s denial of leave to amend for abuse of
discretion. Troville v. Venz,
303 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2002). We review de
novo whether a requested amendment to a complaint would be futile. Cockrell v.
Sparks,
510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007).
Arguments not presented in the district court and raised for the first time on
appeal are deemed waived. Walker v. Jones,
10 F.3d 1569, 1572 (11th Cir. 1994).
Issues not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson,
518 F.3d
870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We may modify a district court order on appeal to reflect
the appropriate grounds for dismissal. Boda v. United States,
698 F.2d 1174, 1177
n.4 (11th Cir. 1983). Where a claim could be dismissed based on both lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, the court should dismiss on only the
jurisdictional grounds, and the dismissal is without prejudice.
Id.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over a case where the plaintiff in essence seeks to overturn a state court
judgment. Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. for Fla.,
679 F.3d 1257, 1262 (11th Cir. 2012). The
Supreme Court has clarified that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to cases
brought by state court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments. Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg.
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Corp.,
881 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2018). We’ve squarely held that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine applies to a prisoner’s § 1983 claim that a state court misapplied
its own DNA access procedures because success on the prisoner’s claim would
“effectively nullify” the state court’s judgment in violation of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine.
Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 1264. However, a prisoner’s challenge to a state
DNA statute as unconstitutional on its face is not barred by Rooker-Feldman when
it does not challenge a state court decision but solely the constitutionality of the state
laws. Skinner v. Switzer,
562 U.S. 521, 531-33 (2011).
Res judicata is often analyzed as two separate components: claim preclusion
and issue preclusion. Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
465 U.S. 75, 77
n.1 (1984). Claim preclusion requires a final judgment on the merits to bar a
subsequent claim, and dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is a final judgment on the merits for these
purposes. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394, 398, 399 n.3 (1981).
Collateral estoppel is another name for the issue preclusion aspect of res judicata.
Community State Bank v. Strong,
651 F.3d 1241, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011).
Issue preclusion has four elements: (1) the issue at stake must be identical to
the one involved in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated
in the prior suit; (3) the determination of the issue in the prior litigation must have
been a critical and necessary part of the judgment in that action; and (4) the party
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against whom the earlier decision is asserted must have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier proceeding. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bhd.
of Maint. of Way Emps.,
327 F.3d 1309, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003). In determining
when an issue has been “actually litigated,” we have cited with approval the
Restatement’s formulation that “[w]hen an issue is properly raised, by the pleadings
or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined, the issue is
actually litigated.” Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp.,
142 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th
Cir. 1998) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27 cmt. d (1982)).
The district court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, the district court need not grant leave to amend
where there has been bad faith or dilatory motive or where amendment would be
futile. Chang v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
845 F.3d 1087, 1094 (11th Cir. 2017).
Amending a complaint would be futile if the complaint as amended would still be
subject to dismissal.
Cockrell, 510 F.3d at 1310.
Here, Woodson’s challenge to the application of the Florida DNA statute is
barred from federal review because, like in Alvarez, the success of his challenge
would “effectively nullify” the state court’s denial of his post-conviction motion for
access to the DNA, in violation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Alvarez, 679 F.3d
at 1264. We note, however, that Woodson’s claim should have been dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which is without prejudice, rather than failure to
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state a claim, which is with prejudice.
Boda, 698 F.2d at 1177 n.4. We therefore
modify the district court’s order of dismissal on appeal so that the dismissal of the
as-applied challenge is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction alone, which is a
dismissal without prejudice.
Id.
While Woodson’s challenge to the facial constitutionality of the Florida DNA
statutes is not barred by Rooker-Feldman because it is not seeking review of a state
court decision but rather review of the state laws themselves for constitutionality,
see
Skinner, 562 U.S. at 531, the district court did not err in rejecting this claim on
collateral estoppel grounds. As the record reveals, Woodson raised the same claims
in his prior federal lawsuits and was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate his
claims in both prior cases. Claim preclusion was correctly applied in the second
case because Woodson’s claim in the first case was dismissed for failure to state a
claim, which is a final judgment on the merits.
Moitie, 452 U.S. at 399 n.3. In
addition, Woodson’s procedural due process arguments were actually litigated in
both his prior cases because his claims were raised, discussed, and decided on in
each case.
Pleming, 142 F.3d at 1359. Thus, the district court did not err in applying
collateral estoppel to Woodson’s claim and dismissing it with prejudice.
Nor can we say that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing
Woodson’s complaint without leave to amend, since Woodson’s proposed
amendment to change the named defendant was futile.
Chang, 845 F.3d at 1094.
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Addressing the issue of the original defendant not being subject to suit would have
resulted in a claim still subject to dismissal based on the independent grounds of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and collateral estoppel.
Finally, Woodson has also asked this Court, for the first time on appeal, that
his complaint be construed as seeking Rule 60(b) relief; notably, he is not alleging
that the district court misconstrued the relief sought in his original complaint. We
typically do not consider arguments raised on the first time on appeal,
Walker, 10
F.3d at 1572, and, in any event, this relief is more appropriately sought in a separate
filing in the district court, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Thus, we deny the request made
in Woodson’s supplemental brief.
In short, we affirm the district court’s order as modified to reflect that
Woodson’s as-applied constitutional is dismissed without prejudice.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
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