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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 16-16136
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cv-00430-MMH-MCR
NEHEMIAH WILLIAM FORD,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents - Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(February 14, 2018)
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Before WILSON, JORDAN, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 2008, Nehemiah William Ford (“Petitioner”) was convicted in Florida
state court of selling cocaine. After multiple postconviction appeals in state court,
Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 in federal district court. After the district court denied Petitioner relief, we
granted Petitioner’s application for a certificate of appealability on one issue:
whether the district court properly interpreted the state court’s rejection of
Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim as an adjudication on
the merits entitled to deference under § 2254(d). After reviewing the record and
the parties’ briefing, we agree with the district court’s determination.
I. BACKGROUND
In early 2008, Petitioner was arrested and charged with selling cocaine. 1 At
trial, the State presented testimony from the two undercover detectives who
described how they purchased cocaine from Petitioner, audio recordings from the
1
Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a) (West 2006) states:
Except as authorized by this chapter and chapter 499, it is unlawful for any person to sell,
manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver, a
controlled substance. Any person who violates this provision with respect to:
1. A controlled substance named or described in s. 893.03(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d),
(2)(a), (2)(b), or (2)(c) 4., commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
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devices that the detectives wore documenting their interactions with Petitioner,
testimony from the crime lab analyst who confirmed that the substance sold by
Petitioner was cocaine, testimony from a third detective who interviewed Petitioner
immediately after his arrest and testified that Petitioner admitted that he had sold
cocaine to the undercover officers, and an audio recording of that interview.
Petitioner cross-examined each witness, but put forward no evidence in his
defense. The jury deliberated for less than an hour before returning a guilty
verdict.
Within days of the verdict, on July 18, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion for a
new trial on the basis that the trial court had erred by not granting Petitioner’s
motions for judgment of acquittal made twice during the trial, by denying
Petitioner’s motion in limine to limit the testimony of the undercover detectives, by
denying Petitioner’s objection to facts not in evidence made during the State’s
closing rebuttal, and by failing to instruct the jury that Petitioner had to have
knowledge of the presence of cocaine to be convicted. The motion also asserted
that the jury’s verdict was contrary to the evidence and to the law.
The trial court denied Petitioner’s motion on August 14. After applying a
habitual felony offender enhancement for Petitioner’s past convictions, the judge
sentenced Petitioner to 30 years in prison. On January 23, 2009, Petitioner filed a
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motion to correct an illegal sentence, which the court denied shortly afterward on
January 27.
In June, Petitioner filed a direct appeal. Petitioner’s appellate counsel
argued only that the application of the habitual felony offender enhancement was
unconstitutional. Petitioner’s appellate counsel did not raise any of the claims
preserved in Petitioner’s motion for a new trial. On December 16, 2009,
Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed per curiam. Ford v. State,
23
So. 3d 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (table opinion).
On July 28, 2010, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging
that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claims presented in
his motion for a new trial. The court denied the petition in an opinion on August
25 that stated: “DENIED. See Pope v. Wainwright,
496 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1986).”
Ford v. State,
46 So. 3d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (memorandum opinion). On
September 8, Petitioner moved for rehearing en banc, which was summarily denied
on October 20.
Petitioner filed a separate motion for postconviction relief alleging that he
was illegally and vindictively sentenced on November 20, 2010. That motion was
denied on July 2, 2012. Petitioner appealed the denial. That appeal was denied on
November 9, and his subsequent motion for rehearing was denied on December 21.
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Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Middle
District of Florida on April 22, 2013. He alleged three grounds for relief, including
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, vindictive sentencing, and illegal
sentencing. The district court denied Petitioner’s sentencing-related claims, and
they are not at issue in the present appeal. For Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claim, the district court determined that the claim had been
adjudicated on the merits in state court and therefore analyzed the claim under the
deferential standards of
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The district court concluded that the
state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to nor an
unreasonable application of federal law and was also not based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts. Accordingly, the district court held that Petitioner’s
claim did not merit relief.
Petitioner then filed an application for a certificate of appealability (“COA”)
under
28 U.S.C. § 2253 with this Court. A member of this Court granted a COA
for his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim solely on the issue of:
Whether the district court erred in interpreting the state habeas court’s
reliance on Pope v. Wainwright,
496 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1986), as a
determination that the issues that Ford asserted appellate counsel should
have raised were nonmeritorious, and deferring to that inferred merits
determination.
Having been fully briefed on this issue, we turn to it now.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s conclusions on mixed questions of fact
and law, including whether a state court’s decision is a procedural ruling or a
merits-based adjudication. See Borden v. Allen,
646 F.3d 785, 808 (11th Cir.
2011).
III. DISCUSSION
The COA limits the issue on this appeal to whether or not the district court
properly interpreted the state court’s denial of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel claim as an adjudication on the merits entitled to deference under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See Murray v. United States,
145 F.3d 1249, 1250–51 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“[A]ppellate review is limited to the issues specified in the COA.”).
Under Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), defendants have a right to
effective appellate counsel. Overstreet v. Warden,
811 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir.
2016). 2 Whether the state court denied Petitioner’s Strickland claim on procedural
grounds matters because, if Petitioner’s claim was never adjudicated on the merits,
then § 2254(d)’s deferential review standards would not apply to the state court’s
decision. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (according deference to “any claim that was
2
“Under Strickland, a petitioner must show (1) his attorney’s performance was deficient, and
(2) the deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner’s defense.” Overstreet, 811 F.3d at 1287.
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adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings”). 3 Petitioner’s claim would
instead be procedurally defaulted.4 See Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 729–
31 (1991) (explaining the procedural default doctrine).
To determine whether a state court’s decision is a procedural or merits-based
ruling, the Supreme Court has instructed that “[w]hen a federal claim has been
presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed
that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any
indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington v.
Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). So, when a state court denies a petitioner’s claim
without giving a statement of reasons, there is a presumption that the state court
adjudicated the claim on the merits.
Id. at 98–100. This presumption may be
overcome “only ‘when there is reason to think some other explanation for the state
court’s decision is more likely.’” Loggins v. Thomas,
654 F.3d 1204, 1216 (11th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Harrington,
562 U.S. at 99–100). Accordingly, “we will
3
If a claim was adjudicated on the merits in state court, then a federal court may grant habeas
relief only if the state court adjudication either: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . or (2) resulted in
a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
4
If Petitioner’s claim is procedurally defaulted, he would have to show cause for the default and
prejudice from a violation of federal law to overcome the prohibition on hearing procedurally
defaulted claims. Martinez v. Ryan,
566 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2012).
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presume that the state court has rendered an adjudication on the merits when the
petitioner’s claim is the same claim rejected by the state court.” Id. at 1217
(quotation marks omitted); see also Shelton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
691 F.3d
1348, 1353 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n adjudication on the merits is best defined as
any state court decision that does not rest solely on a state procedural bar and . . .
deference is presumed unless the state court clearly states that its decision was
based solely on a state procedural rule.”) (quotation marks omitted).
Here, the state court summarily denied Petitioner’s Strickland claim in an
opinion that stated only: “DENIED. See Pope v. Wainwright,
496 So. 2d 798
(Fla. 1986).” Ford v. State,
46 So. 3d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (memorandum
opinion). The district court interpreted this to be an adjudication on the merits of
Petitioner’s claim. We agree. Neither the state court’s summary denial nor its
citation to Pope v. Wainright,
496 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 1986)—a case that denied a
petitioner’s Strickland claim on the merits and is commonly cited for the general
Strickland standard in Florida5—provides us with any reason to think that it is
more likely that the state court applied a procedural bar to Petitioner instead of
5
See, e.g., Baker v. State,
214 So. 3d 530, 536 (Fla. 2017); Serrano v. State,
225 So. 3d 737, 757
(Fla. 2017); Johnson v. Moore,
837 So. 2d 343, 345 (Fla. 2002); Delgado v. State,
174 So. 3d
1071, 1073 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015); Dill v. State,
79 So. 3d 849, 851 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012); Comer
v. State,
997 So. 2d 440, 440–41 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Irving v. State,
627 So. 2d 92, 93 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1993).
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adjudicating his claim on the merits. Thus, we presume the state court’s decision
is an adjudication on the merits for the purposes of § 2254(d). Accordingly, the
district court correctly interpreted the state court’s decision as a merits-based
determination and properly reviewed that decision under § 2254(d)’s deferential
standards to determine that Petitioner’s Strickland claim did not merit relief.
AFFIRMED.
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