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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-13098
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:18-cv-00501-CEM-KRS
BRENNEN CLANCY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
NORTHAMPTON COUNTY CORRECTIONS ADULT PROBATION,
INTERSTATE COMMISSION FOR ADULT OFFENDERS,
Defendants-Appellees,
INTERSTATE COMPACT OFFICE FOR ADULT OFFENDERS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(July 22, 2019)
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Before TJOFLAT, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Brennen Clancy, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his third
amended complaint for civil rights violations under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also
appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a fourth amended
complaint. We affirm.
We review the denial of a motion for leave to amend a complaint for abuse
of discretion. Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of Marietta,
654 F.3d
1231, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011). A district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim
is reviewed de novo, and we accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations. See
Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm., LP,
634 F.3d 1352, 1359
(11th Cir. 2011). Though pro se pleadings are construed more leniently than
attorney-drafted pleadings, Hughes v. Lott,
350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003),
the same rules apply, Moon v. Newsome,
863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989),
including the requirement that the complaint “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.”
Id.
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Clancy contends that the Defendants-Appellees “switched [his] status from
misdemeanor to felony” “during the transfer process” in “April of 2015.”
Presumably, his probationary supervision was transferred from Pennsylvania to
Florida under the aegis of the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender
Supervision (“ICAOS”). Documents that Clancy had attached to an earlier
complaint 1 clarify his allegations: he was convicted of a misdemeanor offense in
Pennsylvania—specifically, his third DUI—and now lives in Florida. His
“status”—i.e., what he is listed as being on probation for—is listed on multiple
public-record websites as a felony.
All of this is a natural consequence of how supervision of parolees and
probationers is normally transferred between states. In Pennsylvania, a third DUI
offense is a misdemeanor, but in Florida it is a felony. Compare 75 Pa. Stat. §§
3802(a), 3803(a)(2) with
Fla. Stat. § 316.193(2)(b)(1). Mr. Clancy was convicted
of a third DUI and, on his request, his probationary supervision was transferred to
Florida. Under the terms of the relevant interstate compact, Florida 1) is permitted
to impose conditions on transferee probationers that “would have been imposed on
an offender sentenced in” Florida and 2) is required to “supervise offenders
1
Clancy did not incorporate his earlier complaints or their attachments into his third amended
complaint. “[A]s a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes and replaces the original
complaint unless the amendment specifically refers to or adopts the earlier pleading.” Varnes v.
Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n of U.S. & Canada,
674 F.2d 1365, 1370 n.6 (11th Cir.
1982). We will consider these documents only to the extent they clarify, rather than add to, the
meaning of the complaint we are reviewing.
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consistent with the supervision of other similar offenders sentenced in” Florida.
ICAOS Rule 4.103(a), 4.101, available at http://interstatecompact.org/step-by-
step/chapters/4.2 Since third-DUI offenders in Florida are given probation terms
and conditions consistent with their having been sentenced as felons, third-DUI
transferees at least may (and possibly must) have the same conditions imposed on
their probation, including what Clancy describes as felony status.
Nonetheless, Clancy’s complaint asserts that the three defendants—ICAOS,
the Florida Department of Corrections, and the Northampton County Corrections
Adult Probation Department—violated
42 U.S.C. § 1983 when they “switched
[his] status from misdemeanor to felony.” In his complaint, Clancy locates the
predicate federal rights for a § 1983 violation in the Privacy Act of 1974, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and three statutes—
18 U.S.C. §§ 3559, 3601, and 3603—
governing criminal sentencing and probation. And on appeal, he seems to argue
that the Fourteenth Amendment provides the predicate federal rights.
None of these statutes support a plausible claim for relief. Section 1983
provides a right of action for a violation of a federal statute only when the statute
unambiguously grants an individual right. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,
536 U.S. 273,
2
The status-switching Clancy complains of might even be required by the Constitution. The
Third Circuit has found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause when a state treated
probationers convicted of the same category of offense differently based on whether their
convictions were in-state or out-of-state. Doe v. Penn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,
513 F.3d 95, 108
(3d Cir. 2008). Since we find for other reasons that the complaint does not state a claim, we
need not decide this constitutional question.
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282,
122 S. Ct. 2268, 2274 (2002) (“[A] plaintiff must assert the violation of a
federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.” (citation omitted)). All
possibly relevant portions of the Privacy Act of 1974 impose requirements only on
federal agencies, see Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc.,
551 F.3d 122, 124–25
(2d Cir. 2008), so non-federal agencies are not required to comply with them, and
none of the defendants are federal agencies: the two state agencies for obvious
reasons, and ICAOS because it is an agency of the compacting states. See
Fla.
Stat. § 949.07, Art. III(1). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is inapplicable, since
Clancy has not alleged discrimination based on his race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000e. Nor are the federal sentencing
and probation requirements in Title 18 relevant: these statutes, along with the rest
of Title 18 part II, govern criminal procedure in the federal court system for federal
crimes, not Clancy’s state offenses. See
18 U.S.C. § 3601 (identifying applicable
provisions of the federal criminal code); 11 Melley et al., Cyclopedia of Federal
Procedure § 39:23 (3d ed.). So none of these provisions provide Clancy with a
federal right he can assert against the defendants.
Nor does Clancy’s complaint state (as he argues on appeal) a Fourteenth
Amendment claim. The facts in Clancy’s complaint do not plausibly suggest that
he was deprived of “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,”
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“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,” or “the equal protection of
the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
Though the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects a constitutional right to
travel, see Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489, 503,
119 S. Ct. 1518, 1526 (1999), this right
can be lawfully abridged by the conditions of a criminal sentence, including
probation. See
18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(14); United States v. Friedberg,
78 F.3d 94,
97 (2d Cir. 1996). Moreover, Clancy’s complaint is devoid of allegations showing
that the status-switching is an unreasonable burden on his right to travel under the
circumstances. So Clancy has not stated a claim under this Clause.
The Due Process Clause protects fundamental rights, Washington v.
Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720–21,
117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997), and guarantees
appropriate legal process calibrated to the character of any deprivation of life,
liberty, or property. See Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 332–33,
96 S. Ct.
893, 901 (1976). Clancy has not stated a Due Process claim because he has not
pleaded facts showing he was deprived of a fundamental right or given insufficient
process. We are not aware of any authority suggesting that there exists a
fundamental right for a probationer not to have his “status” labeled “probation
felony” in public records when his offense of conviction was a misdemeanor. Nor
has Clancy told us how much process he received, such that we could assess the
sufficiency of the defendant’s procedures for imposing this status.
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The Equal Protection Clause requires equal treatment for similarly situated
persons. Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216,
102 S. Ct. 2382, 2394 (1982). Clancy
has not alleged he was treated differently from any similarly situated person, let
alone pleaded facts to support this allegation.
Far from “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(2), Clancy’s complaint is too threadbare to allow his case to proceed.
Moreover, as Clancy has already been given ample opportunity to amend his
complaint and has not addressed the deficiencies identified by the District Court,
the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to file a fourth
amended complaint. In re Engle Cases,
767 F.3d 1082, 1108–09 (11th Cir. 2014).
We thus affirm the dismissal of Mr. Clancy’s complaint and the denial of his
motion to amend.
AFFIRMED.
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