Enora Perez v. Wdlls Fargo N.A. , 774 F.3d 1329 ( 2014 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-13853
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:12-cv-00218-HLM
ENORA PEREZ,
d.b.a. Perez Center,
Counter Defendant
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
WELLS FARGO N.A.,
Counter Claimant
Defendant - Appellee,
FIRST JOHN DOE THROUGH
TENTH JOHN DOE,
inclusive,
Defendant - Appellee,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Third Party Defendant.
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________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(December 18, 2014)
Before WILSON and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER, *
District Judge.
ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
A “[r]ose is a rose is a rose is a rose.” 1 And a motion for an entry of default
judgment is a motion for an entry of default judgment is a motion for an entry of
default judgment is a motion for an entry of default judgment—even if its writer
calls it a motion for judgment on the pleadings. So Rule 55’s standard of “good
cause” for setting aside an entry of default judgment—not the higher one of
“excusable neglect” applicable to missed deadlines outside the default context—
governs the court’s determination of whether, despite her one-time error in not
responding to a pleading, the non-moving party should get the opportunity to have
her case considered on the merits before final judgment against her is entered.
In this case, Defendant-Counterclaimant Wells Fargo, N.A. (Wells Fargo),
in its so-called “motion for judgment on the pleadings,” urged the court to apply
the excusable-neglect standard to preclude Plaintiff-Counter-defendant Enora
*
Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Middle District
of Florida, sitting by designation.
1
Gertrude Stein, Geography and Plays 187 (The Four Seas Press 1922) (1913).
2
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Perez from filing an answer to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim after Perez missed a
single deadline to respond to the counterclaim. Then, because Perez had not been
permitted to file her answer, Wells Fargo argued that the court should deem Wells
Fargo’s allegations in its counterclaim admitted and enter judgment in Wells
Fargo’s favor (a default judgment by any other name). 2 The court granted Wells
Fargo’s motion, effectively entering what amounted to a default judgment against
Perez.
But process matters. And we have a strong preference for deciding cases on
the merits—not based on a single missed deadline—whenever reasonably possible.
So the order granting judgment on the pleadings and denying Perez the opportunity
to file an answer to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim must be reversed, and Perez must
be given a chance to demonstrate that she should have her case considered on the
merits. We also conclude that the district court’s order denying Perez’s motion to
amend her complaint must be reversed.
I.
Perez’s complaint alleges that she owned and operated her own business
called Perez Center. 3 In connection with her business, in May 2012, Perez opened
2
Cf. William Shakespeare, “Romeo and Juliet,” act 2, sc. 2 (“a rose by any other name
would smell as sweet”).
3
According to a brief that Perez filed in the district court in support of her motion to file
an out-of-time answer to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim, Perez Center was a grocery store that
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three accounts with Wells Fargo: a “Gold Business Services Package Account,” a
“Wells Fargo Simple Business Checking Account,” and a “Business Market Rate
Savings Account.” She used the money that she deposited into these business
accounts to support her family and to continue the operation of Perez Center.
By letter dated June 19, 2012, though, Wells Fargo informed Perez that it
had blocked all monetary transactions on Perez’s accounts and had deactivated the
ATM cards linked to the accounts because Wells Fargo had made a “business
decision to end [Perez’s] deposit account relationship.” Wells Fargo provided no
further explanation for why it had closed Perez’s accounts. At the time, Perez’s
three accounts held a combined almost $100,000.00.
In response to the letter, Perez made numerous calls to Wells Fargo to find
out why Wells Fargo had closed her accounts and to try to obtain her money. But,
according to Perez, Wells Fargo would not provide Perez with “any plausible
explanation of why [her] bank accounts . . . were closed,” and it refused to return
the money in her accounts. So Perez filed suit against Wells Fargo in the Superior
Court of Floyd County, Georgia, seeking injunctive and monetary relief.
Wells Fargo then removed this action to federal court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction. In federal court, Wells Fargo filed its answer and affirmative
“cater[ed] to Hispanic shoppers selling food items native to the countries of origin of Hispanics
who have immigrated to the Chattooga County area.”
4
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defenses and included a counterclaim against Perez and a claim against the United
States for interpleader. 4 Wells Fargo alleged in its counterclaim that it had closed
and frozen Perez’s accounts after several United States Treasury checks had been
deposited into them. According to the counterclaim, the contractual agreement
between Wells Fargo and Perez allowed Wells Fargo to take these actions because
depositing Treasury checks constituted money services business (MSB) activity,
and Perez’s accounts were “not approved for [ ] ‘MSB’ activity.” Wells Fargo did
not quote the contract or attach a copy of it to the counterclaim but instead simply
characterized it.
The counterclaim further averred that about six weeks after it had frozen and
closed Perez’s accounts, on August 7, 2012, Wells Fargo had received a letter from
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) notifying Wells Fargo that it had “issued tax
refunds that it should not have issued” and that it claimed an interest in the funds in
Perez’s accounts. This IRS letter is the only communication of any kind between
Wells Fargo and the IRS that the counterclaim alleges. Because, in light of the
August 7, 2012, IRS letter, Perez and the United States both claimed rights to the
funds, Wells Fargo explained, it filed the counterclaim for interpleader to resolve
the dispute. Finally, the counterclaim sought “litigation costs and attorneys’ fees”
from Perez, the United States, or both.
4
For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the counterclaim against Perez and the claim
against the United States for interpleader as the “counterclaim.”
5
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In response to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim, the United States filed an answer
repudiating any interest in the funds in Perez’s accounts and requesting that the
court deny the requested relief. Although the United States admitted that the IRS
had sent the August letter to Wells Fargo claiming an interest in the funds in
Perez’s accounts, it stated that, upon further examination, the IRS had determined
that the United States had “no right” to the funds in Perez’s accounts.
So, nearly six months after it originally froze Perez’s bank accounts and six
weeks after the United States disclaimed any interest in the funds in Perez’s
accounts, on December 14, 2012, Wells Fargo returned to Perez part of the monies
in Perez’s accounts. Specifically, Wells Fargo tendered a check to Perez in the
amount of $88,770.99—keeping about $10,000.00 for itself for “costs” and
“attorneys’ fees” incurred in freezing and closing Perez’s accounts and in
defending against Perez’s attempts to get her money back.5 By stipulation, the
United States was dismissed from the case. Perez did not respond to the
counterclaim.
When Perez did not file a response to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim, Wells
Fargo moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for judgment on the
pleadings. In support of its motion, Wells Fargo argued that the court should deem
5
Before the court entered its order, Wells Fargo returned $88,770.99 to Perez but
retained $10,130.64 to cover its attorney’s fees. Because Wells Fargo concedes Perez’s
entitlement to the funds in her account, the parties agree that her claim for injunctive relief is
now moot.
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admitted all of its allegations in the counterclaim since Perez had not filed a timely
response to the pleading. Once deemed admitted, Wells Fargo asserted, the
allegations in the counterclaim established that Perez’s claim for wrongful closure
of her accounts and withholding of her funds necessarily failed as a matter of law.
Wells Fargo reasoned that, under the deemed-admitted allegations of the
counterclaim, the contract governing Perez’s accounts entitled Wells Fargo to
freeze Perez’s accounts since, in Wells Fargo’s view, Perez had used her accounts
for MSB activity, and her accounts were not approved for that purpose.
Perez timely filed a response to Wells Fargo’s motion for a Rule 12(c)
judgment on the pleadings and requested leave to file an out-of-time answer to the
counterclaim. Although no default had been entered against Perez, she argued that
not permitting her to respond out of time and instead deeming the allegations of the
counterclaim admitted in ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings
would be tantamount to entering a default against her.
So Perez urged the court to invoke Rule 55 and asserted that good cause
existed to allow her to file an answer. Perez averred that her failure to answer was
neither willful nor culpable but rather resulted from her attorney’s mistake. As
Perez explained the circumstances, she originally had filed her action in Georgia
state court, where her attorneys were accustomed to practicing, and Georgia does
not require the filing of an answer to a counterclaim. Perez also contended that she
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sought leave to file her response soon after the error was brought to her attention
and that Wells Fargo would suffer no prejudice by allowing her to answer. In
addition, Perez urged that, even in the absence of a response to the counterclaim,
her complaint contained sufficient facts to rebut Wells Fargo’s allegations. Perez
also separately filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint, seeking relief
specifically for breach of contract, conversion, and negligence.
The district court denied Perez’s motion to file an answer to the
counterclaim. Applying Rule 6(b)(1)(B)’s “excusable neglect” standard, the
district court concluded that even if Perez had not acted culpably and Wells Fargo
faced little prejudice if Perez were provided with an opportunity to respond, Perez
nonetheless had failed to show excusable neglect because her attorney’s proffered
reason for the delay in filing was insufficient to relieve Perez of the consequences
of the missed deadline.
Then, because Perez had not timely filed a response to the counterclaim, the
district court deemed admitted the allegations in the counterclaim and relied on
them in evaluating Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The
district court determined that Wells Fargo was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law on its counterclaim because, under the deemed-admitted allegations of the
counterclaim, the Business Account Agreement, as characterized by Wells Fargo
in its counterclaim, authorized Wells Fargo to close Perez’s accounts and freeze
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the monies within them. The district court did not consider the language of the
actual Business Account Agreement.
With respect to Perez’s complaint, the district court again invoked the
counterclaim’s deemed-admitted characterization of the Business Account
Agreement as having authorized Wells Fargo’s actions in closing Perez’s accounts
to find that Perez could not plausibly argue—as her complaint alleged—that Wells
Fargo’s actions were wrongful or unlawful. As a result, the district court also
determined that Wells Fargo was entitled to judgment on the pleadings on Perez’s
complaint.
Additionally, the district court denied Perez’s motion to amend. Relying for
the third time on the deemed-admitted counterclaim characterization of the
Business Account Agreement as having authorized Wells Fargo to freeze the funds
in Perez’s accounts, the court concluded that no amendment of the complaint could
enable Perez to establish that Wells Fargo’s actions were wrongful. Therefore, the
court determined that any amendment of the complaint would be futile.
The district court then directed Wells Fargo to file an affidavit detailing the
attorney’s fees and expenses it had incurred. In ruling on the issue of attorney’s
fees, the district court did not permit Perez to argue Wells Fargo’s entitlement to
fees. Rather, relying on the fact that the Business Account Agreement contains an
attorney’s fees provision, it determined that Wells Fargo could recover its litigation
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expenses. The district court focused on only the amount that Wells Fargo was
allegedly owed under the Business Account Agreement. After determining the
applicable rates and hours worked, the district court found that Wells Fargo was
entitled to $9,955.00 in fees and costs and ordered Wells Fargo to return $175.64
to Perez.
II.
In this appeal, Perez raises three issues: (1) whether Wells Fargo’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings should have been granted, (2) whether Perez’s
motion to file an amended complaint should have been denied on futility grounds,
and (3) whether the district court’s award of attorney’s fees was proper. We
address each question in turn.
A. Wells Fargo’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
We review de novo an order granting judgment on the pleadings. Cannon v.
City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). “Judgment on the
pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. In determining
whether a party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings, we accept as true all
material facts alleged in the non-moving party’s pleading, and we view those facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Hawthorne v. Mac
Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998). If a comparison of the
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averments in the competing pleadings reveals a material dispute of fact, judgment
on the pleadings must be denied. See Stanton v. Larsh, 239 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir.
1956). 6
In considering Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
district court first denied Perez’s motion to file an out-of-time answer to Wells
Fargo’s counterclaim because it concluded that Perez had failed to establish
“excusable neglect” for not timely filing her answer. As a result, no answer to
Wells Fargo’s counterclaim existed, so the district court deemed admitted all of the
allegations in Wells Fargo’s counterclaim when it considered Wells Fargo’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings.
This was error for two reasons: First, by taking as true all of the allegations
in the counterclaim for purposes of considering the motion for judgment on the
pleadings as it pertained to the counterclaim, the district court essentially
conducted the analysis for determining whether a motion for default judgment
should be granted after the clerk of court has entered a default under Rule 55. So it
was necessary to evaluate whether Perez could file an out-of-time answer under
Rule 55(c)’s standard for setting aside the clerk of court’s default. Second, even if
Wells Fargo’s motion could have been properly considered as a motion for
6
Opinions of the Fifth Circuit issued prior to October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in
the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
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judgment on the pleadings, Wells Fargo’s characterization of the Business Account
Agreement as having fully authorized Wells Fargo’s actions and its entitlement to
attorney’s fees and costs, which drove the entry of judgment on the pleadings for
Wells Fargo, was a legal conclusion not amenable to being deemed admitted. We
discuss each issue in turn.
1.
Once the district court denied Perez’s motion to file an answer to the
counterclaim out of time and accordingly deemed admitted the allegations in the
counterclaim, the court essentially conducted the analysis applicable on a motion
for default judgment following the entry of a clerk’s default under Rule 55, not the
analysis applicable on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. A comparison of
the rule governing a motion for default judgment with the rule pertaining to a
motion for judgment on the pleadings shows why this is so.
Rule 55, governing “Default; Default Judgment,” applies specifically to
situations where the defendant or counter-defendant has failed to answer.
Subsection (a) provides, “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(a). “Rule 55 . . . appl[ies] . . . where only the first step has been taken—i.e., the
filing of a complaint—[because] the court thus has only allegations and no
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evidence before it.” D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 107 (2d Cir.
2006) (internal citation omitted). As the Second Circuit has explained, “Rule 55
tracks the ancient common law axiom that a default is an admission of all well-
pleaded allegations against the defaulting party.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), “Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings,” on the other hand, provides “a means of disposing of cases when . . . a
judgment on the merits can be achieved by focusing on the content of the
competing pleadings . . . .” 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1367 (3d ed. 2004) (emphasis added). When only a
single pleading has been filed, “competing pleadings” do not exist, so a motion for
judgment on the pleadings is not appropriate. Cf. id. at 211 n.10 (compiling case
law demonstrating that judgment on the pleadings is proper after the defendant has
answered).
Rule 12(c) incorporates this principle by permitting motions for judgment on
the pleadings only after the pleadings have “closed”: “After the pleadings are
closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on
the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). So here we must determine whether the
pleadings were closed at the time that Wells Fargo sought judgment on the
pleadings.
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Rule 7(a), in turn, governs pleadings and sets forth a limited list of
permissible pleadings: “Only these pleadings are allowed: “(1) a complaint; (2) an
answer to a complaint; (3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a
counterclaim; (4) an answer to a crossclaim; (5) a third-party complaint; (6) an
answer to a third-party complaint; and (7) if the court orders one, a reply to an
answer.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a). The rule’s express provision for an answer to a
counterclaim anticipates that the pleadings do not “close” until an answer has been
filed by the counter-defendant (unless the court orders a reply to the answer). See
Flora v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 685 F.2d 209, 211 n.4 (7th Cir. 1982)
(“Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) prescribes when the pleadings are closed. In a case such as
this when, in addition to an answer, a counterclaim is pleaded, the pleadings are
closed when the plaintiff serves his reply.”) (citing 2A Moore’s Federal Practice ¶
12.15 (2d ed. 1982)); see also Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir.
2005) (“[T]he pleadings are closed [under Rule 7(a)] for the purposes of Rule 12(c)
once a complaint and answer have been filed, assuming . . . that no counterclaim or
cross-claim is made.”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); 5C Wright & Miller, § 1367;
Flora, 685 F.2d at 211 n.4)); 5 Wright & Miller, § 1184 at 24 n.1 (compiling case
law that supports this proposition); see 5A Wright & Miller, § 1189 at 41; 5C
Wright & Miller, § 1367 at 213.
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The rationale underlying Rule 12(c) further supports this notion: that
competing pleadings pertinent to the counterclaim be available for the court to
consider on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Sovereign Bank v.
Sturgis, 863 F. Supp. 2d 75, 80 (D. Mass. 2012) (“In the instant case,
counterclaims have been filed but [the plaintiff-counter-defendant] has not yet
responded to them, so the pleadings are not yet closed.”). Indeed, the name of
Rule 12(c), which incorporates the plural of “pleading”—“Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (emphasis added)—along with the use of the
plural “pleadings” as opposed to the singular “pleading” throughout the rule,
supports the idea that judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate when only a
single pleading related to a claim (whether alleged in a complaint or counterclaim)
has been filed.
In short, Rule 55(a) authorizing default judgments dovetails with Rule 12(c)
allowing for judgments on the pleadings. When a defendant fails to answer, Rule
12(c) precludes a judgment on the pleadings because the pleadings have not yet
closed, and competing pleadings do not exist. But the plaintiff is not left to twist in
the wind; rather, Rule 55(a) mandates the entry of default so that “the adversary
process [will not be] halted because of an essentially unresponsive party.” H.F.
Livermore Corp. v. Aktiengesellschaft Gebruder Loepfe, 432 F.2d 689, 691 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (per curiam). Rule 55(a)—and not Rule 12(c)—protects the diligent
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party. Id. at 692; see 5C Wright & Miller, § 1367 at 214 (“Since the plaintiff
cannot move under Rule 12(c) until [the pleadings close], the proper course for the
plaintiff in a case in which the defendant fails to answer is to move for a default
judgment under Rule 55 rather than seek a judgment on the pleadings.”).
Here, under the plain language of Rule 55(a), had Wells Fargo sought a
clerk’s default as it should have since Perez had not filed an answer to the
counterclaim, the district-court clerk would have been required to enter default
against Perez because (1) Wells Fargo’s motion sought a judgment for affirmative
relief; (2) Perez failed to plead or otherwise defend against Wells Fargo’s
counterclaim; and (3) that failure was shown by Wells Fargo’s motion. Wells
Fargo’s decision not to seek the entry of a clerk’s default did not somehow alter the
fact that Perez was nonetheless in default on the counterclaim. “[A] defendant
who fails to answer within the time specified by the rules is in default even if that
fact is not officially noted.” 10A Wright & Miller, § 2692 at 85. So “a motion for
relief under Rule 55(c) [setting aside a default] is appropriate . . . even [when]
there has not been a formal entry of default . . . .” Id.
And relief under Rule 55(c)’s “good cause” standard 7 is precisely what
Perez sought in this case, even though no default had formally been entered. The
7
Rule 55(c) provides that a court “may set aside an entry of default for good cause . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). We have previously noted that “‘[g]ood cause’ is a mutable standard,
varying from situation to situation.” Compania Interamericana Export-Import, S.A. v. Compania
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district court, however, declined to apply Rule 55(c) and instead applied Rule
6(b)(1)(B)’s “excusable neglect standard” 8 because Wells Fargo had not “requested
entry of default (or . . . an entry of default judgment).” But Wells Fargo’s
characterization of its motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings did not
somehow change the nature of the relief that Wells Fargo actually sought—
effectively, a default judgment. A motion for entry of default judgment is a motion
for entry of default judgment, regardless of what it is called. So Perez was entitled
to have her motion to file an out-of-time answer to the counterclaim considered
under the “good cause” standard applicable to setting aside a default rather than
under the “more rigorous,” “excusable neglect” standard. See E.E.O.C. v. Mike
Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). While the
standard must be construed to have substance, we have nonetheless described it as a “liberal
one.” Id. (citation omitted). As we have explained, “‘good cause’ is not susceptible to a precise
formula . . . .” Id. Rather, we evaluate various factors that may be applicable in a given case.
See id. For example, courts generally consider whether the default was culpable or willful,
whether setting it aside would prejudice the non-moving party, and whether the defaulting party
may have a meritorious defense. Id. Depending on the circumstances, courts have also
considered factors such as “whether the public interest was implicated, whether there was
significant financial loss to the defaulting party, and whether the defaulting party acted promptly
to correct the default.” Id. (citation omitted). On the other hand, where a party demonstrates an
intentional or willful disregard of the judicial proceedings, good cause to set aside the default
does not exist. Id. at 951-52.
8
Rule 6(b)(1)(B) applies generally, when a more precise rule does not govern the
situation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) (“Extending Time. (1) In General. When an act may
or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time: . . . (B)
on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable
neglect.”) (bold and italics in original, underline added). Rule 55(c), however, which speaks
directly to the particular issue of setting aside defaults, applies instead of Rule 6(b)(1)(B) where
a party seeks to set aside a default.
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Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc., 896 F.2d 524, 528 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that the
“excusable neglect” standard is “more rigorous” than the “good cause” standard).
Applying Rule 55(c)’s “good cause” standard to Perez’s motion, as opposed
to Rule 6(b)(1)(B)’s more exacting “excusable neglect” standard, also squares with
our decision in Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir.
2005), where we held that a failure to answer a counterclaim should not, by itself,
“justify the draconian remedy of dismissal with prejudice.” Id. at 1339. Although
Betty K involved the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of the counter-plaintiff’s
complaint under Rule 41, the rationale grounding the analysis in Betty K applies
here with equal force.
In Betty K, this Court analyzed the effect of a counter-defendant’s failure to
answer a counterclaim. 9 We reasoned that the failure to respond to a counterclaim
did not warrant a dismissal with prejudice where the counter-defendant’s failure to
answer was not “willful or contumacious.” See id. at 1339. We also opined that
dismissal with prejudice is “plainly improper unless and until the district court
finds a clear record of delay or willful conduct and that lesser sanctions are
inadequate to correct such conduct.” Id. Finally, we took account of the fact that
9
The counter-defendant maintained that it served the counter-plaintiff’s counsel with its
answer by hand. Id. at 1336. The counter-plaintiff’s counsel denied this contention. Id.Nevertheless, it was undisputed that the counter-defendant did not file its answer to the
counterclaim with the clerk of court. Id. In its analysis, this Court proceeded under the
assumption that the counter-defendant had “wholly failed” to respond to the counterclaim, just as
Perez wholly failed to answer Wells Fargo’s counterclaim here. See id. at 1339.
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the record did not suggest that the counter-defendant, “rather than its attorney, was
in any way responsible for [the] failure to answer the counterclaim.” Id. at 1340.
We concluded this section of our analysis by noting that “failure to file a pleading
is generally corrected by an order to compel filing.” Id. (quoting 4B Wright &
Miller, § 1152) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Perez’s conduct did not appear to be “willful or contumacious.” Soon
after learning of her failure to file an answer to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim, she
filed her motion to file an out-of-time answer. Additionally, the record lacks
evidence suggesting a pattern of delay or willful conduct by Perez. Despite her
failure to answer, Perez had been actively litigating her case. She and Wells Fargo
submitted their joint discovery report shortly before Wells Fargo filed its motion,
and Perez had already propounded written discovery. Finally, as in Betty K, the
record suggests that Perez’s attorney, and not Perez herself, was responsible for the
failure to answer the counterclaim.
We do not suggest that we excuse Perez’s failure to file an answer to the
counterclaim. Attorneys who practice in federal court are responsible for knowing
the rules governing the practice. But a party’s claims should not be subjected to
default under a standard higher than that applicable to default. And we have long
expressed our “strong policy of determining cases on their merits” when
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reasonably possible. Fla. Physician’s Ins. Co., Inc. v. Ehlers, 8 F.3d 780, 783
(11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
In sum, then, Perez defaulted on Wells Fargo’s counterclaim when she failed
to file a timely answer. So her request for leave to file an out-of-time answer to
Wells Fargo’s counterclaim should have been analyzed as a motion to set aside an
entry of default under the more forgiving Rule 55(c) standard as opposed to the
more exacting Rule 6(b)(1)(B) standard. And, because Perez’s failure to respond
to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim meant that the pleadings had not yet closed, 10 the
district court’s evaluation of Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
was premature. For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s order granting
Wells Fargo’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and remand so that the court
can consider Perez’s motion under Rule 55(c).
10
Nor were the pleadings closed with respect to Perez’s complaint, since Wells Fargo
had filed a counterclaim and Perez had not filed an answer to the counterclaim. Because the
counterclaim related to the same subject matter as Perez’s complaint, and a ruling on the
complaint would necessarily create law of the case for purposes of the issues raised in the
counterclaim, it would make little sense to decide the claims at issue in the complaint without
simultaneously considering the claims at issue in the counterclaim. Apparently, for this reason,
where a counterclaim is filed, the pleadings are not closed until a response to the counterclaim is
filed. 5C Wright & Miller, § 1367 (“Rule 7(a) [] provides that the pleadings are closed upon the
filing of a complaint and an answer . . . , unless a counterclaim . . . is interposed, in which event
the filing of a reply to a counterclaim . . . normally will mark the close of the pleadings.”)
(emphasis added). Since the pleadings as they related to Perez’s complaint were not closed, the
motion for judgment on the pleadings was premature under Rule 12(c). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c)
(“After the pleadings are closed . . . a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”)
(emphasis added); cf. Doe, 419 F.3d at 1061 (holding that the plaintiff’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings was premature and should have been denied because it was filed before the
defendant filed an answer).
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2.
Even if Wells Fargo’s motion could have been properly considered as a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, it should have been denied. Although a
defaulted defendant is deemed to have admitted the movant’s well-pleaded
allegations of fact, she is not charged with having admitted “facts that are not well-
pleaded or . . . conclusions of law.” Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d
1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted) (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v.
Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)).
Here, Wells Fargo alleged that it was “authorized by the applicable
[Business Account Agreement] governing [Perez’s] relationship with Wells Fargo”
to close Perez’s accounts and freeze Perez’s funds. But under Georgia law, which
governs the contract at issue here, “[t]he construction of a contract is a question of
law for the court.” O.C.G.A. § 13-2-1. So whether Wells Fargo’s actions were
authorized by the contract was a legal assertion couched as a factual allegation, and
it should not have been deemed admitted. 11 This is particularly true here because
Wells Fargo’s counterclaim did not quote any part of the contract and instead
11
We recognize that, as Wells Fargo pointed out in its appellate brief, Perez did not raise
this issue for the first time until the case was on appeal. Normally, we would not entertain an
entirely new argument raised for the first time on appeal. Here, however, we are remanding this
case for further proceedings in the district court solely because the “good cause” standard must
be applied to determining Perez’s motion to file an out-of-time answer. So it appears that the
issue of whether Wells Fargo’s characterization of the Business Account Agreement can be
accepted as a “fact” not in dispute may well arise again. In the interests of judicial economy,
therefore, we address the issue of whether such an allegation may be accepted as a “fact.”
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merely characterized the Business Account Agreement. But, because the
construction of a contract is a question of law for the court, the contents of the 65-
page Agreement itself must be evaluated in determining whether Wells Fargo was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its motion for judgment on the
pleadings. 12
B. Perez’s Motion to Amend her Complaint
We review de novo an order denying a plaintiff leave to amend because of
futility. Hollywood Mobile Estates Ltd. v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 641 F.3d 1259,
1264 (11th Cir. 2011).
Under Rule 15(a)(2), courts should freely give leave to amend the pleadings
“when justice so requires.” A court may consider several factors when deciding
whether to grant a motion to amend, including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive . . . , repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
12
Wells Fargo filed the Business Account Agreement in support of its motion for
judgment on the pleadings. The district court was under the impression that it could not consider
the Business Account Agreement in ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings since the
Agreement was not attached to the pleadings. But, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
documents that are not a part of the pleadings may be considered, as long as they are central to
the claim at issue and their authenticity is undisputed. See Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125,
1134–35 (11th Cir. 2002) (applying the doctrine that allows documents outside the pleadings to
be considered on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) only when the documents are central
to the claim and undisputed to the motion-for-judgment-on-the-pleadings context under Rule
10(c)); cf. Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court’s
reliance on a contract that was not attached to the parties’ complaint but was submitted by the
defendants along with their motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), because the contract was
central to the plaintiffs’ complaint, and its authenticity was not in dispute). Here, both
requirements were satisfied because the Business Account Agreement, which the counterclaim
referenced, was central to Wells Fargo’s counterclaim, and the parties did not dispute its
authenticity.
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allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla.
Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2009) (alteration
in original) (quoting Forman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230
(1962)).
The district court expressly concluded that Perez had not filed her motion to
amend “in bad faith or with dilatory motive,” that Wells Fargo would not be
unduly prejudiced by allowing the amendment, and that the case “[did] not involve
any repeated failures to cure deficiencies or undue delay” in seeking to amend the
complaint. Instead, the district court denied Perez’s motion to amend because it
concluded that amendment would be futile. In particular, the district court
reasoned that, against the deemed-admitted counterclaim allegation that the
Business Account Agreement authorized Wells Fargo to close Perez’s accounts
and freeze her funds, Perez could not conceivably prevail on any claims that Wells
Fargo’s actions were wrongful.
As we have previously explained, though, deeming admitted Wells Fargo’s
counterclaim allegation that purported to characterize the legal contents of the
Business Account Agreement without quoting it was error because, among other
reasons, the allegation constituted a legal conclusion. And under Georgia law,
“[t]he construction of a contract is a question of law for the court.” O.C.G.A. § 13-
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2-1. For this reason, the district court was required to review the actual contract at
issue in evaluating whether amendment of the complaint would necessarily be
futile.
While we recognize that we can affirm the district court’s ruling on any
basis in the record, a review of the contract at issue does not allow us to affirm the
denial of the motion to amend on futility grounds. We express no opinion on the
strength or lack thereof of Perez’s claims but merely note that we cannot say after
review of the Business Account Agreement that any amendment of her complaint
would necessarily be futile.13 We therefore reverse the district court’s order
13
For example, we note that in its motion for judgment on the pleadings, Wells Fargo
quoted a portion of the Business Account Agreement. While we do not suggest that Wells Fargo
did anything improper, it could appear from the excerpt that all of the quoted material is part and
parcel of a single section of the Agreement and that that section authorizes an award of
attorney’s fees and costs for, among other things, expenses associated with the freezing of a
depositor’s accounts “when the Bank suspects that irregular, unauthorized, or unlawful activities
may be occurring in connection with [the depositor’s account] . . . .” In fact, however, a review
of the actual Agreement reveals that the part of the Agreement authorizing this particular type of
freezing of accounts arguably does not contain a provision permitting the award of attorney’s
fees and costs. Instead, the fee-and-cost provision appears in what is arguably another section of
the Agreement, which states that fees and costs may be imposed if the bank freezes accounts
because “there is a dispute over matters such as . . . the authority to withdraw funds from [the]
account.” Wells Fargo alleged that it froze Perez’s accounts because “numerous United States
Treasury checks for tax refunds were deposited into the accounts, reflecting unauthorized MSB
activity.” This averment arguably may not allege the existence of a “dispute” since other
allegations in the counterclaim demonstrate that the IRS had not made a claim (and did not for
another six weeks) to the funds in Perez’s accounts at the time that Wells Fargo closed and froze
the accounts, and the counterclaim does not allege that a “dispute” between Perez and anyone
else existed at the time that Wells Fargo closed and froze Perez’s accounts. Nor, arguably, does
it allege that Perez was improperly “withdraw[ing] funds” from the accounts. Instead, the
challenged activity may arguably fall under the provision authorizing Wells Fargo to freeze
accounts when it suspects that unlawful activities may be occurring in connection with them.
That provision, however, does not provide for an award of attorney’s fees and costs. We do not
opine on the strength of such a construction but identify it solely to illustrate the point that it is at
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denying the motion to amend and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
C. Attorney’s Fees
We review “an award of attorney's fees for abuse of discretion; nevertheless,
that standard of review still allows us to closely scrutinize questions of law decided
by the district court in reaching a fee award.” Villano v. City of Boynton Beach,
254 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Because we have
reversed the order granting judgment on the pleadings for Wells Fargo, on which
the award of attorney’s fees was based, we remand the attorney’s fees issue to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
III.
This Circuit expresses a “strong preference that cases be heard on the
merits,” Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), and
“strive[s] to afford a litigant his or her day in court, if possible.” Betty K., 432 F.3d
at 1339. Because Wells Fargo filed what was in nature a motion for default
judgment, the court was obligated to apply the standard for setting aside a default
in determining whether Perez should have been permitted to file an out-of-time
answer. To allow the district court to conduct the analysis for setting aside a
least arguable that the Business Account Agreement may not have authorized the charging of
attorney’s fees and costs to Perez under the circumstances, so we cannot say that the Agreement
necessarily authorized Wells Fargo’s actions and that any attempt to amend the complaint would
necessarily be futile.
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default, we reverse the district court’s order denying Perez’s motion to file an out-
of-time answer with instructions for the district court to reconsider the motion,
applying Rule 55(c)’s “good cause” standard. We also reverse the district court’s
order granting judgment on the pleadings to Wells Fargo and awarding it costs and
attorney’s fees, as well the district court’s order denying Perez’s motion to file an
amended complaint. We remand the case for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
26