United States v. Ellisa Martinez , 800 F.3d 1293 ( 2015 )

Case: 11-13295 Date Filed: 09/03/2015 Page: 1 of 4
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-13295
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D.C. Docket No. 0:10-cr-60332-KMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ELLISA MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 3, 2015)
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, BLACK, Circuit Judge, and RESTANI, * Judge.
PER CURIAM:
*
The Honorable Jane A. Restani, United States Court of International Trade Judge,
sitting by designation.
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This case is before this Court for further consideration in light of Elonis v.
United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). We previously affirmed
Ellisa Martinez’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for knowingly transmitting a
threatening communication. United States v. Martinez, 736 F.3d 981 (11th Cir.
2013). The Supreme Court vacated the opinion and remanded the case to us for
consideration in light of Elonis. See Martinez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2798
(2015).
In Elonis, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the defendant’s
conviction under § 875(c), holding a jury instruction providing “that the
Government need prove only that a reasonable person would regard [the
defendant’s] communications as threats” was error. 135 S. Ct. at 2012. The Court
determined that “[h]aving liability turn on whether a ‘reasonable person’ regards
the communication as a threat—regardless of what the defendant thinks”—is
insufficient for a conviction under § 875(c). Id. at 2011. The Court cited “the
basic principle that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal,” id. at 2009, and
held that “what [the defendant] thinks does matter,” id. at 2011. While the
Supreme Court declined to answer the question of the exact mental state required
by a defendant, it held negligence is not enough to support a conviction under
§ 875(c). Id. at 2013.
Martinez’s indictment charged that:
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On or about November 10, 2010, in Broward County, in the Southern
District of Florida, and elsewhere [Martinez] did knowingly transmit
in interstate commerce a communication, that is an email form
response, to WFTL Radio, which communication contained a threat to
injure the person of another, in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 875(c).
Martinez moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting, inter alia, that it was facially
defective because it failed to allege she subjectively intended to convey a threat to
injure others. The district court denied the motion. Martinez then pled guilty to
the crime charged in the indictment, but, in pleading guilty, reserved the right to
appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to dismiss.
Martinez then appealed to this Court, asserting first that her indictment was
deficient because it did not allege she subjectively intended to convey a threat to
injure others, and second that § 875(c) was unconstitutionally overbroad if it did
not require subjective intent. Martinez, 736 F.3d at 984. We rejected both of these
arguments and relied on our prior decision in United States v. Alaboud, 347 F.3d
1293 (11th Cir. 2003), holding the inquiry for a conviction under § 875(c) is an
objective one—specifically, “whether there was sufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally made the statement
under such circumstances that a reasonable person would construe [it] as a serious
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm,” id. at 1296-97.
Based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Elonis, Martinez’s indictment is
insufficient as it fails to allege an essential element of § 875(c). An indictment
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must set forth the essential elements of the offense. United States v. Fern, 155
F.3d 1318, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 1998). This rule serves the purposes of (1)
informing the defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation, as required by
the Sixth Amendment; and (2) ensuring a grand jury found probable cause to
support all the necessary elements of the crime, as required by the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 1325. The indictment fails to allege Martinez’s mens rea or
facts from which her intent can be inferred, with regard to the threatening nature of
her e-mail. It alleges only that a reasonable person would regard Martinez’s
communication as a threat. Martinez’s indictment does not meet the Fifth
Amendment requirement that the grand jury find probable cause for each of the
elements of a violation of § 875(c).
In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Elonis, our holdings in Martinez
and Alaboud are overruled. Martinez’s conviction and sentence are vacated, and
we remand this case to the district court with instructions to dismiss Martinez’s
indictment without prejudice.1
VACATED AND REMANDED.
1
After remand, the parties were directed to file supplemental letter briefs addressing how
the Elonis decision applies to this case. Both parties agreed the case should be remanded to the
district court for dismissal of the indictment without prejudice.
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