United States v. Travis Antwan Roberson , 615 F. App'x 648 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-15089
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:14-cr-00100-BAE-GRS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TRAVIS ANTWAN ROBERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(September 2, 2015)
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Travis Antwan Roberson appeals his 96-month sentence, imposed above the
guideline sentence of 60 months, after pleading guilty to one count of carrying
firearms during or in relation to drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
On appeal, Roberson argues that the district court did not properly explain its
reasoning in imposing the upward variance and that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable in light of the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). He argues
that his sentence created an unwarranted sentence disparity between himself and
his similarly situated co-conspirator, Caitlin Pool, who was sentenced in state
court. Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591
(2007). The party challenging the sentence carries the burden to show substantive
unreasonableness in light of the record and the factors contained in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error and then examine whether
the sentence was substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the
circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Generally, when the district
court considers the factors of § 3553(a), it need not discuss each of them. United
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States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784,786 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007). An acknowledgment
by the district court that it has considered the defendant’s arguments and the
factors in § 3553(a) is sufficient. Id.
The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court. United States v. Garza-Mendez, 735 F.3d 1284,
1290 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 54 (2014). A court can abuse its
discretion when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant
weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3)
commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). While
unjustified reliance on a single § 3553(a) factor may be a symptom of an
unreasonable sentence, such a sentence is not necessarily unreasonable. United
States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008).
Roberson’s 96-month sentence is reasonable. The district court did not
make any procedural errors in its explanation of its reasoning in imposing an
upward variance above the guideline sentence. Further, Roberson does not meet
his burden of proof in showing that the district court abused its discretion when
weighing the factors contained within 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Tome, 611 F.3d at
1378. While the district court did attach significant weight to Roberson’s criminal
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history, the weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court. Garza-Mendez, 735 F.3d at 1284.
Finally, Roberson has not demonstrated that his sentence violates
§ 3553(a)(6) in light of the sentence the state court imposed on Roberson’s co-
conspirator, Pool. Pool’s conviction was never introduced into the record before
the district court, and as such, we decline to consider this evidence on appeal. See
CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“We rarely enlarge the record on appeal to include material not before the district
court which has labored without the benefit of the proffered material.”). Even
assuming, arguendo, that Pool’s conviction were in the record, Roberson has not
demonstrated that her culpability is similar to his. Moreover, it is clear she is not
similarly situated to Roberson, a federal defendant, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(6). See United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1102 (11th Cir. 2009).
Section 3553(a)(6) only addresses unwarranted disparities in sentences among
federal defendants. Id. (citing United States v. Willis, 139 F.3d 811, 812 (11th Cir.
1998)).
Accordingly, we affirm the sentence as reasonable. 1
AFFIRMED.
1
We reject Roberson’s remaining arguments without need for further discussion.
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