Case: 17-13128 Date Filed: 04/16/2019 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-13128
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-20178-KMW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HUBERT YOUTE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 16, 2019)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Hubert Youte appeals his conviction for making a false statement to a U.S.
customs official. He raises arguments about the reasonableness of the search of his
Case: 17-13128 Date Filed: 04/16/2019 Page: 2 of 9
shipboard quarters, the adequacy of his Miranda warnings, and the sufficiency of
the evidence to convict him. Because we conclude that these arguments fail, we
affirm.
Youte, a national of Haiti whose first language is Haitian Creole, was an
able seaman on board a freighter docked in Miami. When U.S. customs officials
arrived to conduct a routine outbound inspection of the freighter, customs agent
Angel Rodriguez remembered Youte from previous inspections and thought his
demeanor seemed odd this time. According to Rodriguez’s later testimony, Youte
looked upset that customs officials were on board. Rodriguez questioned Youte in
Youte’s cabin in English and had no difficulty conversing. After Youte told
Rodriguez that everything in the cabin was his, Rodriguez asked him if he was
carrying more than $10,000. Youte said no. When asked how much money he did
have, Youte produced about $2,000 from a pillowcase. Asked if he had any more
money, Youte produced $42 from his shirt pocket. Asked again, he produced $200
from a pair of jeans lying nearby. Rodriguez then asked three more times if Youte
had disclosed all of the money he had, and Youte said yes. Rodriguez and his
partner searched Youte’s cabin and discovered a Tide detergent box, taped shut
with a lot of clear tape. They cut the box open and found it contained $36,930 in
cash. Youte immediately began to repeat, “Talk to Jeff,” and the officers escorted
him off the ship.
2
Case: 17-13128 Date Filed: 04/16/2019 Page: 3 of 9
In the customs office, Youte was interviewed by three agents including
Jacque Philippe, who is a native speaker of Haitian Creole but is not trained as a
translator. Youte told Philippe that he did not know how to write, that he did not
know how to speak English, and that he only spoke Creole. Philippe then read
Youte his Miranda rights in Creole by extemporaneously translating the English
waiver form, since the Creole form was unavailable. Philippe paused several times
to ask Youte whether he understood; Youte said he did and marked the waiver
form. Youte then agreed to speak with the agents. He told them that he knew that
the Tide box contained money and that he was bringing it to Haiti at the request of
a former coworker named Jeff, who was flying to Haiti and planned to receive the
box from Youte there.
Youte was charged with bulk cash smuggling,
31 U.S.C. § 5332(a), and
making a false statement,
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). Before trial, Youte
unsuccessfully moved to suppress the cash and his post-Miranda statements. After
the government presented its evidence at trial, the district court granted Youte’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal on the cash smuggling charge, finding that the
government had not proved Youte’s knowledge of the currency reporting
requirement, an essential element of the crime. 1 The jury convicted Youte on the
1
See
31 U.S.C. § 5332(a)(1) (requiring “intent to evade a currency reporting requirement under
section 5316”). A report is required when a person knowingly transports “monetary instruments
3
Case: 17-13128 Date Filed: 04/16/2019 Page: 4 of 9
false statement charge. He was sentenced to time served, and he lost his work visa
as a result of the conviction. This is Youte’s appeal.
Youte first argues that the currency evidence should have been suppressed as
the fruit of an unreasonable search. He asserts that the customs officials lacked
reasonable suspicion to enter and search his living quarters on board the vessel. We
review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence under a mixed standard of
review: the district court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, while its
application of the law is reviewed de novo. United States v. Pierre,
825 F.3d 1183,
1191 (11th Cir. 2016).
As Youte acknowledges, his position is foreclosed by our precedent in
United States v. Alfaro-Moncada,
607 F.3d 720 (11th Cir. 2010). In that case we
held that, under the border search exception, 2 searches of a crew member’s
onboard cabin at the U.S. border do not require reasonable suspicion.
Id. at 728–
32. Under our prior panel precedent rule, we are bound by our published decisions
that have not been overruled by the Supreme Court or our en banc Court. United
of more than $10,000 at one time . . . from a place in the United States to or through a place
outside the United States.”
31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)(A).
2
“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s balance of reasonableness is qualitatively different at the
international border . . . . Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject
to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant.” United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
4
Case: 17-13128 Date Filed: 04/16/2019 Page: 5 of 9
States v. Romo-Villalobos,
674 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the
district court did not err in denying Youte’s motion to suppress on these grounds.
Second, Youte argues that his post-Miranda statements should have been
suppressed because the poorly translated Miranda warnings he received were
inadequate. Again, we review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of
law de novo. United States v. Barbour,
70 F.3d 580, 584 (11th Cir. 1995). We
assess the “‘totality of the circumstances,’ construing the facts in the light most
favorable to the party prevailing below.”
Id. (quoting Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S.
707, 725 (1979)).
We conclude that the warnings Youte received were adequate under
Miranda, which announced that, before questioning, an individual must be warned
“that he has the right to remain silent,” “that anything said can and will be used
against the individual in court,” “that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and
to have the lawyer with him during interrogation,” and “that if he is indigent a
lawyer will be appointed to represent him.” Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,
467–68, 469, 471, 473 (1966). The Supreme Court has clarified that Miranda
requires not a “talismanic incantation” but rather that the warnings “reasonably
‘conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.’” Duckworth v. Eagan,
492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (quoting California v. Prysock,
453 U.S. 355, 359, 361
5
Case: 17-13128 Date Filed: 04/16/2019 Page: 6 of 9
(1981)) (alterations in original). The warnings given to Youte in Creole met this
standard.
Youte argues that he was not adequately warned that his statements could be
used against him in court because Philippe translated that part of the warning
incompletely. According to the interview transcript and its translation, Philippe
said, “Nan pot bagay ou di nou . . . Nou ka used li nan kot, nan tribinal la,” to
convey, “Anything you tell us . . . We can use it in court.” He did not translate used
into Creole and he did not specifically say that Youte’s statements could be used
against him in court. We find, however, that neither shortcoming of the translation
was fatal to conveying the relevant information, since Youte repeatedly told his
interviewers that he understood and never appeared confused or asked for
clarification.3 Miranda itself instructs that this part of the warning “is needed in
order to make him aware not only of the privilege [against self-incrimination], but
also of the consequences of forgoing it.”
384 U.S. at 469. Agent Philippe’s
statement adequately conveyed those consequences.
Youte also argues that he was not adequately warned that he was
unconditionally entitled to have a lawyer with him during interrogation. Agent
Philippe stated in Creole, “You have the right to contact an attorney before you
3
His understanding may reasonably be explained by the district court’s factual finding, not
clearly erroneous, that Youte understood some spoken English, as evidenced by Youte’s
interactions and conversation in English with Rodriguez on board the ship.
6
Case: 17-13128 Date Filed: 04/16/2019 Page: 7 of 9
make any statements.4. . . You have the right to have an attorney present with you
while being questioned. . . . If you cannot pay an attorney yourself . . . they will
appoint you one before if you need one. [Umm] If you want.” We find that any
ambiguities or misstatements in Philippe’s translation were immediately corrected.
If translating “consult” as “contact” was misleading, the “right to have an attorney
present with you while being questioned” clarified the statement. And although “if
you need” an attorney was improper, it was immediately corrected to “if you
want.”
Thus, despite the inelegant translation by Agent Philippe, neither of these
two requisite components of a Miranda warning was lacking. Cf. United States v.
Street,
472 F.3d 1298, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2006) (warnings were inadequate where
neither how statements might be used nor whether counsel would be appointed
were mentioned at all). A suspect’s difficulties with English do not preclude the
possibility of receiving adequate Miranda warnings, especially when he
unequivocally states that he understands the rights of which he has been informed.
United States v. Boon San Chong,
829 F.2d 1572, 1573–74 (11th Cir. 1987)
(defendant was able to read rights waiver form in native language and indicated
that he understood). Given that the Supreme Court “has not dictated the words in
4
Youte argues that Philippe here corrected himself and said, “After you give us any statements.”
It is not clear from the transcript, however, that this alteration was meant as a correction. In any
case, Philippe’s next statement, “You have the right to have an attorney present while being
questioned,” correctly stated Youte’s right to consult with an attorney and have him present with
him during interrogation as required by Miranda.
7
Case: 17-13128 Date Filed: 04/16/2019 Page: 8 of 9
which the essential information [of the Miranda warnings] must be conveyed,”
Florida v. Powell,
559 U.S. 50, 60 (2010), the district court did not err when it
concluded that Youte received that essential information.
Finally, Youte argues that the evidence was legally insufficient for the jury
to convict him of making a false statement under
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). We
review the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal on sufficiency of the
evidence grounds de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the government.
United States v. Capers,
708 F.3d 1286, 1296 (11th Cir. 2013). “The evidence need
not be inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis except guilt, and the jury is
free to choose between or among the reasonable conclusions to be drawn from the
evidence presented at trial.”
Id. at 1297. We will not overturn a jury’s verdict if
any reasonable construction of the evidence would have allowed the jury to find
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
The false statement at issue is Youte’s statement to the customs officials in
his cabin that he was not transporting more than $10,000. Section 1001 of Title 18
makes it unlawful to “knowingly and willfully . . . make[] any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation” in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the federal government.
18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). In order to obtain a
conviction under § 1001, the government must establish “(1) that a statement was
8
Case: 17-13128 Date Filed: 04/16/2019 Page: 9 of 9
made; (2) that it was false; (3) that it was material; (4) that it was made with
specific intent; and (5) that it was within the jurisdiction of an agency of the United
States.” United States v. Clay,
832 F.3d 1259, 1305 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting
United States v. House,
684 F.3d 1173, 1203 (11th Cir. 2012)). The fourth
element—the only one Youte disputes—can be satisfied by circumstantial
evidence from which a reasonable jury can infer that the defendant acted
knowingly and willfully.
Id. at 1309.
We find that the jury could have reasonably inferred from the totality of the
evidence that Youte knowingly and willfully lied about transporting more than
$10,000. 5 First, Rodriguez specifically asked him if he had more than $10,000, and
he said no. Then, Youte failed to mention the Tide box as he was piecemeal
disclosing the money in his cabin—but in his later interview, he admitted that he
knew the box contained money. A reasonable jury could infer from this evasive
and inconsistent behavior that Youte must have known the box contained more
than $10,000 or else he would have been candid about its existence. The district
court did not err in denying Youte’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.
AFFIRMED.
5
Although the district court entered a judgment of acquittal on the bulk cash smuggling count,
for which specific knowledge of the currency reporting requirement was an element the
government failed to prove, no knowledge of any such requirement is needed in order to lie
about transporting $10,000.
9
