United States v. Darious D. McDaniels , 602 F. App'x 763 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-13472
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cr-00516-SCB-MAP-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DARIOUS D. MCDANIELS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(March 11, 2015)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, HULL and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Darious D. McDaniels appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He argues that § 922(g),
which makes it illegal for certain persons to “possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm or ammunition,” violates the Commerce Clause on its face because it
does not define “commerce” as “interstate or foreign commerce.” Alternatively, he
argues that, under the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), the Commerce Clause requires a “substantial
nexus,” not a “minimal nexus,” between firearm possession and commerce to
support federal jurisdiction. In the event that we disagree with him and affirm his
conviction, McDaniels seeks a remand for the limited purpose of correcting
clerical errors in his Presentence Investigation Report and in the district court’s
judgment.
I.
Ordinarily, we review de novo the constitutionality of a statute. See United
States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). But because McDaniels did
not object to the constitutionality of § 922(g) before the district court, our review is
only for plain error. See id. To prevail under plain error review, McDaniels must
show: “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United
States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).
If McDaniels makes these showings, we may then exercise our discretion to correct
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the error, but only if it seriously “affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
McDaniels’ challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g) doesn’t make it out
of the gate. As he concedes in his brief, this Court has already rejected each of his
Commerce Clause arguments. See United States v. Nichols, 124 F.3d 1265, 1266
(11th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the argument that § 922(g) is unconstitutional on its
face because it does not define “commerce” as “interstate or foreign commerce”);
United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the
argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez rendered constitutionally
suspect the current “minimal nexus” test for federal jurisdiction). And we are
bound by those decisions until the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc
overrules them. See Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir.
1998). Thus, McDaniels fails to show error, plain or otherwise, with respect to his
conviction.
II.
Having affirmed McDaniels’ conviction, we now turn to the clerical errors
that he has identified in his PSR and in the district court’s judgment. Both
documents contain the same error: they state that, for his conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the applicable penalty provision is 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), as
opposed to 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). See PSR ¶ 70; Judgment [DE 47: 1].
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McDaniels seeks a remand for the limited purpose of correcting those errors. The
government does not oppose a remand for that purpose, but it asks us to order the
district court to correct some additional clerical errors in McDaniels’ PSR and in
the court’s judgment. Specifically, it asks that the PSR reflect (1) that McDaniels
was charged and convicted of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a
convicted felon, as opposed to possession of a firearm only, see PSR at 1, ¶ 2; and
(2) that McDaniels’ advisory guidelines range was 100 to 120 months
imprisonment pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines § 5G1.1(c)(1), as
opposed to § 5G1.1(a), see id. ¶ 71. The government also asks that the judgment
reflect that McDaniels pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition
by a convicted felon. See Indictment [DE 1: 1–2] (charging McDaniels in count 1
with possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon); Acceptance of
Plea of Guilty & Adjudication of Guilt [DE 29: 1] (adjudicating McDaniels guilty
as to count 1).
“[I]t is fundamental error for a court to enter a judgment of conviction
against a defendant who has not been charged, tried, or found guilty of the crime
recited in the judgment.” United States v. Massey, 443 F.3d 814, 822 (11th Cir.
2006) (quotations marks omitted). But sometimes that fundamental error is simply
a clerical one. Where that is the case, “[w]e may remand with instructions to
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correct [the] clerical error in the judgment.” United States v. James, 642 F.3d
1333, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011).
Because the judgment incorrectly states that (1) McDaniels was convicted of
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, as opposed to possession of both a
firearm and ammunition, and that (2) he was convicted under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e), as opposed to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), we
remand for the limited purpose of correcting those clerical errors. We leave it up
to the district judge to decide whether to correct the clerical errors in McDaniels’
PSR. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 (providing that, “[a]fter giving any notice it
considers appropriate, the court may at any time correct a clerical error in a
judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an error in the record arising
from oversight or omission”).
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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