Pablo Guevara v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. ( 2019 )


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  •            Case: 17-14889    Date Filed: 04/01/2019   Page: 1 of 37
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-14889
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cv-24294-KMW
    PABLO GUEVARA,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    NCL (BAHAMAS) LTD.,
    a Bermuda Company
    doing business as
    Norwegian Cruise Line,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 1, 2019)
    Case: 17-14889       Date Filed: 04/01/2019        Page: 2 of 37
    Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and SUTTON, ∗ Circuit Judges.
    WILSON, Circuit Judge:
    Pablo Guevara slipped and fell as he stepped down from a landing located
    on the outer deck of a cruise ship operated by NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. Guevara
    claimed that he did not perceive the step down because NCL failed to adequately
    warn him of the change in elevation. Moreover, a lightbulb was out in the area
    where Guevara fell, making it harder for him to navigate the floor level change at
    night. Guevara sued NCL, alleging that NCL negligently failed to (1) warn
    passengers of the step down and (2) maintain and inspect the lighting in the area.
    The district court granted summary judgment in favor of NCL on both claims,
    holding that Guevara failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding
    NCL’s actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous conditions posed by
    the step down or the unilluminated light.
    Guevara appeals the district court’s orders (1) striking his expert’s
    supplemental reports and (2) granting summary judgment in favor of NCL. After
    careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we reverse and remand the
    district court’s ruling on Guevara’s failure to warn claim. We affirm, however, the
    ∗Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton, United States Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by
    designation.
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    district court’s orders (1) striking Guevara’s expert’s supplemental reports and (2)
    granting summary judgment on Guevara’s negligent maintenance claim.
    I.     Factual Background
    Guevara was a cruise passenger on the Norwegian Spirit, which departed
    from Barcelona, Spain. On his first night aboard, at approximately 11:30 p.m.,
    Guevara was walking on an outdoor deck near the pool, searching for the ship’s
    cigar lounge. He walked up three steps to a landing. After the landing, there is a
    single step down, which Guevara claims he did not see.1 When he stepped down,
    Guevara slipped on the deck and fell, landing with his arm wedged between the
    wall and a handrail. As a result, Guevara broke his arm.
    After he fell, Guevara noticed a “sheen” of water on the floor where he
    slipped and that a lightbulb was out in one of the globe lamps at the top of the
    steps. Directly underneath the unilluminated lamp was a permanently affixed
    warning sign: “ATTENTION! FOR YOUR OWN SAFETY PLEASE USE THE
    HANDRAIL. WATCH YOUR STEP.” Guevara contends that he could not see
    the warning sign because the bulb immediately above the sign was out.
    II.     Procedural History
    1
    Guevara claims that the landing appeared flush with the brown deck area below the step.
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    Guevara filed a complaint against NCL in the Southern District of Florida.
    He alleged that NCL negligently failed to (1) warn passengers of the step down,
    and (2) maintain and inspect the lighting in the area.
    A. Expert Witness Reports
    The parties proceeded to discovery. The district court’s Scheduling Order
    set Guevara’s expert disclosure deadline for June 18th, NCL’s expert disclosure
    deadline for July 2nd, and the disclosure deadline for any rebuttal expert witness
    reports for July 16th.
    Guevara disclosed Dr. Ronald Zollo as an expert and served a copy of his
    report on June 20th—two days after the expert disclosure deadline.
    NCL’s human factors and illumination expert, Dr. Joseph B. Sala, opined
    that there was sufficient lighting on the deck of the Spirit for a reasonably alert and
    attentive person walking in the area to safely navigate the floor level change.
    Guevara successfully moved for an extension of time to file rebuttal expert reports.
    He served Dr. Zollo’s rebuttal expert report on July 26th. Dr. Zollo’s rebuttal
    report addressed the step’s dimensions and the insufficient slip resistance on the
    flooring.
    On August 19th—the Friday before Dr. Zollo’s Monday deposition—
    Guevara served NCL with a copy of a thirteen-page “Addendum to the Preliminary
    Report” (First Supplemental Report) that supplemented both Dr. Zollo’s initial and
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    rebuttal expert opinions. The First Supplemental Report contained previously
    undisclosed opinions and references to authoritative materials. NCL proceeded
    with Dr. Zollo’s deposition notwithstanding its objection to the submission of the
    First Supplemental Report. Dr. Zollo terminated his deposition after three hours
    and refused to resume later in the day.
    Discovery closed on August 26th.
    On September 26th—a month after the close of discovery and three days
    after the district court’s deadline for dispositive and Daubert motions—Guevara
    filed a second, three-page addendum to Dr. Zollo’s preliminary report (Second
    Supplemental Report).
    NCL moved to strike Dr. Zollo’s testimony and reports because of
    Guevara’s untimely disclosure of Dr. Zollo as an expert witness, Dr. Zollo’s early
    termination of his deposition, and the presentation of new arguments in Dr. Zollo’s
    supplemental reports that were not addressed in NCL’s expert’s report or alleged in
    the complaint. NCL also filed a Daubert motion to exclude Dr. Zollo’s opinions,
    arguing that (1) he was not qualified to offer opinions on the construction of
    seaworthy vessels or human factors; (2) he did not use a sufficiently reliable
    methodology; (3) his opinions were based on assumptions and speculation; and (4)
    his opinions would not assist the trier of fact.
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    The district court did not strike Dr. Zollo’s initial expert report as untimely,
    even though it was filed two days late. In considering Dr. Zollo’s First and Second
    Supplemental Reports, the district court acknowledged that NCL was dilatory in
    setting the deposition of NCL’s corporate representative, which was taken well
    after the expert discovery deadlines and a week before discovery closed on August
    26th. During the corporate representative’s deposition, NCL produced for the first
    time a drawing of the deck area, photographs of the area taken the night of
    Guevara’s fall, and a coefficient of friction (COF) 2 testing report of the deck. The
    district court found that, given NCL’s late production, Dr. Zollo was justified in
    supplementing his initial report based on the new information obtained during the
    corporate representative’s deposition. Dr. Zollo did not, however, have “carte
    blanche to supplement everything in both his initial and rebuttal expert reports.”
    As such, the district court excluded certain portions of the First Supplemental
    Report and the entirety of the Second Supplemental Report because Guevara failed
    to show that their late disclosure was either justified or harmless.
    The district court struck the portion of Dr. Zollo’s First Supplemental Report
    listing industry standards on lighting because it was produced too close in time to
    Dr. Zollo’s deposition. In reaching this conclusion, the district court explained that
    2
    Coefficient of friction measures a surface’s “degree of slip resistance.” Sorrels v. NCL
    (Bahamas) Ltd., 
    796 F.3d 1275
    , 1279 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Mihailovich v. Laatsch, 
    359 F.3d 892
    , 896, 921 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004)).
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    none of Dr. Zollo’s opinions on lighting in the First Supplemental Report referred
    to any of the late discovery produced by NCL. The district court found that the
    late submission of the report was not harmless.
    The district court struck the entirety of Dr. Zollo’s Second Supplemental
    Report because its late disclosure harmed NCL. While Dr. Zollo was justified in
    supplementing his initial expert reports on account of NCL’s late production of the
    COF report, the court found no justification for Dr. Zollo supplementing his expert
    opinion more than five weeks after he received the COF report, over a month after
    the close of discovery, and three days after the district court’s dispositive and
    Daubert motions deadline. Guevara did not seek leave to extend discovery, which
    left NCL with no opportunity to depose Dr. Zollo about his Second Supplemental
    Report.
    B. NCL’s Motion for Summary Judgment
    NCL moved for summary judgment, arguing that there was no record
    evidence of a dangerous condition, or evidence of actual or constructive notice of a
    dangerous condition, in the area where Guevara fell. Guevara opposed NCL’s
    motion, asserting two theories of NCL’s negligence liability: duty to warn and
    negligent maintenance. Under the first theory, Guevara argued that NCL failed to
    adequately warn him of the dangerous condition posed by the step down. Under
    the negligent maintenance theory, Guevara argued that NCL “permit[ed] the light
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    to go out and remain out and [did] not post[] warning signs (or other more effective
    warnings such as yellow tape) that could have been seen by passengers traveling
    from the direction that Mr. Guevara was traveling.”
    The district court granted summary judgment in favor of NCL, holding that
    Guevara did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding NCL’s actual or
    constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition posed by the step down.
    The district court rejected Guevara’s argument that the presence of the warning
    sign alone was sufficient to create an issue of fact regarding NCL’s notice of the
    dangerous step.3 The court reasoned that Guevara offered no evidence that NCL
    created or affixed the warning sign, and thus failed to create a “logical inference
    that [NCL] had prior knowledge of the dangerous condition necessitating the
    warning.” Lipkin v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 
    93 F. Supp. 3d 1311
    , 1323 (S.D.
    Fla. 2015).
    Guevara also argued that NCL was on constructive notice that the light had
    been out because, under NCL’s normal practices, the light was checked at 7:00 or
    8:00 p.m. The light thus theoretically could have been out for up to four hours
    before Guevara fell. The district court disagreed. The court reasoned that the
    possibility that the light could have been out for four hours was not evidence of
    3
    Guevara conceded that NCL did not design, manufacture, construct, or install the step or
    decking materials. Guevara also conceded that there had been no prior injuries, accidents, or
    claims against NCL related to the step.
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    when the light actually went out. The district court held that Guevara failed to
    create a genuine dispute of material fact about NCL’s notice of the alleged
    dangerous condition posed by the unilluminated light. Guevara appealed.
    III.   Discussion
    We now consider Guevara’s argument that the district court erred in
    excluding Dr. Zollo’s supplemental expert reports and in granting summary
    judgment to NCL.
    A. Exclusion of Supplemental Expert Reports
    Guevara challenges the district court’s ruling to exclude his expert’s
    supplemental reports, arguing that those reports would have created a genuine
    dispute of material fact. “We . . . review a district court’s exclusion of expert
    reports for abuse of discretion.” Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 
    475 F.3d 1239
    , 1250
    (11th Cir. 2007). “A district court abuses its discretion when it makes a clear error
    of judgment or applies an incorrect legal standard.” Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas)
    Ltd., 
    796 F.3d 1275
    , 1281 (11th Cir. 2015).
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 requires that “[a] party must make
    [expert witness] disclosures at the times and in the sequence the court orders.”
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(D). In order to make a proper disclosure, parties must, by
    the deadline, disclose the identity of their experts “accompanied by a written
    report.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). This written report “must contain a complete
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    statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for
    them” and “the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them.” Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)(i)–(ii).
    Rule 26(e) imposes a duty on an expert to supplement her report “in a timely
    manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure . . . is
    incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not
    otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in
    writing.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(A). But “[a]ny additions or changes to” the
    expert report “must be disclosed by the time the party’s pretrial disclosures under
    Rule 26(a)(3) are due.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2) (emphasis added).
    If a party violates Rule 26(a) or (e), Rule 37(c) provides for the exclusion of
    the expert evidence “unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); see also OFS Fitel, LLC v. Epstein, Becker and Green,
    P.C., 
    549 F.3d 1344
    , 1363 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Under Rule 37(c)(1), a district court
    clearly has authority to exclude an expert’s testimony where a party has failed to
    comply with Rule 26(a) unless the failure is substantially justified or harmless.”).
    Courts have broad discretion to exclude untimely expert testimony—even when
    they are designated as “supplemental” reports. See 
    Corwin, 475 F.3d at 1252
    (“[A]
    supplemental expert report may be excluded pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 37(c) if a party fails to file it prior to the deadline imposed.”).
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    Guevara submitted Dr. Zollo’s supplemental reports out of time. The district
    court set deadlines for Guevara to produce initial and rebuttal reports from his
    experts. But Guevara produced Dr. Zollo’s two supplemental reports after these
    deadlines. The district court set a June 18th deadline for Guevara to identify his
    expert witnesses and produce their reports. Guevara identified Dr. Zollo as an
    expert and produced his initial report on June 20th. In his initial report, Dr. Zollo
    opined that Guevara’s fall was caused by the inadequate design of the stairway
    landing, insufficient maintenance of the landing and surrounding area (including
    insufficient lighting), and the use of improper flooring material that was
    unreasonably slippery when wet. On August 19th, Guevara filed Dr. Zollo’s First
    Supplemental Report, which listed a host of industry standards on lighting. The
    standards were not included in Dr. Zollo’s initial or rebuttal reports and were not
    produced ahead of his deposition. A month after the close of discovery and three
    days after the deadline for dispositive and Daubert motions, Guevara filed Dr.
    Zollo’s Second Supplemental Report. The Second Supplemental Report largely
    addressed the COF report disclosed by NCL’s corporate representative. The
    district court excluded certain portions of the First Supplemental Report addressing
    the industry standards on lighting and the entirety of the Second Supplemental
    Report because Guevara failed to show that the late disclosure of these reports was
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    either justified or harmless. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion.
    Guevara argues that the district court erred in excluding portions of the First
    Supplemental Report because his delay in disclosing these opinions was harmless
    as NCL had delayed producing documents and responding to discovery. The
    problem with this argument is that the district court did not strike the opinions in
    Dr. Zollo’s First Supplemental Report that incorporated or relied upon NCL’s late
    discovery. The portions of the First Supplemental Report that the district court
    excluded made no reference to any of NCL’s late discovery. The district court did
    not abuse its discretion in finding that NCL’s late production did not give Dr. Zollo
    “carte blanche to supplement everything in both his initial and rebuttal expert
    reports.”
    We also cannot say that the district court’s conclusion that the late disclosure
    harmed NCL was an abuse of discretion given the timing of Guevara’s disclosure
    of the First Supplemental Report immediately before Dr. Zollo’s deposition.
    Guevara only produced Dr. Zollo’s First Supplemental Report on the eve of Dr.
    Zollo’s deposition, which gave NCL little time to review or prepare questions on
    the new information. The severity of the harm to NCL increased when Dr. Zollo
    left his deposition after only three hours without the prior agreement of the
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    parties.4 NCL attempted to object to Dr. Zollo’s early departure. In response,
    Guevara moved for a protective order, claiming that NCL’s counsel took an
    “inordinate amount of time” going through Dr. Zollo’s file. But Guevara, not
    NCL, created the problem by disclosing Dr. Zollo’s First Supplemental Report on
    the eve of Dr. Zollo’s deposition.
    The First Supplemental Report attempts to bolster Dr. Zollo’s preliminary
    and rebuttal opinions regarding lighting conditions in response to NCL’s expert
    report. But “a party cannot abuse Rule 26(e) to merely bolster a defective or
    problematic expert witness report.” Companhia Energetica Potiguar v. Caterpillar
    Inc., No. 14-cv-24277, 
    2016 WL 3102225
    , at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 2, 2016). Given
    these facts, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion when it struck
    portions of Dr. Zollo’s First Supplemental Report.
    We also cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in striking Dr.
    Zollo’s Second Supplemental Report in its entirety. The district court
    acknowledged that NCL was not diligent in producing the COF report, and
    permitted Dr. Zollo to supplement his initial expert report after receiving the new
    information. But Guevara unreasonably delayed in filing that supplement.
    Guevara filed Dr. Zollo’s Second Supplemental Report more than five weeks after
    he received the COF report, over a month after the close of discovery, and three
    4
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d)(1) limits a deposition to one day of seven hours.
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    days after the district court’s deadline for dispositive and Daubert motions.
    Guevara did not seek leave of the district court prior to disclosing the Second
    Supplemental Report, nor did he move to extend discovery.
    Our decision in Reese v. Herbert, 
    527 F.3d 1253
    (11th Cir. 2008), is
    instructive. In Reese, a plaintiff filed his expert report almost seven weeks after
    the close of 
    discovery. 527 F.3d at 1264
    –65. This late filing harmed the
    defendants because it “foreclosed the defendants’ opportunity to depose [the
    expert].” 
    Id. at 1265.
    We found that, at a minimum, the plaintiff could have filed
    a motion to extend discovery to permit a proper disclosure, but he failed to do so.
    
    Id. at 1266.
    “Because the expert witness discovery rules are designed to allow
    both sides in a case to prepare their cases adequately and to prevent surprise,” we
    reasoned, “compliance with the requirements of Rule 26 is not merely
    aspirational.” 
    Id. Accordingly, we
    held that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in striking the expert’s report in its entirety. 
    Id. Similarly, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in striking the Second
    Supplemental Report, which Guevara unreasonably delayed in filing. By that
    point, NCL had already filed its motion for summary judgment and Daubert
    motions. As in Reese, Guevara never sought leave of the district court for the late
    filing or moved to extend discovery.
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    We thus conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    striking a portion of Dr. Zollo’s First Supplemental Report and the entirety of his
    Second Supplemental Report.
    B. Summary Judgment
    Guevara contends that the district court erred in holding that (1) the warning
    sign was insufficient to establish NCL’s actual or constructive notice of the
    dangerous condition posed by the step down, and (2) Guevara failed to present
    evidence of negligent maintenance of the lightbulb.
    “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
    all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual inferences, in favor of the
    nonmoving party.” Stephens v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 
    749 F.3d 1318
    , 1321
    (11th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment must be granted “if the movant shows that
    there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is
    improper, however, “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
    verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    ,
    248 (1986).
    Maritime law governs actions arising from alleged torts committed aboard a
    ship sailing in navigable waters. See Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 
    867 F.2d 1318
    , 1320–21 (11th Cir. 1989). “In analyzing a maritime tort case, [we] rely on
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    general principles of negligence law.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 
    693 F.3d 1333
    , 1336 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc., 
    616 F.2d 825
    ,
    827 (5th Cir. 1980)).
    To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the
    defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular injury, (2) the
    defendant breached that duty, (3) the breach actually and proximately caused the
    plaintiff’s injury, and (4) the plaintiff suffered actual harm.” 
    Id. With respect
    to
    the duty element in a maritime context, “a shipowner owes the duty of exercising
    reasonable care towards those lawfully aboard the vessel who are not members of
    the crew.” Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 
    358 U.S. 625
    , 630
    (1959). This standard “requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the
    carrier have had actual or constructive notice of [a] risk-creating condition, at least
    where, as here, the menace is one commonly encountered on land and not clearly
    linked to nautical adventure.” 
    Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322
    . In this circumstance, a
    cruise ship operator’s liability “hinges on whether it knew or should have known”
    about the dangerous condition. Id.5
    A maritime plaintiff can establish constructive notice with evidence that the
    “defective condition exist[ed] for a sufficient period of time to invite corrective
    5
    An operator of a cruise ship has a duty to warn only of known dangers that are not open and
    obvious. See Thomas v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 
    203 F. Supp. 3d 1189
    , 1192 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
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    measures.” Monteleone v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 
    838 F.2d 63
    , 65 (2d Cir.
    1988); see 
    Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322
    ; Rodgers v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A., No. 08-
    60233, 
    2009 WL 10666976
    , at *3 (S.D. Fla. July 6, 2009). Alternatively, a
    plaintiff can establish constructive notice with evidence of substantially similar
    incidents in which “conditions substantially similar to the occurrence in question
    must have caused the prior accident.” Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 
    861 F.2d 655
    ,
    661–62 (11th Cir. 1988).
    i.   Guevara’s Failure to Warn Claim
    Guevara argues that NCL failed to adequately warn him of the dangerous
    condition posed by the step down. NCL responds that summary judgment is
    warranted because it lacked prior notice of the dangerous condition and therefore
    had no duty to warn Guevara of the step down. Guevara points to the warning sign
    alerting passengers to “watch your step” as evidence that NCL was on actual or
    constructive notice of the deceptive, and therefore dangerous, nature of the step
    down.
    NCL contends that the mere presence of a warning sign does not
    automatically establish a cruise line’s notice of a potentially dangerous condition.
    Specifically, NCL asserts that the warning sign at issue was installed by either the
    original owner or the builder of the Spirit, and there is no evidence as to why the
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    sign was placed at that location or what specific condition, if any, it was affixed to
    address.
    In analyzing whether the warning sign raises a genuine issue of material fact
    as to NCL’s knowledge, we look to our recent decision in Sorrels. In Sorrels, a
    cruise ship passenger slipped and fell on the deck of a Norwegian ship, which was
    wet from 
    rain. 796 F.3d at 1279
    . We held that the cruise ship employees’
    testimony—that the cruise line regularly placed warning signs advising passengers
    that the deck was “slippery when wet”—was enough to create a genuine issue of
    material fact regarding whether the cruise line had actual or constructive
    knowledge that the deck could be slippery after precipitation. 
    Id. at 1288–89.
    Not all warning signs will be evidence of notice; there must also be a
    connection between the warning and the danger. See, e.g., Taiariol v. MSC
    Crociere S.A., 677 F. App’x 599 (11th Cir. 2017). The district court cited Taiariol
    in support of its ruling against Guevara, but we find Taiariol favors Guevara. In
    Taiariol, the plaintiff slipped on the metal nosing of a step while leaving a theater
    on a cruise ship. 
    Id. at 600.
    The plaintiff argued that the presence of a “watch
    your step” sticker affixed to the nosing of the step was evidence that the cruise line
    had notice of the nosing’s slippery condition. 
    Id. at 601.
    We disagreed, holding
    that “[c]ommon sense dictates that the sticker served to caution persons on the ship
    that the step was there; that is, it warned passengers that the surface was not flat.
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    There is no evidence that it was intended to warn passengers that the nosing may
    be slippery.” 
    Id. at 602
    (emphasis added).
    In Taiariol, the plaintiff attempted to utilize the “watch your step” sticker as
    evidence of notice for a different purpose: that the stair’s nosing was slippery. By
    contrast, Guevara argues that the “watch your step” warning sign means precisely
    what it says, and what this Court interpreted a similar warning to mean in Taiariol:
    “to caution persons on the ship that the step was there.” 
    Id. Contrary to
    the district
    court’s application of Taiariol against Guevara, we find that the similarity of the
    signs establishes a sufficient connection between the warning and the danger—the
    step down.
    NCL argues that Sorrels does not control here because the cruise line in that
    case was responsible for creating and placing the warning. But we see no
    significant distinction between a cruise line placing a warning sign and a cruise
    line having knowledge of a permanently affixed warning sign that has been present
    on its ship for years. A warning sign’s primary function is to warn of dangers.
    Whether a cruise line places the warning sign itself or becomes aware of the
    warning sign after taking ownership is of little significance.6 Both situations allow
    6
    The district court heavily relied on its previous decision in Lipkin, in which it held that a
    warning label affixed to a moving walkway off of the vessel in the port of Miami was
    insufficient to establish Norwegian’s notice because “the undisputed evidence shows that the
    walkway manufacturer, not Norwegian, affixed the warning labels, and that Miami-Dade
    County, not Norwegian, was responsible for maintenance of the 
    walkway.” 93 F. Supp. 3d at 1322
    –23. We find Lipkin distinguishable on its facts, and therefore unpersuasive. In Lipkin, the
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    for an inference that NCL had actual or constructive knowledge that the step down
    could be deceiving, and therefore dangerous, to cruise passengers. See 
    Sorrels, 796 F.3d at 1288
    .
    The district court noted that the language of the warning sign did not
    demonstrate notice of the dangerous condition posed by the step down because it
    only “generically advises passengers to ‘hold the handrail’ and ‘watch your step’
    as they climb the three steps to the landing. It does not warn of a potential danger
    associated with the small step from the landing to the deck.” At the summary
    judgment stage, however, we must view all evidence and factual inferences in
    favor of Guevara. See 
    Stephens, 749 F.3d at 1321
    . Contrary to the district court’s
    conclusion, NCL’s corporate representative testified that the warning sign was
    intended to draw passengers’ attention to the step down in the area at issue. A
    reasonable jury could conclude that the warning sign’s language applies to the step
    down, particularly where, as here, the warning sign immediately precedes the very
    step at issue and expressly warns passengers to “watch your step.” Guevara has
    thus raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding NCL’s prior notice of the
    dangerous condition posed by the step down.
    warning in question was affixed to a moving walkway off of the vessel in the port of Miami. And
    it was Miami-Dade County, not Norwegian, who was responsible for maintaining the walkway.
    It is one thing to find that a cruise line cannot be responsible for a sign that is off of the vessel—
    it is another thing entirely to rule that a cruise line is not responsible for a sign that has been
    permanently affixed on the vessel for years. In further contrast to Lipkin, NCL itself was
    responsible for maintaining the deck area in the present case.
    20
    Case: 17-14889     Date Filed: 04/01/2019      Page: 21 of 37
    NCL contends that by holding that the warning sign here put it on notice of
    the dangerous condition, we are improperly transforming cruise ship operators into
    insurers of their passengers’ safety. But NCL overstates the effect of our decision.
    We are merely holding that a cruise ship operator has notice of a condition—and
    thus a duty to warn—if a sign is posted on a ship warning about the condition.
    This decision does not mean that a cruise ship operator is automatically liable any
    time a passenger is injured in the area of the sign. After all, the cruise ship
    operator may be able to defeat the negligence claim by showing that it did not
    breach its duty to warn because the sign provided passengers with a sufficient
    warning about the dangerous condition in the area. In this case, NCL still may
    argue at trial that it is not liable because it fulfilled its duty to warn through the
    posted sign. 7
    Accordingly, we reverse and remand the district court’s ruling regarding
    Guevara’s failure to warn claim.
    ii.   Guevara’s Negligent Maintenance Claim
    Guevara argues that the district court erroneously granted summary
    judgment based on its finding that he failed to present any evidence of NCL’s
    7
    Guevara contends that he did not see the warning sign alerting him to the change in elevation
    because the bulb immediately above the sign was out. At trial, the factfinder can decide whether
    Guevara could see the sign at the time of his fall and, if Guevara could see the sign prior to
    falling, whether the warning was sufficient to satisfy NCL’s duty to warn. See Outlaw v.
    Firestone Tire & Rubber, 
    770 F.2d 1012
    , 1014 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that once a duty to
    warn is established, the adequacy of the warning is usually a question for the jury).
    21
    Case: 17-14889     Date Filed: 04/01/2019   Page: 22 of 37
    negligent maintenance of the unilluminated lightbulb. Guevara asserts that he was
    not required to present evidence of negligent maintenance because NCL did not
    present any admissible evidence of its proper maintenance of the lightbulb. We
    disagree.
    NCL may carry its burden of showing no genuine issue of material fact by
    showing “an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex
    Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 325 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 
    64 F.3d 590
    , 593 (11th Cir. 1995). In its motion for summary judgment, NCL argued
    that there was no evidence in the record establishing “a condition requiring
    maintenance or inspection of the subject deck or light fixtures, that [NCL] failed to
    maintain or inspect the subject deck or lighting fixtures, or that [NCL’s] alleged
    failure to maintain or inspect the subject deck or lighting fixtures caused
    [Guevara’s] injuries.”
    Guevara has failed to adduce evidence proving that NCL had actual or
    constructive notice that the subject lightbulb was out on the night that Guevara fell.
    Guevara does not point to any prior passenger complaints or reported issues about
    the ship’s lighting that would alert NCL to any potential safety concern. See
    Cohen v. Carnival Corp., 
    945 F. Supp. 2d 1351
    , 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (finding no
    evidence of notice where plaintiff cannot offer “any accident reports, passenger
    comment reviews or forms, or reports from safety inspections”); see also Klein v.
    22
    Case: 17-14889       Date Filed: 04/01/2019      Page: 23 of 37
    Seven Seas Cruises S. DE R.L., No. 16-21981, 
    2017 WL 3405531
    , at *4 (S.D. Fla.
    Aug. 7, 2017). Moreover, the record indicates that NCL retained four electrical
    engineers who were responsible for inspecting the lighting on the Spirit at 8:00
    a.m. and 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. each day. Given these routine inspections,8 and that
    Guevara cannot identify when the light went out, he has failed to make a sufficient
    showing that the dangerous condition was “present for a period of time so lengthy
    as to invite corrective measures.” 
    Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322
    (citing 
    Monteleone, 838 F.2d at 65
    ). Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Guevara
    failed to create a triable issue of fact on whether NCL had notice of the allegedly
    dangerous condition posed by the unilluminated lightbulb.
    IV.     Conclusion
    We affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s ruling granting
    summary judgment in favor of NCL. We affirm the district court’s orders (1)
    striking Dr. Zollo’s supplemental reports and (2) granting summary judgment on
    Guevara’s negligent maintenance claim. But we reverse and vacate the grant of
    summary judgment on Guevara’s failure to warn claim. We remand for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
    8
    NCL’s regular inspections weigh against a finding of constructive notice. See 
    Monteleone, 838 F.2d at 66
    .
    23
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    JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    I concur fully in the majority’s opinion. I write this special concurrence to
    respond in more detail to the dissent’s argument that our decision today is in
    tension with the admiralty law of this circuit.
    Plaintiff Pablo Guevara contends that defendant NCL (Bahamas), Inc. was
    negligent because it failed to warn him of a hidden step down on its cruise ship, the
    Spirit. To determine whether the district court erred in granting summary
    judgment to NCL, we must decide whether NCL owed Guevara a duty.
    Like the dissent, I begin with the premise that a cruise ship operator “is not
    liable to passengers as an insurer.” See Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc.,
    
    867 F.2d 1318
    , 1322 (11th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). But a
    cruise ship operator remains liable for its negligence and thus must exercise
    “ordinary reasonable care under the circumstances.” 
    Id. The reasonable
    care
    standard “requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the carrier have had
    actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition,” at least when the
    menace is commonly encountered on land. 
    Id. The dissent
    accepts that when a
    cruise ship operator has actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, it
    generally owes a duty to warn its passengers of that condition.
    Whether NCL had a duty to warn Guevara of the step down turns on
    whether it had notice of the dangerous condition. Guevara contends that NCL had
    24
    Case: 17-14889     Date Filed: 04/01/2019    Page: 25 of 37
    notice of the dangerous condition based on a sign installed immediately before the
    step down that cautioned “WATCH YOUR STEP.” As an initial matter, the entire
    panel agrees that a reasonable jury could find that the sign warned about the
    dangerous condition created by the step down (as opposed to some other dangerous
    condition). See Dissent at 4 (observing that the risk created by the step down
    “came with a warning”).
    The dissent nonetheless concludes that NCL had no notice of the dangerous
    condition because the ship’s manufacturer, rather than NCL, installed the sign.
    But I see no reason to require that NCL must have installed the sign for a factfinder
    to conclude that NCL had notice. A reasonable jury could infer that NCL
    understood or at least should have understood from the sign that the step down
    created a dangerous condition. After all, the dissent acknowledges, “[w]arning
    signs are meant to be seen,” 
    id., and this
    sign could be seen by the ship’s crew and
    passengers alike.
    Instead of allowing this question of fact to be decided by a jury, the dissent
    would prefer a legal rule that a cruise ship operator can be put on notice of a
    dangerous condition by a warning sign only if the ship operator installed the
    warning sign. See 
    id. at 5
    (“Because the boat came with the warning sign, [NCL]
    never took any affirmative act in connection with the alleged risk and cannot be
    held liable for it.”). The dissent’s bright-line rule would require courts to ignore
    25
    Case: 17-14889      Date Filed: 04/01/2019    Page: 26 of 37
    facts establishing that the cruise ship’s officers and crew learned or should have
    learned of the dangerous condition from the sign. Nothing in our precedent
    establishes such a rule. We have held that a cruise ship operator’s affirmative act
    of warning of a risk is sufficient to establish that it had notice of a danger. See,
    e.g., Sorrels v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 
    796 F.3d 1275
    , 1288-89 (11th Cir. 2015)
    (concluding that a cruise ship operator had notice that the ship’s pool deck could
    be slippery after rain from evidence that crew members sometimes posted warning
    signs on the pool deck after rain). But we have never held that it is necessary that
    a cruise ship operator have taken an affirmative act regarding a risk to establish
    that it had knowledge of the danger. To the contrary, we have recognized that a
    cruise ship operator may be put on notice of a danger after the dangerous condition
    causes an injury, even though the operator has taken no affirmative act. See Caron
    v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 
    910 F.3d 1359
    , 1370 (11th Cir. 2018) (accepting that that
    prior reports of similar incidents are sufficient to provide a cruise ship operator
    with notice of a dangerous condition); see generally Chimene v. Royal Caribbean
    Cruises, Ltd., No. 16-23775-CV, 
    2017 WL 8794706
    , at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14,
    2017) (concluding that cruise ship operator had notice of dangerous condition
    created by zip line from prior reports of substantially similar incidents).
    The dissent contends that our previous decision in Everett v. Carnival Cruise
    Lines, 
    912 F.2d 1355
    (11th Cir. 1990), bars us from concluding that a cruise ship
    26
    Case: 17-14889        Date Filed: 04/01/2019       Page: 27 of 37
    operator could receive notice of a dangerous condition from a sign that it did not
    install. In that case, a cruise ship passenger sustained injuries when she tripped
    over a metal threshold on the ship. 
    Id. at 1357.
    The passenger argued that the
    cruise ship operator had knowledge of the dangerous condition because it created
    and maintained the threshold. 
    Id. at 1359.
    We rejected this argument, explaining
    that accepting the passenger’s argument would effectively “defeat[]” the notice
    requirement. 
    Id. Although we
    recognized in Everett that a cruise ship operator
    does not have knowledge of a dangerous condition simply because the condition is
    present on the ship that it maintains, Everett did not address whether a warning
    posted on a cruise ship—that is, a posting identifying a condition as dangerous—
    could put the operator on notice of that dangerous condition. 1
    The majority opinion runs afoul of the rule established by Everett, the
    dissent argues, because if the warning sign put NCL on notice, it must have also
    1
    The dissent also relies on our unpublished decision in Pizzino v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.,
    709 F. App’x 563 (11th Cir. 2017) (unpublished). Like Everett, Pizzino did not address whether
    a warning sign placed by a third party can put a cruise ship operator on notice. In Pizzino, a
    passenger sued a cruise ship operator for negligence after slipping on the cruise ship’s floor. 
    Id. at 564.
    The hazard was created by water that appeared to splash out of a ship employee’s bucket.
    
    Id. at 563-64.
    After the district court instructed the jury that the passenger had to show that the
    operator had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition, the jury returned a verdict
    in favor of the cruise ship operator. 
    Id. at 564.
    The passenger appealed, arguing that the cruise
    ship operator could be held liable on the basis that its employee had created the dangerous
    condition by spilling water on the floor. 
    Id. We affirmed,
    concluding that the district court had
    properly instructed the jury that a cruise ship operator must have actual or constructive notice of
    a dangerous condition, even if it created the danger. 
    Id. at 566-67.
    There was no posted warning
    in Pizzino that arguably put the cruise ship operator on notice of the dangerous condition, so
    Pizzino did not decide or address the issue we face here.
    27
    Case: 17-14889     Date Filed: 04/01/2019   Page: 28 of 37
    put Guevara on notice, unless NCL’s ability to understand the sign differed from
    Guevara’s. And “the only thing that differentiates Guevara from [NCL],”
    according to the dissent, “is [NCL’s] operation of the Spirit.” Dissent at 6. The
    dissent glosses over another important difference between NCL and Guevara,
    however. A reasonable jury could find that NCL received notice before Guevara’s
    fall when the Spirit’s officers and crew members encountered the area with the
    sign in daylight or at night time when the sign was lit. In contrast, a reasonable
    jury could find that Guevara encountered this area just once—the night of the
    incident when the light above the sign was not lit, which made the sign unreadable.
    The dissent also asserts that NCL should not be held liable because it was
    due only to “bad luck” that the light was out and Guevara could not see the sign.
    
    Id. at 4.
    This argument addresses a different issue, though: whether, assuming
    NCL had a duty to warn, the sign was sufficient to discharge NCL’s duty. At trial,
    the jury could find that the warning sign was visible and adequately warned
    Guevara of the danger, meaning that NCL had discharged its duty to warn. But
    whether NCL gave an adequate warning, assuming it had a duty to warn, does not
    tell us whether it had notice and thus owed such a duty. See Chaparro v. Carnival
    Corp., 
    693 F.3d 1333
    , 1336 (11th Cir. 2012) (identifying duty and breach as
    separate elements of a negligence claim).
    28
    Case: 17-14889        Date Filed: 04/01/2019        Page: 29 of 37
    Returning to where it began, the dissent closes with the concern that our
    decision will make a cruise ship operator a general insurer liable for every warning
    any manufacturer places on a ship. To answer that concern, the dissent would
    adopt a bright-line rule that a cruise ship operator can never receive notice of a
    dangerous condition from a warning sign installed by a manufacturer or other third
    party. By eliminating one way in which a cruise ship operator could actually gain
    knowledge of a danger, the dissent’s approach defies common experience and
    would erode the long-standing principle of admiralty law that a cruise ship
    operator must warn its passengers of known dangerous conditions. Because
    questions of fact remain about whether the warning sign installed by the ship’s
    manufacturer put NCL on notice of the danger associated with the step down, I
    voted with the majority to allow the case to go to a jury.
    I want to emphasize that the majority’s decision today is narrow. Even
    assuming the dissent is correct that the decision means a cruise ship operator owes
    a duty to warn of any danger for which a warning is posted on a ship, 2 only in rare
    2
    Some warnings posted by third parties on a ship would be insufficient to put a cruise
    ship operator on notice of the dangerous condition identified by the warning. To take the
    dissent’s example, a sticker placed on a lamp in a cabin stateroom warning that the lamp
    becomes hot may not give the cruise ship operator actual or constructive notice of the danger.
    The question of whether such a sticker would put the cruise ship operator on notice could depend
    on factual issues such as: the access that officers and crew had to the cabin stateroom to see the
    sticker, the size of the sticker, and the location of the sticker (in this example, the warning could
    be hidden by the lamp shade). In contrast, here there is ample evidence from which a reasonable
    jury could infer that the warning sign informed NCL of the danger caused by the step down
    29
    Case: 17-14889       Date Filed: 04/01/2019      Page: 30 of 37
    cases will a passenger attempting to hold a cruise ship operator liable for a breach
    of that duty get past summary judgment. To get to trial, the passenger will have to
    come forward with evidence, not speculation, that the warning was sufficiently
    visible to put the cruise ship operator on notice yet was not visible to the
    passenger. Guevara has carried this burden given the cruise ship operator’s “bad
    luck” that the light over the sign went out, but I doubt many operators will be so
    unlucky.
    because the warning sign was large and prominently posted in a public area that was accessible
    to anyone on the ship.
    30
    Case: 17-14889     Date Filed: 04/01/2019    Page: 31 of 37
    SUTTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
    As a visiting judge, I am reluctant to quibble over the meaning of local law.
    And as a visiting judge from a largely land-locked and exclusively fresh-water
    circuit, I am especially reluctant to quibble over the meaning of admiralty law with
    judges from a circuit whose every State touches the sea. In overcoming that
    hesitation, I take some comfort in the reality that the Miami-based district court
    judge who handled this case reached the same conclusion I do and the view that
    one does not have to be a seaworthy judge to see some tension between today’s
    decision and the admiralty law of this circuit.
    Eleventh Circuit admiralty law establishes three related propositions when it
    comes to slip-and-fall accidents at sea. The first is that cruise ships are not general
    insurers of their passengers. See Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, Inc., 
    867 F.2d 1318
    , 1322 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). The second is that cruise ships may be
    liable only if they knew or should have known about the danger that caused the
    accident. 
    Id. The third
    is that such knowledge does not arise from buying and
    operating a ship with pre-existing signage about pre-existing risks. See Everett v.
    Carnival Cruise Lines, 
    912 F.2d 1355
    , 1358–59 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Malley
    v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 713 F. App’x 905, 908 (11th Cir. 2017) (per
    curiam); Pizzino v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 709 F. App’x 563, 566–67 (11th Cir.
    31
    Case: 17-14889     Date Filed: 04/01/2019   Page: 32 of 37
    2017) (per curiam); cf. Lipkin v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 
    93 F. Supp. 3d 1311
    ,
    1323 (S.D. Fla. 2015).
    Applied here, these principles should make short work of this case. On
    November 26, 2014, Pablo Guevara and his wife boarded a cruise ship, the Spirit,
    in Barcelona, Spain. Later that first night, at around 11:30 p.m., Guevara left his
    wife in the casino and went in search of the cigar lounge. The accident occurred
    on Spirit’s pool deck. Here’s the scene: Three steps lead up to a small landing,
    followed by a step down. Two pillars flank the landing. Each pillar has a light and
    a handrail; one pillar bears a sign warning pedestrians to “please use the handrail”
    and “watch your step.” R. 66-1.
    According to Guevara, the light next to the sign was out and the deck was
    wet. After he ascended the three steps, he didn’t notice the step down, tripped,
    slipped, and broke his arm.
    Guevara’s negligence complaint against Norwegian targeted three defects:
    (1) The company “[f]ailed to adequately inspect the lights in the subject area to
    make sure operational”; (2) the company “[f]ailed to warn plaintiff of the danger of
    a wet and slippery floor in the subject area”; and (3) the company “failed to warn
    of the change of level in the area.” R. 1 at 3–4.
    Each theory does not work.
    32
    Case: 17-14889     Date Filed: 04/01/2019    Page: 33 of 37
    Begin with the broken-light-bulb theory. The unrebutted evidence shows
    that Norwegian did not notice the spent light bulb, that no one identified any such
    problem before the accident, and that its employees checked the area (and the light
    bulbs) twice a day and did not see any problem. On this record, Norwegian did not
    act negligently. The majority agrees.
    Turn to the wet-deck theory. Here too Norwegian did nothing wrong, as it
    had no notice of any problem. The record does not contain any evidence of prior
    accidents on this part of the ship due to a wet deck. This thus is not a case in
    which the cruise ship identified the problem, say by putting orange cones near the
    hazard, and could be liable if its precautions did not adequately address the risk.
    Think by comparison of Horne v. Carnival Corporation, 741 F. App’x 607
    (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). A passenger sued the cruise line after high winds
    caused a door to slam and chop off part of his finger. 
    Id. at 608.
    The cruise line
    had previously “put up signs warning of strong winds” but failed to provide notice
    on the day of the accident. 
    Id. at 609.
    The prior signs, the court reasoned, could
    show that the cruise line had “notice of the hazardous condition.” 
    Id. Nor is
    this a case in which passengers had slipped on this same wet deck
    before, placing the cruise ship on notice of the danger. See Sorrels v. NCL
    (Bahamas) Ltd., 
    796 F.3d 1275
    , 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2015). No evidence of any
    such accidents appears in the record. Apparently appreciating these gaps in this
    33
    Case: 17-14889     Date Filed: 04/01/2019   Page: 34 of 37
    theory of liability, Guevara does not develop on appeal his claim premised on a
    wet deck, which explains why the court (correctly) does not address it.
    That leaves the last theory—that Norwegian did not adequately warn of the
    risk from the step down. But that’s the least plausible theory of the three. It takes
    up the one risk that night (a drop down in the steps) that came with a warning (a
    “please use the handrail” and “watch your step” sign). It involves a risk and a
    warning sign that predated Norwegian’s ownership of the cruise ship. And it
    involves a warning sign that by Guevara’s own admission could not be seen given
    the broken light. For many of the reasons that Judge Kathleen Williams rejected
    this claim as a matter of law, so would I.
    Start with a problem of Guevara’s making. By his own account, Guevara
    could not see the sign “because the bulb immediately above the sign was not
    functioning.” Appellant’s Br. 6; 
    id. at 36
    (“[T]he light on the pedestal just above
    the warning sign was out.”); see also Reply Br. 6 (“The sign is clearly visible in
    daylight, or at night with appropriate lighting.”). Warning signs are meant to be
    seen. Just as arguments are meant to be heard. And briefs and opinions are meant
    to be read. The law does not hold parties liable for signs that, by a claimant’s own
    account, cannot be seen. I am not aware of any case from any court that holds a
    property owner liable for posting an inadequate warning sign when the source of
    the inadequacy—darkness—turned on bad luck, not the negligence of the owner.
    34
    Case: 17-14889    Date Filed: 04/01/2019   Page: 35 of 37
    Guevara never acknowledges, much less fills, this yawning gap in his theory of the
    case.
    No less importantly, Norwegian had nothing to do with the sign. It came
    with the boat. And no evidence shows that the sign did not do its job. The record
    does not contain any evidence of prior accidents during the day based on the step
    down or accidents during the night (whether the light worked or not) based on the
    step down. Because the boat came with the warning sign, Norwegian never took
    any affirmative act in connection with the alleged risk and cannot be held liable for
    it. See Horne, 741 F. App’x at 609; 
    Sorrels, 796 F.3d at 1287
    –88.
    Last of all, precedent does not allow us to hold that Norwegian knew about
    the sign and realized that the step was dangerous simply because Norwegian
    bought and operated the vessel. See 
    Everett, 912 F.2d at 1359
    . That’s simply
    another way of making Norwegian a general insurer—liable for all risks of running
    a cruise ship and transporting passengers—which is just what this court’s decisions
    foreclose. See 
    Keefe, 867 F.2d at 1322
    .
    Everett v. Carnival Cruise Lines illustrates the point. 912 F. App’x 1355
    (11th Cir. 1990). A passenger tripped over a metal door threshold. 
    Id. at 1357.
    She argued that she did not need to prove the cruise line knew about the threshold
    because the cruise line “created the threshold and maintained it. In other words,
    [the shipowner] should have known that there was a danger of passenger injury
    35
    Case: 17-14889      Date Filed: 04/01/2019    Page: 36 of 37
    because it was the owner and operator of the ship.” 
    Id. at 1359.
    The court rejected
    the theory as a matter of law, holding that it would “defeat[]” the point of having a
    notice requirement and the point of “limit[ing] . . . the shipowner’s liability” so that
    it was not a general insurer of its passengers. 
    Id. Pizzino v.
    NCL (Bahamas) Ltd. is of a piece. 709 F. App’x 563 (11th Cir.
    2017) (per curiam). A crew member spilled water on the deck, and the Eleventh
    Circuit re-affirmed that operation of a ship alone does not create notice. 
    Id. at 564–66.
    Something more is required—namely that the passenger prove that the
    shipowner knew about the danger. 
    Id. at 565.
    Size up this aspect of Guevara’s argument—that the pre-existing warning
    sign gave Norwegian notice of this risk—from another direction. If it’s fair to say
    that the warning sign put Norwegian on notice of the danger posed by the step
    down, the sign also must have made Guevara aware of the danger as well—unless
    daylight exists between Guevara’s ability to understand the sign and Norwegian’s.
    But the only thing that differentiates Guevara from Norwegian is Norwegian’s
    operation of the Spirit. And we cannot attribute notice to a shipowner simply
    because it operates a ship, as case after case from this circuit says. 
    See supra
    .
    Any other approach to this case will make shipowners liable for every
    warning that a manufacturer places on any part of the ship. Imagine a
    manufacturer who places a sticker on lamps in cabin bedrooms, warning patrons
    36
    Case: 17-14889     Date Filed: 04/01/2019   Page: 37 of 37
    that they can become hot to the touch. Or a manufacturer who warns that children
    might suffocate if they play with the plastic trash bags in cabin bathrooms. Under
    the majority’s rule, the cruise line now possesses constructive notice of these
    dangers and can become liable to the first passenger who burns himself or the first
    child who asphyxiates. Cruise ships are floating cities, and these types of scenarios
    end only when the horizon does.
    That Norwegian may argue at trial that this sign fulfilled its duty to warn and
    thus may still prevail, as the court points out, offers cold comfort to this shipowner
    and any other. All that means is that in some number of cases juries will not treat
    shipowners as general insurers and in some number of cases they will. But never,
    not sometimes, is the point of the court’s steadfast commitment to declining to
    make shipowners the general insurers of their passengers. That is a rule of law, not
    a rule of fact.
    I respectfully dissent.
    37