United States v. Demetrius Moody ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 20, 2007
No. 07-10577 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00619-CR-JTC-1-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DEMETRIUS MOODY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(July 20, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Demetrius Moody appeals his convictions for possession of counterfeit
obligations and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 472 and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) respectively. Moody argues on appeal that
the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence collected after
he was stopped based on suspicion of violating a Georgia statute regulating
window tinting.
“Rulings on motions to suppress evidence constitute mixed questions of law
and fact.” United States v. LeCroy, 441 F.3d 914, 925 (11th Cir. 2006) cert.
denied, 127 S.Ct. 2096 (2007). We accept the district court’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous, but review questions of law de novo. Id. We
construe the facts in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed below.
United States v. Nunez, 455 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006).
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable search and
seizure. U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment must be suppressed. United States v. Gilbert, 942 F.2d 1537, 1541
(11th Cir. 1991) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d
1081 (1961)). Determining if a seizure violates the Fourth Amendment involves
two questions: (1) was the officer’s action justified at its inception and (2) was the
search reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the
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interference.1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889(1968). With regard to the first question, “the police may stop and briefly detain a
person to investigate a reasonable suspicion that he is involved in criminal activity,
even though probable cause is lacking.” United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d 1521,
1524 (11th Cir. 1989). Although reasonable suspicion requires less than probable
cause, the police must “articulate facts which provide some minimal, objective
justification for the stop.” Id. at 1524. “Great deference is given to the judgment
of trained law enforcement officers ‘on the scene.’” United States v.
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). We have indicated that a
stop may be valid, even if it was based on an officer’s mistake of fact, as long as
the mistake was reasonable. Id. at 1275. However, an officer’s mistake of law
cannot provide reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. Id. at 1279. Georgia
law prohibits materials and glazing on rear windshields and side and door windows
that reduce light transmission “to less than 32 percent, plus or minus 3 percent.”
Ga. Code Ann. § 40-8-73.1(b)(2).
Here, Officer Martel reasonably believed, based on his eight years of
experience enforcing the window tint statute, that Moody’s windows were in
1
Because Moody does not dispute that Officer Martel had probable cause to search after
detecting the smell of marijuana, only the first question and the basis for the original stop is at
issue here.
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violation of the window tint law when he observed that he could not (1) see the
front passenger’s facial features or (2) determine the number of passengers in the
back seat. Because he had a reasonable suspicion that the car was in violation of
Georgia law, the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment and the district court
did not err by denying the motion to suppress.
Upon careful review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs,
we find no reversible error.
AFFIRMED 2
2
Moody’s request for oral argument is denied.
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