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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
Nos. 16-16055; 17-13798
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket Nos. 2:16-cv-00463-WKW-SRW; 2:05-cr-00197-MEF-SRW-1
JOE CARROLL ZIGLAR,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent - Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(December 11, 2018)
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joe Carroll Ziglar, a federal inmate, appeals the district court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, which he filed after this Court granted him
authorization to file a second or successive such motion. Ziglar argues that the
district court erred in concluding that he was ineligible for relief under Johnson v.
United States,
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), from his Armed Career Criminal Act
(“ACCA”) sentence. After careful review, we affirm. 1
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ziglar pled guilty in 2006 to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in
violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Ziglar had four prior Alabama convictions for
third degree burglary; based on those convictions his presentence investigation
report (“PSI”) recommended that he receive an enhanced sentence under ACCA.2
ACCA requires a minimum 15-year prison sentence whenever a § 922(g)
defendant has three prior “violent felony” or serious drug convictions. See
18
U.S.C. § 924(e). (Otherwise, the maximum sentence for a § 922(g) offense is 10
years.)
1
In an appeal consolidated with this case, Ziglar also challenges the district court’s denial
of his motion for release pending appeal. Because we affirm the district court’s denial of his
motion to vacate, we also affirm the denial of the motion for release.
2
Although the PSI did not specifically identify the ACCA predicate offenses, the parties
agree that they were Ziglar’s burglary convictions.
2
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At the time of Ziglar’s sentencing, ACCA provided three definitions of
“violent felony.” The “elements clause” covered any offense that “has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another.”
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The next subsection in the statute
contained the other two definitions. See
id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). That subsection
defined “violent felony” as any offense that “is burglary, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.” The first 9 words made up the
“enumerated crimes clause,” and the last 15 comprised the catchall “residual
clause.” The enumerated crimes clause encompassed (and still encompasses) only
“generic” versions of the listed offenses—that is, offenses comporting with the
way “in which the term [i.e., burglary] is now used in the criminal codes of most
[s]tates.” Taylor v. United States,
495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990).
At Ziglar’s sentencing, the district court adopted the PSI and imposed the
ACCA enhancement without specifically discussing the predicate convictions or
which “violent felony” definition encompassed them. The court sentenced Ziglar
to the statutory mandatory minimum term of 15 years’ imprisonment. Ziglar did
not file a direct appeal; he filed an unsuccessful § 2255 motion to vacate based on
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
3
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After Ziglar’s first § 2255 motion was rejected, the Supreme Court decided
Johnson, in which it struck ACCA’s residual clause definition of “violent felony”
as unconstitutionally vague.
135 S. Ct. at 2557, 2563; see also Welch v. United
States,
136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016) (explaining that Johnson’s holding is
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review). Ziglar sought authorization
in this Court to file a second or successive § 2255 motion based on Johnson. See
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). We granted him that authorization, and he filed his
motion to vacate in the district court. The government agreed with Ziglar that
Johnson rendered his ACCA-enhanced sentence unconstitutional. It acknowledged
that, without the enhancement, Ziglar had “probably served more time in prison
than he will receive under a new sentence under his new guidelines range” and
requested a resentencing “as soon as possible.” 3 Doc. 5 at 14. 4 The district court
disagreed with the parties, concluding that Ziglar failed “to show that, at the time
of sentencing, his convictions for third-degree burglary under Alabama law did not
count as violent felonies under [ACCA]’s enumerated-crimes clause.” Doc. 12 at
34. Thus, the court concluded, Ziglar failed to satisfy the gatekeeping requirement
for the filing of a second or successive § 2255 motion and, alternatively, failed to
establish entitlement to relief on the merits. The district court granted Ziglar a
3
The government has since reversed course and now defends the district court’s rejection
of Ziglar’s motion to vacate.
4
“Doc. #” refers to the numbered entry on the district court’s docket in this case.
4
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certificate of appealability (“COA”) on whether he is entitled to challenge his
sentence under Johnson.
This is Ziglar’s appeal. Much has transpired during the pendency of Ziglar’s
appeal. A panel of our Court decided Beeman v. United States,
871 F.3d 1215
(11th Cir. 2017), which addressed a movant’s burden of proof to show entitlement
to relief under Johnson. A member of our Court sought en banc review of
Beeman, and as a result this appeal was stayed for several months. Rehearing of
Beeman en banc has been denied. See Beeman v. United States,
899 F.3d 1218
(11th Cir. 2018). Now that the mandate has issued in Beeman, this case may
proceed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“In a section 2255 proceeding, we review legal issues de novo and factual
findings under a clear error standard.” United States v. Walker,
198 F.3d 811, 813
(11th Cir. 1999). A district court’s determination that a conviction qualifies as a
violent felony under ACCA is a legal conclusion, which we review de novo.
United States v. Gandy,
710 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2013).
III. DISCUSSION
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), an individual who has filed a § 2255 motion to vacate is barred from
filing another such motion subject to a very limited set of exceptions, including
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that his claim relies on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.”
28
U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (requiring the new motion to “contain” such a new rule and
cross-referencing
28 U.S.C. § 2244); see
id. § 2244(b)(2)(A) (requiring a second or
successive habeas corpus petition to “rel[y] on” such a new rule). This
“‘gatekeeping’ mechanism” applies when this Court first authorizes the filing of a
second or successive § 2255 motion under § 2244(b)(3), and it applies again when
the district court considers the new motion after our authorization. 5 Stewart v.
Martinez-Villareal,
523 U.S. 637, 641 (1998); see Felker v. Turpin,
518 U.S. 651,
662 (1996) (explaining that § 2244(b)’s “‘gatekeeping’ system for second petitions
. . . applies to applications filed in the district court” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Only if an individual can pass through this statutory gate may a court
proceed to review the merits of his claim. The gatekeeping requirements are
jurisdictional, both in our Court and in the district court. See Randolph v. United
States,
904 F.3d 962, 964 (11th Cir. 2018).
5
Although we previously authorized Ziglar to file a second or successive § 2255 motion
in the district court, that authorization required only a prima facie determination that his claim
relied on the rule announced in Johnson. See In re Moss,
703 F.3d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir. 2013)
(noting that this Court may authorize the filing of a second or successive § 2255 motion “‘only if
it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the
requirements of’” § 2244(b) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C))). Our prima facie
determination was not binding on the district court, and it cannot bind us here. See
id. at 1303.
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As mentioned above, after the district court’s decision in this case and while
Ziglar’s appeal was pending, a panel of this Court decided Beeman v. United
States. The Beeman panel held that to prevail on a Johnson claim a § 2255 movant
bears the burden of proving that it is more likely than not that “it was [the] use of
the residual clause that led to the sentencing court’s enhancement of his
sentence.” Beeman, 871 F.3d at 1222. Put differently, the panel held that a
movant is tasked with “proving th[e] historical fact” that he was sentenced “solely
per the residual clause.” Id. at 1224 n.5. Cases decided after the movant’s
sentencing that exclude a conviction as a predicate under ACCA’s enumerated
crimes or elements clauses, the Beeman panel said, “cast[] very little light, if any,
on the key question of historical fact” of whether the movant was sentenced under
the residual clause. Id. According to the Beeman panel’s analysis, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Descamps v. United States,
570 U.S. 254 (2013), is unavailable
to those seeking relief based on Johnson who were sentenced before Descamps
issued because Descamps construed ACCA’s enumerated crimes clause and
therefore has no bearing on the residual clause analysis. See Beeman, 871 F.3d at
1224 n.5.
We are bound by Beeman to conclude that the district court correctly
dismissed Ziglar’s § 2255 motion to vacate. The district court, although without
the benefit of the Beeman decision, applied the same test the panel applied in
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Beeman. In denying Ziglar’s motion, the district court said: “[A]t the time of
sentencing in 2006, Ziglar’s third-degree burglary convictions qualified as violent
felonies under the ACCA’s enumerated-crimes clause, which is unaffected by
Johnson. Therefore, Ziglar cannot rely on Descamps, which he must do, to
disqualify his convictions under the enumerated-crimes clause.” Doc. 12 at 17.
We cannot disturb this determination. When Ziglar was sentenced in
December 2006, our precedent indicated that prior convictions for Alabama third
degree burglary could qualify under the enumerated crimes clause, if charging
documents, transcripts, or undisputed facts in a defendant’s PSI showed that the
defendant was convicted of “generic” burglary, or under the residual clause. See
United States v. Dowd,
451 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2006) (concluding that
charging documents and transcripts revealed that an Alabama second-degree
burglary conviction was for generic burglary and therefore qualified under the
enumerated crimes clause); United States v. Bennett,
472 F.3d 825, 832-34 (11th
Cir. 2006) (permitting the use of undisputed facts in a PSI to make the generic
burglary finding); United States v. Matthews,
466 F.3d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir.
2006) (acknowledging that a generic burglary conviction qualifies under the
enumerated crimes clause and explaining that burglary convictions not proven to
constitute generic burglary qualify under ACCA’s residual clause). According to
the undisputed facts in Ziglar’s PSI, which the district court adopted, Ziglar’s
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burglary convictions stemmed from his breaking into three churches and a
residence. These were “generic” burglary offenses within the meaning of ACCA’s
enumerated crimes clause, see Taylor,
495 U.S. at 599, 602, so at the time Ziglar
was sentenced, the district court could have applied Dowd and Bennett to deem
Ziglar ACCA-eligible under that clause. Although it is possible the district court
may have skipped this analysis and deemed Ziglar’s convictions to qualify as
ACCA predicates under the catchall residual clause, see Matthews, 466 F.3d at
1275, Ziglar cannot show that the district court more likely than not sentenced him
under ACCA’s residual clause given the silent record, Dowd, and Bennett.
Ziglar argues that the analysis in Beeman does not require us to affirm the
district court because he, unlike the movant in that case, requested an opportunity
to prove his claim at an evidentiary hearing in the district court. Under some
circumstances, this may make a case distinguishable from Beeman.6 Here,
however, Ziglar’s only arguments are legal arguments, not factual arguments that
could be examined through an evidentiary hearing. Ziglar does not argue that the
record of his sentencing proceedings may reveal that he more likely than not was
6
If, for example, the movant argued that something that occurred during the original
criminal proceedings evidenced the district court’s intent to employ the residual clause, an
evidentiary hearing may be useful in determining whether, as a historical fact, the movant was
sentenced under that clause. A case may also be distinguishable from Beeman if the district
court performed a legal analysis different from the one the Beeman panel adopted. Here, though,
the district court performed the same legal analysis used in Beeman.
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sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause; rather, he argues that under the law at
the time he was sentenced, the residual clause may have been the basis for his
sentence. Ziglar has nothing to gain from an evidentiary hearing because here, as
he did in the district court, he asks us only to review the state of the law at the time
he was sentenced. Our examination of that law reveals that Ziglar cannot meet his
burden under Beeman. 7
IV. CONCLUSION
We acknowledge that if Ziglar were sentenced today, he would be ineligible
for an ACCA-enhanced sentence because his Alabama third-degree burglary
convictions would not qualify under either of ACCA’s remaining clauses. See
Johnson,
135 S. Ct. at 2563 (striking as unconstitutional ACCA’s residual clause);
United States v. Howard,
742 F.3d 1334, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that, in
light of Descamps, a conviction for Alabama third degree burglary does not qualify
as an ACCA predicate under the enumerated crimes clause). We nonetheless are
bound to follow Beeman unless or until it is overruled or undermined to the point
of abrogation by this Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. United States
7
Ziglar also argues that the government should be bound by its concession before the
district court that he was entitled to relief under Johnson. Although we are troubled by the
government’s shifting positions in this case and others in the wake of Johnson, its earlier
concession does not bind either the district court or our Court.
10
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v. Brown,
342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003). Beeman dictates that we affirm
the district court’s denial of Ziglar’s § 2255 motion.
AFFIRMED.
11
