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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-15166
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-01717-TWT
TANYA SINGH DIXIT,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
AKASH DIXIT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(November 5, 2019)
Before MARCUS, DUBINA and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Appellant Akash Dixit appeals, pro se, the district court’s denial of his three
post-judgment motions (1) for review of possible judicial incompetence, (2) for
relief from final judgment, and (3) to “vacate all inhuman and unconstitutional
orders of separating minor children from their parents who are legal residents of
the [United States]” (“motion to vacate separation orders”), which he filed after the
district court sua sponte remanded his removed domestic relations’ action back to
state court for lack of jurisdiction, denied his construed Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) motion for reconsideration, and denied his motion for e-filing
access and waiver of fees. As relevant background, Dixit already unsuccessfully
appealed from the district court’s remand order and denial of his construed Rule
59(e) motion, and, although he did not raise the issue on appeal, the district court’s
denial of his motion for e-filing access and waiver of fees. Dixit v. Dixit, 769 F.
App’x 879, 881 (11th Cir. 2019) (unpublished).
In this appeal, Dixit primarily challenges the district court’s initial order
remanding his case back to state court. He argues that the district court: (1) had
limited jurisdiction to vacate a state court order “that [was] void on its face”;
(2) erred in its original jurisdictional determination because the state courts were
“siding with [his ex-spouse’s] white skinned attorney”; (3) erred in determining
that his case was a domestic relations case rather than a “fraudulent immigration
attempt” by his ex-spouse; and (4) erred in alternatively determining that the time
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period for removal had expired after the September 2016 service, as he alleges that
he was never served. Notably, he does not address the district court’s denial of his
three post-judgment motions for review of possible judicial incompetence, for
relief from final judgment, and to vacate separation orders, although he did
mention these issues in separately filed motions.
We will address each issue in turn.
I.
We have an obligation to satisfy ourselves of our own jurisdiction and may
raise the issue sua sponte. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto
Racing, Inc.,
494 F.3d 1356, 1360 (11th Cir. 2007). We review jurisdictional
issues de novo.
Id.
The timely filing of a notice of appeal is a mandatory prerequisite to the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction in a civil action. Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205,
214,
127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007). Generally, a notice of appeal in a civil action
must be filed no later than 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is
entered on the docket. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(6) “provides the exclusive method for extending a party’s time to
appeal for failure to receive actual notice that a judgment or order has been
entered.” Vencor Hosps., Inc. v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co.,
279 F.3d
1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). Under Rule 4(a)(6), the court may reopen the time to
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appeal, for a period of 14 days, if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the
court finds that the moving party did not receive notice of entry of the judgment or
order within 21 days of entry; (2) a motion “is filed within 180 days after the
judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the moving party receives
notice” of the entry, whichever is earlier; and (3) “the court finds that no party
would be prejudiced.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).
Here, although the district court granted Dixit leave to file an out-of-time
appeal with regard to its denial of his motions for review of possible judicial
incompetence, for relief from final judgment, and to vacate separation orders, the
district court’s order did not allow him to challenge its earlier decisions in a
separate and second appeal. There is no question that Dixit received notice of the
district court’s earlier orders. Moreover, the district court’s remand order was
entered on May 7, 2019, more than 180 days before Dixit’s Rule 4(a)(6) motion
that was filed on November 19, 2018. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6); Vencor Hosps.,
Inc., 279 F.3d at 1311 (Rule 4(a)(6) provides the exclusive method for extending
time to appeal for failure to receive actual notice of a judgment or order).
Accordingly, to the extent that Dixit seeks to relitigate the issues from his earlier
appeal or the district court’s denial of his motion for e-filing access and waiver of
fees, we dismiss the appeal as to these issues for lack of jurisdiction.
II.
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A legal claim or argument that is not plainly and prominently raised in an
initial brief before us is deemed abandoned. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.
Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 680–81 (11th Cir. 2014). An issue is not plainly and
prominently raised when a party fails to advance any arguments or cite any
authority to establish error.
Id.
Although “we give liberal construction to the pleadings of pro se litigants,”
such litigants are still required “to conform to procedural rules.” Albra v. Advan,
Inc.,
490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Loren v. Sasser,
309 F.3d 1296,
1304 (11th Cir. 2002)). A party may not adopt legal arguments raised in separate
legal proceedings, as we have held that we will not consider any arguments that a
party attempts to make by incorporating by reference arguments made in other
district court pleadings. See Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts, B.V. v. Consorcio
Barr S.A.,
377 F.3d 1164, 1167 n.4 (11th Cir. 2004) (declining to consider
arguments made in the district court and “incorporate[ed] by reference” into the
brief on appeal because doing so would bypass briefing space limitations and
transfer the appellant’s duty to make arguments to us).
Here, Dixit has abandoned any challenge to the court’s orders denying his
motions for e-filing access and waiver of fees, for review of possible judicial
incompetence, for relief from final judgment, and to vacate separation orders by
failing to properly raise these issues in his appellate brief. See Sapuppo,
739 F.3d
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at 680–81. It follows that if a party cannot incorporate arguments in the district
court by reference in order to bypass this Court’s filing requirements, a party
cannot incorporate arguments in multiple, separate motions to do so, either.
Cf. Consorcio Barr
S.A., 377 F.3d at 1167 n.4. Accordingly, we affirm because
Dixit abandoned these arguments. See
Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680–81. 1
DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART.
1
We note that, even if Dixit had not abandoned this issue, the district court did not err in
denying Dixit’s motions for review of possible judicial incompetence, for relief from final
judgment, and to vacate separation orders, as his earlier appeal divested the district court of the
authority to grant him the relief he sought. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1(a). Any argument that the
district court should have engaged with the merits of his motions fails, as Rule 62.1 has no such
requirement. See
id.
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