Rickey Thompson v. United States , 608 F. App'x 726 ( 2015 )


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  •             Case: 14-10361   Date Filed: 04/09/2015   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-10361
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket Nos. 1:11-cv-21499-DTKH; 9:07-cr-80036-DTKH-1
    RICKEY THOMPSON,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (April 9, 2015)
    Before HULL, JORDAN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 14-10361        Date Filed: 04/09/2015       Page: 2 of 7
    Rickey Thompson, a pro se federal prisoner, was convicted of, among other
    things, three counts of second degree murder, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1111
    and 2. Specifically, a jury found that Thompson, as a Bahamian boat captain, was
    smuggling drugs and aliens into the United States, and murdered Roselyne Lubin,
    Alnert Charles, and Nigel Warren by ordering them to jump from a boat into the
    Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Florida, where they drowned. Thompson is serving
    a total life sentence.
    Thompson appeals the denial of his first 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion. A
    certificate of appealability was granted on one issue: whether the district court
    lacked jurisdiction to try Thompson for second degree murder when the acts at
    issue occurred within three miles of Florida shores. After review, we affirm. 1
    I. JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES
    Second degree murder is a federal criminal offense if it occurs within the
    “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 1111
    (b). For offenses in Title 18 of the United States Code, the United States’s
    special maritime and territorial jurisdiction includes, inter alia, the “high seas” and
    “any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
    States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular [s]tate.” 
    Id.
     § 7(1). It also
    includes the United States’s “territorial sea.” Antiterrorism and Effective Death
    1
    We review legal issues raised in a § 2255 proceeding de novo and the district court’s
    factual findings for clear error. Lynn v. United States, 
    365 F.3d 1225
    , 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
    2
    Case: 14-10361         Date Filed: 04/09/2015        Page: 3 of 7
    Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 901(a), 
    110 Stat. 1214
    ,
    1317 (1996); see also 
    18 U.S.C. § 7
    , historical and statutory notes). 2
    For purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction, the term “high seas” refers to
    “all waters seaward of the territorial sea baseline.” 
    33 C.F.R. § 2.32
    (a) (emphasis
    added). The territorial sea baseline is ordinarily the mean low water line along the
    United States’s coast. 
    Id.
     § 2.20. The “territorial sea” is “the waters, 12 nautical
    miles wide, adjacent to the coast of the United States and seaward of the territorial
    sea baseline.” Id. § 2.22(a)(1). In other words, federal criminal jurisdiction begins
    at the coast’s mean low water line and extends out into the sea.
    Meanwhile, both Florida and federal law recognize that Florida’s coastal
    boundaries extend three geographical miles into the sea. Specifically, Florida’s
    Constitution sets the state’s eastern boundary at the edge of the Gulf Stream or a
    distance of three geographical miles, whichever is the greater distance. Fla. Const.,
    art. II, § 1.
    2
    Section 7(1) states in full that “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United
    States” includes:
    (1) The high seas, any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
    of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any
    vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or
    to any corporation created by or under the laws of the United States, or of any
    State, Territory, or District or possession thereof, when such vessel is within the
    admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction
    of any” particular State.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 7
    (1). The AEDPA added that “all the territorial sea of the United States . . . for
    purposes of Federal criminal jurisdiction is part of the United States, subject to its sovereignty,
    and is within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States for the purposes
    of title 18, United States Code.” Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 901(a), 110 Stat. at 1317.
    3
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    Similarly, the federal Submerged Lands Act sets the seaward boundaries of
    each coastal state “as a line three geographical miles distant from its coast line,” 
    43 U.S.C. § 1312
    , and grants each state title and ownership of the lands, minerals, and
    other natural resources beneath navigable waters within those three geographical
    miles, 
    id.
     § 1311(a). The Submerged Lands Act also transfers to the states “the
    right and power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use” the submerged
    lands and waters, id. § 1311(a)(2), but it reserves certain rights to the United
    States, such as the right to use, develop, improve, or control the waters “for the
    purposes of navigation or flood control or the production of power,” id. § 1311(d),
    and all rights in and powers of regulation and control for the purposes of
    commerce, navigation, national defense, and international affairs, id. § 1314(a); see
    also United States v. California, 
    436 U.S. 32
    , 40, 
    98 S. Ct. 1662
    , 1666 (1978).
    In Murray v. Hildreth, the former Fifth Circuit concluded that a murder
    committed on or alongside a boat in the Atlantic Ocean, within 200 feet of the
    Florida coast near Dania Beach was committed on the “high seas” because it was
    committed on the ocean below the low water mark of Florida’s coast. Murray, 
    61 F.2d 483
    , 484-85 (5th Cir. 1932) (involving the predecessor statute to 
    18 U.S.C. § 1111
    ).3 Just as Thompson does here, Murray argued that the murder he was
    3
    This Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued
    prior to October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en
    banc).
    4
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    charged with committing was “within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the
    state of Florida.” Id. at 484. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument. The Court
    explained that, although the crime was committed within the State of Florida’s
    three miles of territorial waters, the statutory requirement that the offense be
    committed “out of the jurisdiction of any particular State” did not apply to high
    seas crimes, but only to crimes committed “on any other waters,” such as rivers,
    havens, and bays. Id. at 485 (citing United States v. Rodgers, 
    150 U.S. 249
    , 266,
    
    14 S. Ct. 109
    , 117-16 (1893)). The Court concluded that “Congress has taken
    jurisdiction of crimes committed on the high seas within the three-mile limit . . . .”
    
    Id.
     The Murray Court explicitly left undecided whether the State of Florida had
    concurrent jurisdiction to also prosecute the defendant. 
    Id.
    II. JURISDICTION OVER THOMPSON’S MURDER CHARGES
    Here, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to try Thompson for
    the three murders. 4 In the § 2255 proceeding, the district court found, based on the
    parties’ agreement, that the murders occurred within 200 yards of Florida’s shore,
    and neither party challenges that finding on appeal. Importantly, the trial record
    supports this factual finding and shows that, when Lubin and Charles drowned in
    August 2006, the boat was at least 50 to 100 yards from the Florida shore, and
    4
    Although Thompson did not raise this jurisdictional issue in his direct criminal appeal,
    see United States v. Thompson, 363 F. App’x 737 (11th Cir. 2010), it is not subject to waiver or
    procedural default. See Howard v. United States, 
    374 F.3d 1068
    , 1071 (11th Cir. 2004).
    5
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    when Warren drowned in December 2006, the boat was approximately one length
    of the courtroom away from the Florida shore, both times in water that was over
    the victims’ heads.
    Given that the murders occurred between 50 and 200 yards of Florida’s
    coastline, the murders occurred on the “high seas” and within the “territorial sea”
    of the United States, as those terms are defined by federal law. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 7
    (1); 
    33 C.F.R. §§ 2.22
    (a)(1)(ii), 2.32(a); Murray, 
    61 F.2d at 484-85
    . Thus, the
    murders occurred within the United States’s special maritime and territorial
    jurisdiction and were federal criminal offenses over which the district court had
    subject matter jurisdiction. See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 7
    (1) & 1111(b), 3231.5
    Thompson argues that because he committed his crimes within three miles
    of shore, Florida has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute him. Specifically, he
    contends that 
    18 U.S.C. § 7
    (1) bars his federal prosecution because it limits the
    jurisdiction of the United States to only those waters that are “out of the
    jurisdiction of any particular State.” See 
    id.
     § 7(1). This argument is foreclosed by
    Murray, which concluded that this particular phrase refers only to “any other
    waters,” and does not apply to the “high seas.” See Murray, 
    61 F.2d at 485
    ; see
    also Chambers v. Thompson, 
    150 F.3d 1324
    , 1326 (11th Cir. 1998) (explaining
    that we are bound by a prior panel’s holding unless that holding is overruled or
    5
    We need not, and do not, address whether the State of Florida had concurrent
    jurisdiction to prosecute Thompson for violations of its own laws.
    6
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    undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or this Court sitting
    en banc). Although Murray interpreted an earlier version of 
    18 U.S.C. § 7
     (then
    codified as 
    18 U.S.C. § 451
    ), the relevant language of the provision has not
    materially changed, see Murray, 61 F.3d at 484-85, and Murray’s interpretation of
    the phrase “high seas” is consistent with the current federal regulation defining that
    term, see 
    33 C.F.R. § 2.32
    (a).
    Thompson argues that the Submerged Lands Act conferred exclusive
    criminal jurisdiction on Florida. Nothing in the language of the Submerged Lands
    Act suggests that, notwithstanding 
    18 U.S.C. § 7
    , exclusive criminal jurisdiction
    over all waters within the states’ boundaries is conferred on the states. Indeed, the
    Submerged Lands Act does not refer to either criminal jurisdiction or criminal
    prosecutions at all. Further, Thompson cites no authority indicating that the
    Submerged Lands Act was intended to transfer to the states exclusive criminal
    jurisdiction over waters falling within 
    18 U.S.C. § 7
    (1)’s definition of the special
    maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
    In sum, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to try Thompson on the
    second degree murders counts under 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 7
     and 1111(b). Accordingly, the
    district court properly denied Thompson’s § 2255 motion with respect to these
    convictions.
    AFFIRMED.
    7