United States v. Mario Rapalo-Sarmiento ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •            Case: 18-13180   Date Filed: 04/09/2019   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-13180
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-20736-DMM-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    MARIO RAPALO-SARMIENTO,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 9, 2019)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 18-13180     Date Filed: 04/09/2019   Page: 2 of 6
    Mario Rapalo-Sarmiento appeals the substantive reasonableness of his
    18-month sentence imposed after he was convicted of illegal reentry after removal
    in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). He argues the district court failed to consider
    and properly weigh threats and violence he experienced at the hands of MS-13, a
    prominent gang in Honduras, that prompted him to illegally enter, reenter, and
    commit crimes in the United States. After careful review, we affirm.
    I.
    Rapalo-Sarmiento is a native and citizen of Honduras. In 1998, he illegally
    entered the United States and, in 2003, was convicted of possession or purchase of
    narcotics in California. He was removed twice from the United States, once in
    May 2003 and again March 2004. After returning a third time, Rapalo-Sarmiento
    was arrested on August 2015 in Florida on charges of cocaine trafficking and
    money laundering. He was found guilty of these charges and sentenced to three
    years in Florida state prison. He was released on May 1, 2018. Federal authorities
    then arrested Rapalo-Sarmiento on May 21, 2018 and charged him with one count
    of illegal reentry after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(2).
    Rapalo-Sarmiento pled guilty to the charge of illegal reentry after removal, and the
    modified sentencing report recommended a sentence of 15 to 21 months based on
    the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
    2
    Case: 18-13180     Date Filed: 04/09/2019    Page: 3 of 6
    At sentencing, Rapalo-Sarmiento moved for a downward variance to time
    served—approximately two months. He argued the district court should vary
    downward because his previous drug-related offenses and illegal entry and reentry
    into the United States were caused by violence and duress he experienced by MS-
    13. He explained he first entered the United States illegally to escape MS-13 after
    they shot him in the foot and leg as punishment for refusing to join. Once he came
    to the United States, Rapalo-Sarmiento committed a drug offense at the behest of
    MS-13 members in California. He informed the district court that after he was
    removed to Honduras, members of MS-13 “entered his home, held him at
    gunpoint, removed his clothing and belongings from him, and threatened to kill
    him.” He proffered to the district court an untranslated, uncertified record
    corroborating his account of the attack after his removal. The district court did not
    make the document part of the sentencing record. Because of this attack, Rapalo-
    Sarmiento says he illegally returned to the United States. He explained to the
    district court that his 2015 offense occurred only because MS-13 members who
    were on the “lookout for him.” While serving his prison sentence for his 2015
    conviction, members of MS-13 stabbed him five times “for leaving [Honduras].”
    After hearing Rapalo-Sarmiento’s argument and the government’s rebuttal,
    the district court imposed a sentence of 18-months imprisonment. In reaching its
    determination, the district court stated it was “apparent . . . that Mr. Rapalo-
    3
    Case: 18-13180     Date Filed: 04/09/2019    Page: 4 of 6
    Sarmiento ha[d] faced difficulties in his home county and that perhaps it followed
    him here” to the United States. But the district court also noted Rapalo-Sarmiento
    had two previous narcotics convictions in the United States and, as a result, a
    sentence “within the guideline range [was] appropriate.” Rapalo-Sarmiento now
    appeals his 18-months sentence, arguing that it was substantively unreasonable in
    light of the context of his illegal reentry and criminal history.
    II.
    We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential
    abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 41, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 591 (2007). The district must consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
    § 3553(a), which include, in relevant part, the “nature and circumstances of the
    offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” when determining a
    reasonable sentence. United States v. Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1198 (11th Cir. 2010)
    (en banc) (quotation marks omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it
    (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight,
    (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a
    clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” 
    Id. at 1189
    (quotation
    marks omitted). “The party challenging a sentence has the burden of showing that
    the sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the § 3553(a) factors, and
    4
    Case: 18-13180     Date Filed: 04/09/2019    Page: 5 of 6
    the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” United States v. Rosales-
    Bruno, 
    789 F.3d 1249
    , 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
    III.
    Rapalo-Sarmiento argues the district court abused its discretion because his
    sentence is greater than necessary to achieve the purpose of § 3553(a). He
    contends the district court failed to consider and “accord proper weight to the
    threats of violence that animated his entries into the United States and the coercion
    underlying his commission of offenses while present in the United States.”
    Rapalo-Sarmiento’s argument is premised on the language found in
    § 3553(a), which states “[t]he court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not
    greater than necessary” to achieve the statute’s purposes. See 18 U.S.C.
    § 3553(a)(2) (listing permissible considerations in fashioning a sentence). This
    Court has interpreted this language to require sentences that are “not too short and
    not too long.” See 
    Irey, 612 F.3d at 1197
    . This Court has also held how much
    weight each § 3553(a) factor receives “is a matter committed to the sound
    discretion of the district court.” United States v. Kuhlman, 
    711 F.3d 1321
    , 1327
    (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). As a result, this Court cannot
    substitute its judgment for that of the district court in weighing the relevant
    § 3553(a) factors. 
    Id. “[S]ignificant reliance
    on a single factor does not
    necessarily render a sentence unreasonable.” 
    Id. 5 Case:
    18-13180   Date Filed: 04/09/2019   Page: 6 of 6
    The district court considered Rapalo-Sarmiento’s circumstances and the
    context of his criminal history. Although the district court did not make the
    Honduran document part of the sentencing record, it still considered the relevant
    context for his crimes. Indeed, the district court acknowledged that Rapalo-
    Sarmiento faced “difficulties” in Honduras that “perhaps . . . followed him” to the
    United States.
    Balancing the circumstances of Rapalo-Sarmiento’s crimes and background
    with the nature of his narcotics offenses, the district court found that a sentence
    within the guideline range was appropriate. While the district court may have
    weighted his two narcotics offenses significantly more than the context of his
    offenses, we cannot say this amounted to an abuse of discretion. See 
    Kuhlman, 711 F.3d at 1327
    . We therefore hold that Rapalo-Sarmiento’s sentence was
    substantively reasonable.
    AFFIRMED.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-13180

Filed Date: 4/9/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021