Joseph Llewellyn Worrell v. Emigrant Mortgage Company ( 2019 )


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  •            Case: 18-10415   Date Filed: 04/15/2019   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-10415
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket Nos. 9:16-cv-81993-KAM; 9:16-bkc-01046-EPK
    In re: JOSEPH LLEWELLYN WORRELL,
    Debtor
    _____________________________________
    JOSEPH LLEWELLYN WORRELL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    EMIGRANT MORTGAGE COMPANY,
    RETAINED REALTY, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 15, 2019)
    Case: 18-10415       Date Filed: 04/15/2019      Page: 2 of 4
    Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Joseph Worrell, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s sua
    sponte dismissal of his bankruptcy appeal for failure to prosecute.
    We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s order dismissing a
    bankruptcy appeal on procedural grounds. See In re Pyramid Mobile Homes, Inc.,
    
    531 F.2d 743
    , 746 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). 1
    We read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, but issues not briefed on
    appeal by a pro se litigant are abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 
    518 F.3d 870
    , 874
    (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). A litigant also abandons his claim by making only
    passing references to it or failing to support it with arguments and authority.
    Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 
    739 F.3d 678
    , 681 (11th Cir. 2014).
    Further, we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s
    reply brief. 
    Timson, 518 F.3d at 874
    (citation omitted). Pro se litigants are also
    required to conform to procedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 
    490 F.3d 826
    , 829
    (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
    In bankruptcy appeals to the district court, the appellant must file a brief
    within 30 days after the docketing of notice that the record has been transmitted,
    unless the district court specifies different time limits. Fed. R. Bankr. P.
    1
    See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    (11th Cir. 1981).
    2
    Case: 18-10415    Date Filed: 04/15/2019     Page: 3 of 4
    8018(a)(1). If the appellant fails to timely file a brief, the district court may
    dismiss the appeal on its own motion after notice. 
    Id. 8018(a)(4). In
    the
    bankruptcy context, we have explained that filing briefs, unlike filing a notice of
    appeal, is not a jurisdictional prerequisite; accordingly, a showing of bad faith,
    negligence, or indifference is necessary to a determination that dismissal is
    appropriate for failure to file a brief. In re Beverly Mfg. Corp., 
    778 F.2d 666
    , 667
    (11th Cir. 1985) (interpreting former Bankruptcy Rule 8009(a)(1), requiring timely
    filing of briefs).
    Worrell has abandoned any claim that the district court abused its discretion
    in dismissing his appeal for failure to prosecute on the ground that he filed his
    initial brief almost seven months late. Even reading his opening brief in this Court
    liberally, Worrell has not raised any argument as to the district court’s dismissal of
    his appeal for failure to prosecution, let alone any argument that his failure to
    prosecute was not negligent, indifferent, or done in bad faith. Instead, he has
    raised arguments pertaining only to the lawfulness of the foreclosure sale of his
    home. Although Worrell contends in his reply brief that the district court’s
    dismissal was improper because any delay was caused by the court, not him, we
    will not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief, even from a
    pro se litigant. 
    Timson, 518 F.3d at 874
    .
    3
    Case: 18-10415     Date Filed: 04/15/2019    Page: 4 of 4
    Moreover, even if we were to conclude that Worrell had not abandoned his
    position, we would hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    determining that he had demonstrated indifference and negligence by (1) filing his
    initial district court brief almost seven months late, (2) ignoring the district court’s
    initial order to explain the delay and show cause why his appeal should not be
    dismissed for failure to prosecute, and then (3) failing for five months to respond to
    the court’s second show-cause order. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
    4