United States v. Jean Louis , 602 F. App'x 728 ( 2015 )

Case: 14-11420 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-11420
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20525-DMM-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JEAN LOUIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(February 19, 2015)
Before HULL, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 14-11420 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 Page: 2 of 10
Jean Louis appeals his convictions for filing a false, fictitious, and fraudulent
income tax return, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 287, and wire fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1343. He argues that the district court erred in
failing to grant his motion for judgment of acquittal because the government failed
to present sufficient evidence of his “intent” or “knowledge” to sustain his
convictions, as his codefendant was the “driving force” in the offense and he was
simply an “unknowing dupe.” He also contends that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress his post-arrest statements because he did not
sufficiently understand the English language to voluntarily waive his Miranda 1
rights. Finally, he argues that the district court erred by failing to grant his request
for a recess to obtain the transcript of a witness’s testimony at a prior trial for
impeachment purposes.
I.
We review de novo a challenge to the denial of a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal based on
sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds. United States v. Capers, 708 F.3d 1286,
1296 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 145 (2013). Arguments raised for the first
time on appeal, however, are reviewed for plain error. See United States v.
Hunerlach, 197 F.3d 1059, 1068-69 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting that plain-error
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
2
Case: 14-11420 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 Page: 3 of 10
review applies even when a defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on
sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds but failed to articulate at that time the specific
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim later raised on appeal). After the Government’s
case in chief, Louis argued that judgment of acquittal should be granted,
specifically because the Government failed to identify Louis as the “Louis”
identified by the witnesses in this case. On appeal, he argues that he lacked
knowledge or intent and that Duverger was the one that committed the crimes.
Therefore, his specific arguments on appeal regarding insufficient evidence are
reviewed for plain error. To show plain error, the defendant must show (1) an
error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affected his substantial rights. United States v.
Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007). If the defendant satisfies the three
conditions, we may exercise our discretion to recognize the error if it “seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government, with all inferences and credibility choices
made in the government’s favor, and affirm the conviction if, based on the
evidence, a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Capers, 708 F.3d at 1296-97. “The evidence need not be
inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis except guilt, and the jury is free to
choose between or among the reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the
3
Case: 14-11420 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 Page: 4 of 10
evidence presented at trial,” but when the evidence is only circumstantial,
reasonable inferences must support the conviction, not mere speculation. Id.
at 1297 (citation omitted).
“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.” 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). Under § 2, aiding and abetting is not a separate
federal crime, “but rather an alternative charge that permits one to be found guilty
as a principal for aiding or procuring someone else to commit the offense.” United
States v. Martin, 747 F.2d 1404, 1407 (11th Cir. 1984). A defendant can be
properly convicted as a principal even when he has not personally committed all of
the acts constituting the elements of the substantive crime. Id. Thus, to convict
under a theory of aiding and abetting, the government must prove that: (1) the
substantive offense was committed by someone; (2) the defendant contributed to
and furthered the offense; and (3) the defendant intended to aid in its commission.
United States v. Tagg, 572 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2009).
To sustain a conviction for the substantive offense of making a false claim to
the government under § 287, the government must prove: “(1) the [d]efendant
knowingly presented a false claim against the United States to an agency of the
United States; (2) the claim was based on a false or fraudulent material fact; and
(3) the [d]efendant acted intentionally and knew that the claim was false and
4
Case: 14-11420 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 Page: 5 of 10
fraudulent.” Eleventh Cir. Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases), Offense
Instruction 11.2 (2010).
To establish wire fraud pursuant to § 1343, the government has to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) intentionally participated in a
scheme to defraud; and (2) used the interstate wires in furtherance of that scheme.
United States v. Robertson, 493 F.3d 1322, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007).
The district court did not plainly err in denying Louis’s motion for judgment
of acquittal because the government presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find
Louis guilty of filing a false tax return and wire fraud either as a principal or under
an aiding-and-abetting theory. First, the government presented sufficient evidence
to sustain convictions of the substantive offenses charged in the indictment. As to
his filing a false, fictitious, or fraudulent tax return charge under § 287, Louis does
not challenge that a false or fraudulent claim was presented to the government, but
rather only challenges that he did not present the claim “intentionally” or
“knowingly.” Although Louis suggests that he was not the tax preparer and was
unaware that Duverger filed the false or fraudulent tax return in his name,
sufficient evidence established that Louis acted intentionally and knew that his
claim was false and fraudulent. Detective Fagan testified that Louis admitted to
the police that he had prepared the tax return and that Duverger had only helped
him. Louis stated that the income was from his business, rather than from Warner
5
Case: 14-11420 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 Page: 6 of 10
Brothers Distribution Company, which was indicated as his employer on the
return, and admitted that $9.8 million may have been slightly inflated. Thus, a jury
could have reasonably concluded that Louis filed the return and that he knew it
was false. Capers, 708 F.3d at 1297. A reasonable jury also could have found that
Louis was more than an “unknowing dupe” in the fraud scheme because evidence
showed that he had incorporated JLL Multi Services, opened the Citibank account
in his business’s name, lied to Citibank concerning that account, lied to the police
about the source of the $600,000 deposit to the account, and began to attempt to
withdraw money immediately after the tax refund had been deposited. Granting
the government all reasonable inferences, this evidence was sufficient for a
reasonable jury to find that Louis knowingly participated in the scheme to defraud
the IRS. Capers, 708 F.3d at 1296-97.
The trial evidence also sufficiently supported a wire fraud conviction under
§ 1343. On appeal, Louis does not challenge the existence of wire fraud scheme or
that the scheme included the use of interstate wires, but rather argues that he did
not “intentionally” participate in the scheme and that he did not have knowledge of
Duverger’s wire communications or “the equipment capable of filing such returns”
electronically. His arguments are unavailing. As discussed above, the evidence at
trial was sufficient to establish that Louis intentionally participated in the scheme
to defraud the IRS, establishing the first element of the offense. Robertson, 493
6
Case: 14-11420 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 Page: 7 of 10
F.3d at 1331. Also, the standard does not require knowledge or proof that the
defendant had the equipment to electronically file tax returns, but rather requires
that the defendant simply used the interstate wires in furtherance of that scheme.
Robertson, 493 F.3d at 1331. The evidence showed that the tax return was filed
electronically, and that Louis admitted that he filed it, sufficiently establishing the
second element of the offense. Robertson, 493 F.3d at 1331.
Moreover, the evidence also was sufficient for the jury to convict Louis of
aiding and abetting Duverger in committing the offenses. Louis’s argument that
Duverger “was the driving force in this matter” is irrelevant, because the
government was not required to prove that Louis himself committed the
substantive crimes under an aiding-and-abetting theory, and the government
presented sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Lewis intended to aid
Duverger in the criminal scheme, as discussed above. Tagg, 572 F.3d at 1324.
II.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress as a mixed
question of law and fact. United States v. Ransfer, 749 F.3d 914, 921 (11th Cir.
2014). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its
application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. Facts are construed in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party in the district court. Id.7
Case: 14-11420 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 Page: 8 of 10
Under the Fifth Amendment, “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. Miranda
protects a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by
requiring that law enforcement officers advise the defendant subject to custodial
interrogation of certain rights and to respect the defendant’s invocation of those
rights. United States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1318 (11th Cir. 2010). We
conduct a two-part inquiry when determining the admissibility of a post-arrest
statement. Id. at 1317-18. First, we decide whether the law enforcement officer
complied with Miranda. Id. at 1318. If so, we determine whether the confession
was voluntary. Id. A defendant may waive his Miranda rights if the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Id. Voluntariness requires that the
waiver must be the result of a free and deliberate choice, rather than intimidation,
deception, or coercion. Id. The waiver must be made with full awareness of the
nature of the rights being waived and the consequences of that decision. Id. A
court may conclude that a person waived his Miranda rights only if the totality of
the circumstances demonstrates both a free choice and the requisite level of
comprehension. Id. A written waiver is usually strong proof of the validity of that
waiver. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60
L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). We have held that, “[i]n determining whether an individual
has sufficient comprehension of English to provide voluntary consent [to a vehicle
8
Case: 14-11420 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 Page: 9 of 10
search], courts examine his ability to interact intelligently with the police.” United
States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1242 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that consent
was voluntary where there was “no evidence that [the defendant] was confused by,
or did not understand, any of [the officer]’s questions”).
The district court did not err in denying Louis’s motion to suppress his
post-arrest statements because it properly determined that the interviewing agent’s
testimony that Louis had stated that he could read, write, and understand English
and was comfortable speaking in English, was credible. Viewing that finding in
the light most favorable to the government, Louis understood English, and,
therefore, the waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary.
III.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a continuance for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Valladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir.
2008). The denial of a continuance to further investigate the case or a witness
must be upheld unless the defendant can show a specific and substantial prejudice.
United States v. Gossett, 877 F.2d 901, 906 (11th Cir. 1993). To make a showing
of specific and substantial prejudice necessary to obtain relief, the defendant must
identify something in the record that would indicate the possibility of a different
outcome if the continuance had been granted. Id.9
Case: 14-11420 Date Filed: 02/19/2015 Page: 10 of 10
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a recess for
Louis to acquire the transcript of a witness’s testimony from a prior trial because
Louis failed to show that the denial resulted in specific and substantial prejudice,
as he cited nothing in the record that indicated the possibility of a different
outcome if the recess had been granted.
IV.
Finally, we independently note that the written judgment contains
scrivener’s errors because it omits any reference to aiding and abetting under § 2
from each listed offense of conviction.
Upon review of the entire record on appeal, and after consideration of the
parties’ briefs, we affirm Louis’s convictions, but remand for the limited purpose
of correcting the scrivener’s errors in the written judgment.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REMANDED IN PART.
10