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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-10020
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D.C. Docket No. 2:15-cv-14431-DLG
NICOLE PATSALIDES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
CITY OF FORT PIERCE,
Defendant - Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(February 6, 2018)
Before MARCUS, ANDERSON, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Nicole Patsalides appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
the City of Fort Pierce on her claims of employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)
and 2000e-3(a). After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we
affirm the order of final judgment entered by the district court.
Patsalides’s claims arise from a series of incidents between herself and a
male co-worker that occurred after her three months of police training on the job
and in her first two weeks as a patrol officer for the police department of the City
of Fort Pierce. During that time, by her account, a male patrol officer with whom
she worked touched her repeatedly in ways that she considered to be inappropriate,
and in general showed an undue interest in her. Over the relevant two-week period,
the male officer touched her arm, shoulder, or hands on approximately ten different
occasions, and on one occasion rubbed his hand on her thigh from up by her
service belt all the way down to her knee. The male officer would also arrive as
backup on police calls to which Patsalides was dispatched without being called for,
and tried to maximize the amount of time that he spent with her. Notably,
however, Patsalides does not claim that the male officer ever made any remarks of
a sexual or flirtatious nature to her.
After two weeks of this sort of behavior, Patsalides reported the male officer
to a superior in the police department. Within a day the department launched an
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investigation. Within three days the male officer was placed on paid administrative
leave. Thereafter, his employment with the City was terminated. The termination
was based in part on the City’s determination that his conduct toward Patsalides
violated its sexual harassment policy, and in part on the fact that he had a past
record of sexual misconduct of which the City was aware and for which he had
been reprimanded.
After she reported the male officer’s misconduct, Patsalides claims that she
was subjected to retaliation from co-workers who made rude and offensive remarks
to her about “snitching” on a fellow officer. She also says that various employment
actions, such as the denial of her transfer requests and then her eventual
termination almost a year later for excessive absenteeism, were actually motivated
by the City’s retaliatory desire to punish her for reporting the male officer’s
inappropriate behavior and for filing a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
Patsalides disputes four of the conclusions underlying the district court’s
grant of summary judgment. First, she argues that there are genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the harassment she experienced was based on sex, and
was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment altering the
terms and conditions of her employment, in violation of Title VII. Second, she
contends that the record supports a finding of employer liability for the male
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officer’s offending behavior. Third, she says that there is sufficient evidence to
support a finding of retaliation in violation of Title VII’s opposition clause.
Finally, she asserts that her termination violated Title VII’s participation clause.
Even if we assume that the record, when taken in a light most favorable to
Patsalides, sufficiently supports a finding that the male officer’s inappropriate
conduct was based on sex and that it created a hostile work environment either
because it was severe or pervasive, on this record, we hold that there was no basis
on which to find the City liable for the officer’s actions. After Patsalides reported
the male officer’s offensive conduct, the City promptly investigated the matter.
Further, within three days it took quick and decisive action to ensure that
Patsalides would no longer be subjected to the officer’s unwelcome advances by
placing the officer on administrative leave. Finally, after concluding its
investigation, the City terminated the offending officer, thereby guaranteeing that
no further incidents would occur. In many ways, the City’s actions following the
complaint were a model of proper employer responsiveness under Title VII. See
Kilgore v. Thompson & Brock Mgmt., Inc.,
93 F.3d 752, 754 (11th Cir. 1996).
We also agree with the district court’s determination that the City’s past
responses to prior allegations of sexual misconduct levelled against the male
officer were prompt and adequate. Between 1997 and 2013, the male officer was
found to have engaged in some form of sexual misconduct on some four occasions.
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As for each incident, the City variously responded by issuing written warnings to
the officer, counseling him on proper conduct, or suspending him without pay on
two different occasions, once for three days and once for five. Indeed, after the
most recent incident preceding the events giving rise to this case, the officer was
warned that another infraction would result in his termination. And the City made
good on this warning after investigating the charges brought by Patsalides.
This pattern of disciplinary action, whereby each new infraction was met
with prompt and effective remedial measures and the imposition of increasingly
severe punishment that ultimately culminated in the officer’s termination, is
entirely consistent with the City’s obligations under Title VII. See Baldwin v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama,
480 F.3d 1287, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that
offering to provide counseling, to transfer the complainant to a different branch
office, and warning the accused harasser was an appropriate response to an
accusation of sexual harassment); Fleming v. Boeing Co.,
120 F.3d 242, 246 (11th
Cir. 1997) (holding that warning the harasser and telling the complainant to report
any further problems is, as an initial response, enough to constitute immediate and
appropriate corrective action). In no way can the City be said to have been
negligent in controlling working conditions. Therefore, there is no basis to hold the
City liable for the male officer’s actions toward Patsalides.
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Finally, we also agree with the district court that Patsalides has failed to
show a genuine issue of material fact as to her claims that the City retaliated
against her protected activity. The allegedly retaliatory behavior of Patsalides’s
fellow officers following her complaint of sexual harassment, which largely
consisted of rude remarks and social slights, was neither severe nor pervasive
enough to create a retaliatory hostile work environment. See Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,
548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (“An employee's decision to
report discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty
slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all employees
experience.”). Further, the denial of Patsalides’s transfer requests, which occurred
over seven months after she first reported the alleged harassment, and her eventual
termination, which occurred eleven months after her report and before the City
learned that she had filed her EEOC complaint, were not causally connected to any
protected activity. See Brown v. Alabama Dep't of Transp.,
597 F.3d 1160, 1182
(11th Cir. 2010). Finally, the City had a substantial, legitimate, non-pretextual
reason for terminating her since she had missed many weeks of work during the
preceding months.
The district court therefore correctly concluded that the City was entitled to
summary judgment on all of Patsalides’s Title VII claims. We affirm.
AFFIRMED
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