Regina Patrice Harris v. University of Alabama ( 2019 )


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  •            Case: 19-11599    Date Filed: 11/19/2019   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 19-11599
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 7:18-cv-02069-TMP
    REGINA PATRICE HARRIS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA,
    Brewer Porche,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (November 19, 2019)
    Before BRANCH, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 19-11599       Date Filed: 11/19/2019       Page: 2 of 6
    Regina Harris, a 52-year-old former mental health worker proceeding pro se,
    appeals the magistrate judge’s order dismissing her age discrimination and
    retaliation claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
    (“ADEA”), 
    29 U.S.C. § 623
    (a)(1), (d).1 The magistrate judge determined that her
    employer, the University of Alabama’s Brewer Porche Children Center
    (“University”), was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and dismissed her
    claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Harris does not dispute
    any of the magistrate judge’s reasons for dismissing her claims. Instead, she
    attaches a series of documents, some of which were part of the district court
    record, argues that she was obligated to report her suspicions regarding potential
    employee misconduct, and requests a trial. Additionally, she appears to raise
    several issues and submit several documents that were not presented to the district
    court, including her alleged obligation under the University of Alabama’s Child
    Protection Policy to report professional misconduct involving the director of the
    care center where she worked.
    “Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted
    by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United
    States, 
    148 F.3d 1262
    , 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). However, even with a forgiving
    construction, “issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed
    1
    Harris and her employer consented to entry of a final judgment by a magistrate judge.
    2
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    abandoned,” Timson v. Sampson, 
    518 F.3d 870
    , 874 (11th Cir. 2008), and “issues
    not raised below are normally deemed waived.” Tannenbaum, 
    148 F.3d at 1263
    .
    Given that Harris does not raise any argument that the magistrate judge’s
    determination that the University of Alabama was entitled to immunity under the
    Eleventh Amendment was incorrect, thereby abandoning the issue, and that she
    presents us with arguments not raised below, thereby waiving them, we are
    effectively left with an appeal in name only. Nonetheless, out of an abundance of
    caution, we assume arguendo for the purposes of this appeal that Harris, in
    appealing the district court’s dismissal of her claims, implicitly appealed its ruling
    on the University of Alabama’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. We affirm on
    this ground.
    We review a dismissal based upon Eleventh Amendment immunity de novo.
    Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 
    405 F.3d 954
    , 956 (11th Cir.
    2005). We also review de novo whether an entity constitutes an arm of the state
    under Eleventh Amendment immunity analysis. Lightfoot v. Henry Cty. Sch.
    Dist., 
    771 F.3d 764
    , 768 (11th Cir. 2014). The Eleventh Amendment provides:
    “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
    suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
    Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.
    Const. amend. XI. Absent consent, “a suit in which the State or one of its agencies
    3
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    or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh
    Amendment.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 
    465 U.S. 89
    , 100
    (1984). The Supreme Court has extended the Eleventh Amendment to bar suits
    against a state in federal court brought by its own citizens. Abusaid v.
    Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 
    405 F.3d 1298
    , 1303 (11th Cir. 2005).
    Congress can abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. Pennhurst
    State Sch. & Hosp., 
    465 U.S. at 99
    . The ADEA, however, did not validly abrogate
    states’ sovereign immunity and, therefore, states are immune from such suits
    unless they waive the defense. Stroud v. McIntosh, 
    722 F.3d 1294
    , 1303 (11th Cir.
    2013) (“The Supreme Court has made it clear [in Kimel] that the ADEA is
    unconstitutional as applied to the states because Congress did not enact the law
    under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the only recognized constitutional
    basis for abrogating states’ sovereign immunity.”).
    “To receive Eleventh Amendment immunity, a defendant need not be
    labeled a ‘state officer’ or ‘state official,’ but instead need only be acting as an
    ‘arm of the State,’ which includes agents and instrumentalities of the State.”
    Manders v. Lee, 
    338 F.3d 1304
    , 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). We examine
    four factors in determining whether an entity is an “arm of the State,” including:
    “(1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains
    over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible
    4
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    for judgments against the entity,” but an entity need not meet all four factors to be
    entitled to immunity. 
    Id. at 1309
    , 1328–29.
    After analyzing these factors, we affirm the magistrate judge’s finding that
    the University of Alabama is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. First, the
    Alabama Supreme Court considers its universities to be instrumentalities of the
    state entitled to immunity. See Ex Parte Jacksonville State Univ., 
    40 So. 3d 672
    ,
    673 (Ala. 2009). Second, state law indicates that the University is run by a board
    of trustees, whose members are elected with oversight by the state government.
    
    Ala. Code §§ 16-47-1
    , 16-47-30 (2016). Third, as far as the University’s budget,
    the Alabama legislature allocates money to the University each year and requires
    reporting from the board on expenses. 
    Id.
     §§ 16-47-4, 16-47-36. Finally, with
    regard to the fourth factor, it is unclear who would be responsible for a judgment
    against the University.
    As a whole, these factors support a finding that the University is entitled to
    Eleventh Amendment immunity. Indeed, we have determined that Troy State
    University, an Alabama state university set up with a similar legal framework, is
    entitled to immunity, as well, so this determination is on firm ground. See Harden
    v. Adams, 
    760 F.2d 1158
    , 1163–64 (11th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, we affirm. 2
    2
    We have considered and note that, to the extent Harris alleges a new claim against the
    University in her appellate brief, she has not shown that any “special circumstances” exist for us
    5
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    AFFIRMED.
    to consider this issue for the first time on appeal. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 
    385 F.3d 1324
    , 1331 (11th Cir. 2004).
    6