United States v. Manuel Valles Carrasco ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-12514
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00342-TWT-AJB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MANUEL VALLES CARRASCO,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(January 8, 2015)
Before HULL, ROSENBAUM, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
Manuel Carrasco appeals his total 33-month sentence, imposed at the low
end of the advisory guideline range, after pleading guilty to one count of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, five counts of
aiding and abetting and wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2, and five
counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Briefly stated, Carrasco
argues that a within-guideline sentence was substantively unreasonable in this case
because it failed to take into account adequately his status as a first-time offender
and the collateral consequences he will suffer as a result of his immigration status.
Carrasco specifically asserts that he will lose his permanent resident status and will
be ineligible for release into a halfway house.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591,
169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden
of showing that it is unreasonable in the light of the record and the § 3553(a)
factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
The district court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater
than necessary” to comply with the purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2), including the need to promote respect for the law, provide just
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punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from
further crimes of the defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a
particular sentence, the court must additionally consider the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, any relevant policy
statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted
disparities in sentencing, and the need to provide restitution to victims. Id.§ 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). The weight given to any particular factor is committed to the
sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743
(11th Cir. 2007). We will remand, however, if we are “left with the definite and
firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
weighing the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th
Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Although we do not presume that a sentence falling within the guideline
range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. United
States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). A sentence imposed well
below the statutory maximum penalty also suggests that the sentence is reasonable.
See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that
a within-guideline sentence was reasonable in part because it was well below the
statutory maximum).
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Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining
Carrasco’s request for a downward variance. Carrasco’s sentence was within the
guideline range and substantially below the statutory maximum. The district court
considered and spoke to the collateral-consequences arguments. Carrasco’s
sentence reflected the seriousness of the offense and impact on the victims, the
disparity in culpability between Carrasco and his codefendant, and Carrasco’s
history and characteristics. Carrasco’s sentence was reasonable in the light of the
§ 3553(a) factors, and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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